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Abstract 
Micro data have provided invaluable contributions to a better understanding of 
the drivers of, and factors affecting, wages, productivity and productivity growth. 
The literature in this area has highlighted both ownership and innovative activity 
as two factors that consistently seem to affect productivity and its dynamics at the 
micro level and the empirical regularity that larger firms pay higher wages. This 
thesis provides evidence on these issues. In the first chapter I investigate the im- 
plications of ownership concentration and the presence of financial institutions for 
productivity, using both accounting data and detailed data on shareholdings for a 
panel of quoted UK companies. I control for unobserved firm fixed effects and the 
endogeneity of inputs and ownership using GMM estimation. The second chap- 
ter considers whether nationality of ownership affects productivity. The analysis 
challenges previous evidence of a foreign ownership advantage in the UK by show- 
ing that the foreign advantage is by and large a multinational advantage, except 
for US firms. In addition, longitudinal analysis disentangles the sources of the US 
and MNE productivity advantage. The third chapter examines the hypothesis that 
multinational firms have access to larger knowledge stocks and quantifies how much 
multinationals' innovative success is due to higher innovation expenditure and how 
much to access to their intra-firm worldwide pool of information. The fourth chap- 
ter matches information on innovative activity with production data to investigate 
the link between innovation expenditure, knowledge flows and productivity growth. 
The results confirm the importance of knowledge flows for innovation and of in- 
novation for productivity growth. The final chapter of the thesis investigates the 
empirical regularity that larger establishments pay higher wages. The longitudinal 
estimates demonstrate that positive effects of firm size on wages persist after con- 
trolling for observed and unobserved worker, firm and match specific characteristics 
and correcting for non-random mobility of workers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The existence of differences in wages, productivity levels and growth rates not only 
across industries but also within industries is now a well known phenomenon in the 
literature. A second strong empirical result has emerged from the empirical evidence 
that this differences are not only large but also persistent over time. The evidence 
on the drivers of this heterogeneity is less clear cut. 
Understanding the sources of heterogeneity in firms' productivity and wages is 
a key question. This is because ultimately productivity can explain differences in 
countries' performance, competitiveness and living standards. As for wages, which 
affect income inequality, it is important to understand how much they depend not 
only on workers qualities and characteristics but also on firms' characteristics and 
wage policies. 
Micro data has proved invaluable not only for a better description of firms' 
heterogeneity in innovative activity, productivity and wages but also for a deeper 
insight into the drivers and understanding of the mechanisms that relate institutional 
and technological factors to productivity, growth and wage differentials. 
Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Tybout (2000) recent surveys of longitudinal 
micro level productivity studies identify four factors that consistently seem to affect 
productivity and its dynamics at the microlevel: technology and human capital; 
government regulations that affect incentives to innovate; (international) competi- 
tion on product markets that make firms learn more quickly about new production 
methods and technologies and firm ownership and management of firms. The first 
four chapters of this thesis attempt to analyse some of these issues, whereas the fifth 
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broadens the analysis to one particular aspect of heterogeneity in firms' wages: size 
wage differentials. 
Indispensable to applied research is the availability of good data. I was fortunate 
enough to get access to unique datasets at the firm, plant and worker level. Indeed, 
the order of the thesis chapters mirror the descendent order in terms of the level of 
analysis conducted: from companies in chapter 2, to plants in chapter 3 to 5 and 
workers in chapter V 
The next two chapters study the relationship between ownership and produc- 
tivity, where ownership is considered in two ways: Chapter 2 considers the impact 
of ownership concentration and identity; Chapter 3 focuses on foreign and multina- 
tional status of businesses. 
In the next chapter I investigate the empirical relationship between ownership 
structure and productivity using accounting and detailed shareholdings' ownership 
data for a panel of quoted UK companies. After controlling for unobserved firm fixed 
effects and the endogeneity of the inputs using GMM estimation, concentrated own- 
ership has a positive effect on productivity as predicted by principal agent models. 
Moreover, I find that the presence of financial institutions as large block shaxehold- 
ers has an additional positive effect on productivity. The rationale underlying the 
work in this first chapter is that sepaxation between ownership and control does 
affect firm performance because of principal agent problems. Agency theories pre- 
dict that since managers axe utility maximisers, their interests may conflict with 
shaxeholders' interest. When shareholders have small stakes or have very diversified 
portfolios, a free-rider problem axises: no shaxeholder has an incentive in paxtici- 
pating in costly monitoring or in engaging in active 'voice'; this leads to relatively 
weak control on the paxt of shaxeholders on managers, who do not behave as profit 
maximisers (Grossman and Haxt, 1980). Large shaxeholders, on the other hand, 
have both a strong incentive to invest in acquiring information and monitoring the 
activity of managers and have the voting power to control managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). 
This chapter uses a unique dataset obtained from matching the financial infor- 
'Chapter 3; 4 and 5 contain statistical data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) which 
is Crown copyright and reproduced with the permission of the controller of HMSO and Queen's 
Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorse- 
ment of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. 
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mation from Datastream with shareholdings' information from the CDA Spectrum 
Database. This database is unique in that it contains very detailed time series infor- 
mation for a cross section of listed companies on the concentration and the identity 
of the firm's owners. This allows, for the first time, the use of longitudinal ownership 
information to estimate the relationship between ownership concentration, the pres- 
ence of financial institutions as owners and productivity in levels. Previous studies 
only had cross-sectional ownership information and studied the relationship between 
ownership and productivity growth (Nickell et al., 1997 and Curcio, 1994), this is 
the first study that relates changes in shareholders structure to changes in firm pro- 
ductivity, certainly for the UK and to our knowledge in the literature. Finally, this 
chapter contributes to the policy debate on the efficiency of financial institutions as 
shareholders. In fact, institutional portfolios tend to be highly diversified. Thus, a 
high proportion of institutional ownership tends to be associated with a less concen- 
trated ownership structure, and institutional investors axe seen as relatively passive 
shareholders in the exercise of corporate control, preferring exit rather than voice; 
this would lead to a lower level of productivity, according to our model. On the other 
hand, institutional investors-tend to be better informed than other investors, and 
therefore could choose to invest in companies with a higher productivity potential, 
this could result in the data overestimating the positive correlation between insti- 
tutional ownership and productivity. Thus, with cross-sectional data and without 
additional information on firm's ownership structure it is very difficult to identify 
the presence of a causal relationship between presence of financial institutions as 
shareholders, controlling for the size of their investment, and productivity. In this 
chapter I find that the presence of financial institutions as large block shareholders 
has an additional positive effect on productivity over and above the effect of own- 
ership concentration. This result seems particularly relevant for Europe, where the 
scope for private insurance and non-state pension funds is becoming more and more 
pressing, but might be policy relevant in less developed countries where privatisation 
and the development of a full size stock market is still taking place. 
The third chapter considers whether ownership nationality affects productivity. 2 
The heterogeneity between foreign and domestic firms is the subject of many em- 
pirical papers in developed and developing countries. The confirmed advantage of 
2This chapter draws on joint work with Ralf Maxtin. 
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foreign owned plants relative to domestic has been used as justification for subsidies 
to attract foreign direct investment. However, the comparison of foreign direct in- 
vestors and domestic firms is flawed in that it does not compare like with like and 
this is particulaxly so in the UK, who is both amongst the largest receiver of FDI 
and a very active foreign direct investors. 
Indeed, previous UK studies using firm level data find that foreign owned firms 
are more productive than domestic ones. This could reflect a foreign advantage or 
an omitted variable bias: foreign firms are by definition multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), and MNEs are typically more productive than non-MNEs. 
The first contribution of this chapter consists of a discrimination between these 
hypotheses. Using a newly available dataset - the Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct 
Investment (AFDI) - it identifies, for the first time, domestic MNEs in a large scale 
UK plant level productivity dataset. The results show, that the foreign productivity 
advantage found in previous UK studies is mostly a multinational advantage except 
for US owned plants that axe the productivity leaders. 
This latter result is also a contribution to the literature in that it qualifies pre- 
vious findings by Doms and Jensen (1998): in their study using US data they also 
find that controlling for multinationality of the firms, US firms are the productivity 
leaders. However, since they identify US MNE firms on US data they cannot rule 
out that the leadership of US MNE owned plants is the consequence of a home ad- 
vantage. The results of this chapter establish the leadership of US MNEs in Britain, 
which shows that the US MNE advantage found by Doms and Jensen is not a home 
advantage. 
The third contribution of this chapter is to exploit the longitudinal nature of the 
ARD-AFDI panel to investigate the source of the US and multinational advantages. 
Indeed, the theory of multinational enterprises (MNEs) attributes the superiority of 
MNEs to intrinsic transferable superior firm specific assets - such as better manage- 
ment techniques and better production technology - that they can shaxe with their 
affiliates (Dunning, 1981, Helpman, 1984 and Markusen, 1995). At the same time, 
if multinational firms have better access to credit markets and enjoy a lower cost of 
capital, their advantage might also be strengthened if overvalued firms in the source 
country decide to use low cost capital to taxget firms abroad not affected by the same 
stock market bubble (the 'cheap capital' view of FDI, Baker et al. (2004)). This 
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might explain a better ability to "cherry pick" and take over the best firms in the 
host country. Finally, we can test a third hypothesis, that investing abroad might 
lead to improvement in the efficiency of MNEs domestic plants, through reverse 
learning effects (Branstetter, 2001). 
The longitudinal analysis - inspired by the methodologies recently applied in 
labour economics on matched employer-employees data - shows that the MNE pro- 
ductivity advantage is driven by sharing superior firm specific knowledge among 
affiliated plants and in the ability to takeover already productive plants; however 
no evidence is found that firms' decision to invest abroad leads to short-term im- 
provement in the productivity of domestic plants. The additional US advantage lies 
in the better ability to takeover the most productive plants, and indeed this seems 
in line with evidence for the same time period of a temporary overvaluation on the 
American stock maxket. 
Chapter 4 represents a further investigation of the causes of the MNEs superi- 
ority. ' It extends the analysis to the innovative activity of firms. Indeed, existing 
evidence, econometric and from case-studies, shows that MNEs are the most innova- 
tive firms, in terms of R&D spent and patents held. This is in line with the theory 
of multinationals which asserts that in order to compete successfully in a foreign 
market MNE firms must have some intangible asset that is easily shared among 
affiliates and that is too costly to transact in the market place (Hymer, 1970). 
The chapter focuses on the hypothesis from the trade literature that globally 
engaged firms-either multinationals or exporters-have access to larger knowledge 
stocks. Estimates of knowledge production functions for a cross-section of UK plants 
covering their operations from 1998 to 2000 show that globally engaged firms do gen- 
erate more ideas than their purely domestic counterpaxts. This is not just because 
they use more researchers. It is also because they have access to a larger stock 
of ideas through two main sources: their upstream and downstream contacts with 
suppliers and customers, and, for multinationals, their intra-firm worldwide pool of 
information. 
The study contributes to three different streams of the literature. Firstly, it con- 
tributes to the trade literature, because trade models of multinationals (Maxkusen, 
2002, for an extensive treatment or Carr et al., 2001, for an abridged summary) make 
3This chapter draws on joint work with Jonathan Haskel and Matthew Slaughter. 
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the crucial assumption that these firms are particularly knowledge intensive relative 
to purely domestic firms. Indeed, in this "knowledge capital" model multination- 
als axise via FDI largely because of the desire (and ability) to deploy firm-specific 
knowledge assets in multiple countries despite the co-ordination and set-up costs of 
multi-plant production. There is evidence of this cross-border intra-firm knowledge 
transfer (e. g. Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). However, this literature does not quan- 
tify the relative importance of these different knowledge inputs (e. g. R&D scientists 
and knowledge flows) using a knowledge production function framework as we do 
here. 
Secondly, this chapter adds to the debate in the macro growth literature in that it 
might contribute to shed light on the existence (or the lack there of) of a single global 
stock of knowledge "immediately available to be used in any economy" anywhere in 
the world (Jones, 2002 or for a similar argument see Paxente and Prescott, 1994). 
Although there is widespread acceptance of this framework of a production function 
for new ideas, there is very little evidence on its empirical validity. Indeed one of the 
open questions that remain in this field is the shape of the idea production function 
(Jones, 2003). The estimates in chapter three may help to provide some of the key 
parameters to answer this question. 
Finally, this research adds to the existing Industrial Organisation literature on 
innovation. The paper represents the first attempt to use survey data on innovation 
to analyse the heterogeneity in the innovative activity between domestic, exporter 
and multinational corporation in the UK. Indeed Chapter 3 fits into a relatively 
recent literature that analyses the 'black box' of the innovation process at the firm 
level (Griliches and Pakes, 1980) using as innovation output, beside patents, direct 
product and process innovations indicators from firm level surveys. 
Chapter 5 extends the analysis to integrate the knowledge production function 
approach used in chapter 4 into a system that estimates the determinants of innova- 
tion investments as well as the production of new knowledge, and then models the 
relationship between innovation and productivity growth. Chapter 5 performs this 
by using the information on innovation outputs and inputs from the Community 
Innovation Surveys, and matching it with production data from the ARD panel, for 
the manufacturing sector. Our approach is to use product and process innovation 
output measures and relate them to the inputs of the knowledge production func- 
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tion, and to productivity growth. This is a notable advantage relative to much of the 
previous literature. I can actually estimate parameters of interest in the knowledge 
production function and I can relate to productivity growth successful innovation 
outcomes, rather than innovation inputs, such as R&D, or innovation outputs, such 
as patents, that only capture a small part of the innovation activity. The approach 
adopted is similax in spirit to the models of Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (2000) 
and Klomp and van Leeuwen (2001). Relative to this research, our model adds the 
following features. Firstly, contrary to the models of Crepon et al. and Klomp and 
van Leeuwen, I explicitly consider the knowledge production function for process 
innovation; secondly, I introduce both product and process innovations, novel and 
incremental, in a total factor productivity growth regression that allows for imper- 
fect competition and non constant returns to scale. Finally, I try to control for 
possible endogeneity bias using information from past innovation surveys. 
Finally, the analysis in chapters 4 and 5, hopefully, contributes to future research 
from a different aspect. The present study does for the first time use the Community 
Innovation Survey matching it to both the AFDI and the ARD for productivity 
analysis. This has required a careful and time consuming process of data cleaning 
and matching, that hopefully corrected some of the initial inconsistencies of the 
data that, was the source of the dismissal by other UK researchers. I hope that 
the analysis presented here confirms that the data does have limitations but shows 
consistent patterns. 
Chapter 6 also exploits a unique dataset, the German Institut flir Arbeitsmarkt 
und Berufsforschung (IAB) employment panel, which might be seen as a predecessor 
of matched employer-employees datasets, to investigates why large establishments 
pay higher wages. 
The dataset is unique because it measures wages and sepaxations very precisely, 
and I have a continuous and precise measure of plant's size. For each worker-firm 
pair in the data I can independently follow the work history of the worker and 
the business life of the plant, its size, its past growth, its birth and closure. The 
data contains very useful information for studying the research question of size- 
wage differentials: beside a continuous measure of size, it has industry classification, 
location, the skill composition of the plant and its age. 
An attempt to account for the size premium using observable worker and plant 
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chaxacteristics through level estimation meets with limited success. Therefore, I 
apply fixed effect and first difference models correcting for endogeneity and self- 
selection issues. In the longitudinal analysis, the size wage differential is still sizeable 
and is quite similax to level estimates. I find that the wage change closely resembles 
the differential estimated in the level regression. The empirical findings demonstrate 
that positive effects of firm size on wages persist after controlling for observed and 
unobserved worker and firm characteristics. They suggest that although each of the 
explanations of size-wage differentials can account for some of the observed variation 
in worker wages, none can fully unravel the observed employer size-wage differentials. 
In the end, the unexplained premium remains large and significant. The chapter 
contributes to the existing empirical literature on size-wage differentials because of 
the richness of the data, but because it purges the estimate of the size elasticity from 
unobserved fixed firm and individual chaxacteristics, controlling for the endogeneity 
of size and the non-randomness of job mobility. 
Chapter 7 concludes. It reviews the key findings of this research and suggesting 
some policy implications. It discusses some aspects deserving further attention and 
illustrates the next steps that will be built on the work conducted in this PhD. It 
also suggest some ideas for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Ownership structure and 
productivity 
2.1 Introduction 
The basic neoclassical economic model predicts that ownership should have no ef- 
fect on firm performance (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, as early as Adam 
Smith in the Wealth of Nations (1776), economists recognised that the separation 
of ownership and control potentially leads to a conflict of interest between the man- 
agers, who control the firm, and the owners of the firm. At the beginning of the 
thirties Berle and Means (1932) suggested that an inverse correlation should be ob- 
served between the diffuseness of shareholdings and firm performance. Since the 
work of Berle and Means the consequences of the separation of ownership and con- 
trol have been the subject of a lively debate in the economic and financial literature. 
More recently, Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed a principal agent model to 
explain the modern corporation and the costs of outside equity and show formally 
how the allocation of shares among insiders and outsiders can influence the value of 
the firm. 
Agency theories predict that large shareholders have a positive effect on corpo- 
rate performance because they have both a strong incentive to invest in acquiring 
information and in monitoring the activity of managers and have the voting power to 
control managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). When shareholders have small stakes 
or have very diversified portfolios, a free-rider problem arises: no shareholder has an 
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incentive in participating in costly monitoring or in engaging in active 'voice'; this 
leads to relatively weak control on the part of shareholders on managers, who do 
not behave as profit maximisers (Grossman and Hart, 1980). An alternative view 
of the role of ownership structure is proposed by Demsetz (1983). He challenges 
the hypothesis that diffuseness of ownership has a negative impact on firm perfor- 
mance. He argues that the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought 
of as an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders. 
A diffuse ownership structure, if brought about by shareholders, should maximize 
shaxeholder profit, so that there should be no systematic relation between variations 
in ownership structure and variations in firm performance. The empirical studies 
about the relation between ownership structure and firm performance seem to have 
yielded conflicting results. 
The research has mainly looked at corporate governance and the effect of the sep- 
aration of ownership and control for firm value, with empirical applications mainly 
focused on the US (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Morck 
et al. (1988), to cite a few). Moreover, these empirical studies about the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance seem to have yielded conflicting 
results. 
Fewer studies have explored the relationship between corporate performance and 
(financial) institutional ownership. The reason why this is relevant is that financial 
institutions are likely to to be professional investors with better knowledge about 
historical returns and thus have different preferences for risk and returns from indi- 
vidual shareholders. They will look for diversification of their portfolio to diminish 
risk since they are accountable for the management of funds. Thus, a high proportion 
of institutional ownership tends to be associated with a less concentrated ownership 
structure. Indeed, there are dissenting opinions about institutional shareholder ac- 
tivism. It is argued that institutions are passive shareholders because they lack the 
resources and the incentives to be involved in corporate strategy of all their invest- 
ments, their individual share stakes are frequently quite small and they refrain from 
acquiring private information, preferring 'exit' rather than 'voice'. This, according 
to agency theories would lead to a negative correlation between firm performance 
and presence of financial institutions. At the same time, institutional investors tend 
to have greater expertise and be better informed than other investors, and could 
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therefore choose to invest in companies with a higher productivity potential. More- 
over, they axe likely not to have any ties to incumbent management. Thus, they 
can monitor managers more efficiently than small atomistic shaxeholders. Again, 
empirical studies on the role of institutional investors appear contradictory (see for 
example Pound, 1988, Brickley et al., 1988, and McConnell and Servaes, 1990, for 
the US; and Leech and Leahy, 1991, Curcio, 1994, and Nickell et al., 1997 for the 
UK). 
This chapter investigates if differences in productivity can be related to differ- 
ences in the structure of firms' share ownership, both in terms of its concentra- 
tion and presence of financial institutional investors. It uses a panel of UK quoted 
companies to study the role of concentrated ownership and laxge stockholdings by 
institutional owners for productivity. 
This research makes the following contribution to the existing literature. It 
investigates if differences in the structure of firms' share ownership can be related 
to differences in productivity, rather than market value. 
Productivity captures different aspects of firm performance from market value. 
First, any productive input that is fully compensated in the market may be related 
to productivity but unrelated to market value. Second, productivity captures cur- 
rent activity, while market value reflects future profits and associated anticipated 
value. Thus, the factors that affect current activity may be very different from those 
affecting future profit streams. One might argue that some factors inherently lead to 
" negative correlation between market value and current productivity. For example, 
" business with a new idea carrying a high market value may be actively expanding 
and investing in physical and human capital. Adjustment costs may imply that 
such a firm exhibits low current productivity (Abowd et al., 2002a). Third, most 
studies use as dependent variable Tobin's Q. ' The numerator of this variable, being 
the market value of the firm, is affected by the investors optimism, or pessimism, 
and expectations on future events, including the business' outcomes and thus partly 
reflects the value investors assign to a firms intangible assets. On the other hand, 
the denominator of Q, the estimated replacement cost of the firms tangible assets, 
does not include investments the firm has made in intangible assets. The firm's 
future outcomes are treated as if they can be generated from investments made only 
'Defined as the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement costs of its physical assets. 
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in tangible capital. Thus, performance compaxisons based on Tobin's Q of firms 
that rely in differing degrees on intangible capital would be distorted. 
Relative to previous empirical work in the UK, which analyses the relationship 
between ownership structure and productivity growth (Curcio, 1994, and Nickell, 
Nicolitsas and Dryden, 1997), we can use much more detailed longitudinal informa- 
tion on beneficial share ownership structure. Both of these two previous studies, 
Curcio (1994) and Nickell et al. (1997), had to rely on the implicit assumption that 
ownership remains constant at a particular level over the sample period and that it 
can be treated as exogenous in a first-differenced equation. Such assumptions are 
unlikely to hold over long periods. By contrast this study, exploits the longitudinal 
information on changes in ownership structure, available in the data, to identify 
the causal link between ownership and productivity. Also, the information on share 
ownership structure of the company is much more detailed than in previous stud- 
ies: the dataset, a panel for a sample of listed UK companies over the 1985-1997 
period, contains information on the identity of beneficial owners behind most nom- 
inee accounts for all registered shaxeholdings above 0.25% of a firm's total equity if 
there are less than 99 shareholdings above this threshold, or for the laxgest 99 reg- 
istered shareholdings above 0.25%. This allows me to investigate not only the role 
of ownership concentration but also to identify differences between type of owners. 
Finally, for the identification of a causal effect of ownership on productivity, I need 
to correct for the endogeneity of inputs when estimating production functions and 
consider the possible endogeneity of the ownership structure. To deal with both 
problems, I use the difference-GMM estimator, as introduced by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) that was adopted in both the Curcio and Nickell et al. studies but I also 
test the robustness of the results using the GMM system estimator as described by 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This e, stimator overcomes finite sample bias due to weak 
instruments in autoregressive models with persistent series with small time periods 
of the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator. 
Our findings show that, controlling for endogeneity, ownership concentration 
has a positive effect on productivity, thus supporting the predictions of principal- 
agents models. Secondly, I find that the presence of financial institutional owners 
among the larger shareholders has a positive effect on productivity. These results axe 
robust to the presence of serially uncorrelated measurement error and to alternative 
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specifications and estimation methods. 
The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 2.2 1 review previous UK stud- 
ies on the relationship between ownership and productivity (growth). Section 2.3 
describes the data and the sample. In section 2.5 1 describe the empirical model 
and our preferred estimation method. Section 2.6 reports the main results. Section 
2.7 concludes. Appendix A reports further details on the data, the sample and the 
ownership measures used. 
2.2 Evidence on ownership and productivity from 
previous UK studies 
There seems to be a relatively small empirical literature which examines the effects 
of ownership and control structures on the productivity of the firm. 
Previous papers that have investigated the relationship between the ownership 
structure and productivity growth in the UK are Curcio (1994) and Nickell et al. 
(1997). Curcio studies the relationship between managerial ownership of shares and 
firm performance, measured as market valuation (Tobin's Q) and as total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth using an unbalanced panel of 389 UK manufacturing 
companies, all with dual structure of voting rights, 2 over the 1972-86 period. The 
only ownership information available is the holdings of each director of the companies 
for the year 1981 or 1982. The study looks at the consequences of a dispaxity 
between equity and votes ownership of the managers and finds that managers owning 
more votes than equity has a strong negative effect on TFP growth; managerial 
stakes between 5% and 100% have a weak positive effect on productivity growth 
and concentration of voting power with respect to the equity capital of the firm 
has a weak negative effect on TFP growth. As stressed by the author himself, this 
result does not imply that voting concentration and productivity axe not related in 
levels; the analysis is constrained by the lack of time vaxiation in the concentration 
index. Given the lack of longitudinal information on the ownership structure of the 
firm, the study has to rely on the implicit assumption that management ownership 
2According to Curcio's definition, firms might have a dual structure of voting rights if they have 
issued different types of ordinary shares with different voting rights, share with different rights to 
dividends or if they have issued preference share with attached voting rights. 
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remained constant at the 1981-82 level for the whole time a company is present in 
the sample. Curcio justifies this assumption since managerial ownership is generally 
believed to be quite a sticky variable. A similar assumption underlies the study by 
Nickell et al.. 
Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden concentrate mainly on the issue of the degree 
of substitution between shareholder control, product market competition and fi- 
nancial pressure as discipline devices for non-profit maximising managers using a 
panel of UK manufacturing firms over the period 1982 to 1994. Information on 
shareholder control is available for only 125 of the 582 companies included in the 
sample. Following Cubbin and Leech (1983) and Leech and Leahy (1991) , firms are 
classified as 'owner-controlled' if a dominant shareholder owns a specified fraction 
of the company and as being 'manager-controlled' if the shareholdings are diversi- 
fied. In particular, shareholder control is included in the regression as a dummy 
variable that equals one if a dominant shareholder has aa (equals 90% or 95%) 
probability of winning a shareholder' vote if all other shareholders are assumed to 
vote randomly. Since this variable is available only for one year, the authors can 
only study the effect of the ownership structure, assumed to remain constant at the 
beginning of the period level, on the productivity growth of the firm. The results 
indicate that the presence of a dominant external shareholder has a significant and 
negative effect if the dominant shareholder is an external non-financial institution 
whereas it has a strong positive (3.2%) impact effect on productivity growth if the 
external shareholder is a financial institution, who can substitute for competition to 
discipline managers. This study has three main weaknesses: firstly the ownership 
information is only available for 125 firms. Secondly, it is only available for one 
year, thus hindering the authors to look at the relationship between ownership and 
productivity in levels. Thirdly, the measure of 'control' used hinges on the validity 
of the probability voting model as developed by Cubbin and Leech (1983) and the 
assumption of independent behaviour of shareholders when voting. Finally, a prob- 
lem of selection is introduced, since only firms that were 'alive' in 1981-82 - i. e. the 
only year for which the ownership information is available- can be considered. 
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2.3 The data and the sample 
2.3.1 The data 
The study uses a panel of UK quoted companies over the period 1985-19973. The 
data consists of companies accounting information from Datastream International 
matched with share ownership information from the CDA Spectrum database. 
The CDA Spectrum database contains the identity of beneficial owners behind 
most nominees accounts for all registered shaxeholdings above 0.25% of a firm's 
total equity (if there axe less than 99 shareholdings above this threshold) or for the 
largest 99 registered shareholdings above 0.25%. This means that it covers a large 
proportion of a firm's equity including relatively small shaxeholdings. 
Beneficial owners are classified within 8 categories: 'individuals'; 'private clients 
of banks'; 'non-financial companies'; 'Sepon Ltd"; 'pension funds'; 'insurance com- 
panies'; 'other financial institutions'5 and 'others'. This last category includes 
Church Commissioners, local Government bodies, Universities and foreign govern- 
ment agencies; thus this category mostly include 'non-financial institutions'. Nomi- 
nee holdings that cannot be attributed to any beneficial owner axe treated as uniden- 
tified. 
The ownership information was matched with accounting data from Datastream 
international for the firms in the sample for the 1985-1997 period. In the empirical 
analysis I always use the nearest available shareholding information preceding the 
beginning of the accounting period. 6 
The data presents two main drawbacks. Firstly, it only covers companies that 
are quoted on the Stock Exchange. Quoted companies are mainly large firms. Thus, 
our study might be affected by sample selection problems. Since I do not have in- 
formation on listing decisions, I am not able to correct for this source of sample 
selection bias 7- Also, the fundamental principal agent problem is likely to arise in 
3The data was made available by Steve Bond at the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
4the Stock Exchange clearing company, indicating a shareholding that is in the process of being 
sold 5In the empirical analysis the three categories 'pension funds'; 'Insurance companies' and 'other 
financial institutions' axe aggregated in the category 'financial institutions'. 
6in four cases the ownership is recorded within 27 days from the beginning of the accounting 
yeax 
711owever, the panel is unbalanced so that exiting firms axe kept in the dataset 
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public companies. Secondly, I cannot identify whether shares are held by managers; 
in particulax I cannot distinguish whether individual shareholders are somehow re- 
lated to managers of the firm or to the founder of the firm. 8. 
2.3.2 Sample 
Since for the analysis I need at least 4 consecutive years of available information, I 
discard those companies for which information is available for 3 yeaxs or less. I also 
drop those firms for which information on employment and wages is missing. More- 
over, I drop those observations for which real value added, real sales, employment, 
total real wages or capital grow more than 300% or decrease by more than 75% from 
one accounting yeax to the next. ' Finally, I break the series for those firms, whose 
accounting period was more than 400 or less than 300 days due to changes in end 
date of the accounting year. This leaves me with an unbalanced panel of 268 firms'O 
and 2395 observations over the period 1985 to 1997. 
Appendix A. 1.2 provides more details on the structure of the unbalanced panel: 
table A. 2 describes the structure of the sample by number of annual observations 
per company and table A. 3 reports the number of companies per yeax. 
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 reports measures of ownership concentration: column 1 for the whole 
sample, column 2 for the sample of small firms and column 3 for the sample of 
laxge firms-11 The table shows that larger firms have both a much higher financial 
institutional ownership and a more dispersed ownership. 
Row 1 measures concentration as the proportion of firm's total equity owned by 
the largest shareholder, row 2 by the largest five and row 3 by the laxgest ten share- 
holders. Using any of the three measures I can confirm that shareholding ownership 
8Some studies have attempted to account for possible connections between shareholders and, 
management by matching shareholders and directors' surnames. I axe not able to follow this pro- 
cedure using the information available since the category 'individuals' is constructed as a residual 
category as shown in table A. 1 in appendix A. 1.1 
9These outliers could be due to mismeasurement problems or to mergers and acquisitions 
10my unit of analysis is a firm, for which I have four consecutive years of information. Each time 
there is a break in the series I consider it as being a new firm. 
"Small (large) firms are defined according to whether the number of employees in the first year 
the firm is in the sample is below (above) the median firm in that year. 
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is much more concentrated in smaller companies. Row 4 reports an alternative 
measure of concentration: the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration with an 
average value of 0.06; this value reflects the fact that ownership is quite dispersed in 
companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange. This is consistent with previous 
studies and macro evidence from ONS. This is further confirmed in row 5 where I 
consider the proportion of shaxeholdings held in block greater or equal to 5%: this 
amounts to 38.14% in small firms and to a mere 17.45% in large firms. 
The second panel (rows 6 to 9) report statistics on the identity of large shaxe- 
holders. Rows 6 and 7 summarise the presence of financial institutions and individ- 
uals, respectively, among the largest 5 shareholders. Column 1 shows that financial 
institutions axe much more likely to be among the largest five shareholders than 
individuals and this is much more so in larger firms as shown in column 3. The 
opposite is true in smaller firms as shown by comparing row 6 and 7 in column 
2. A similar pattern emerges from row 8 and 9, when I look at the proportions of 
blockholdings greater or equal to 5% in the hands of financial institutions (row 8) 
and individuals (row 9). However, the difference between the presence of financial 
institutions and individuals among large blockholders is much less evident relative 
to row 6 and 7. 
Table A. 4 in Appendix A. 2 describes the distribution of beneficial share owner- 
ship between the 7 classes of owners for all firms in the sample, for small and large 
firms. The last row of the table shows that on average, I identify the ultimate owners 
for 66.32% of the total equity; this means that 66-32% of shares is in the hand of the 
largest 99 shareholders, or in holdings of more than 0.25%. This confirms the high 
dispersion of share ownership in our sample. A comparison of panels 2 (columns 3 
and 4) and 3 (columns 5 and 6) shows differences in ownership structures between 
small and large firms. Firstly, individual shareholders hold a much larger proportion 
of equity in smaller firms, whereas financial institutions are more present in larger 
companies. Secondly, the percentage of total identified equity, i. e. equity owned in 
blocks larger than 0.25% or by the largest 99 largest shareholders, is much higher in 
smaller firms. This indicates a higher concentration of ownership in this group. Ta- 
ble A. 5, also confirms that in our sample ownership is very dispersed looking at the 
distribution of out preferred six measures of ownership concentration and identity 
of large owners. Examining the six panels I observe that in large firms ownership 
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Table 2.1: Ownership concentration measures 
(1) (2) (3) 
aU smaU big 
(1) topl 13.68 16.69 11.11 
(12.11) (10.92) (12-47) 
(2) top5 34.74 43.17 27.53 
(17.55) (15.69) (15.76) 
(3) toplo 47.08 57.53 38.13 
(19.05) (15.85) (16.88) 
(4) Herfindahl 0.06 0.07 0.04 
(0.08) (0.08) (0-09) 
(5) block5 27.00 38.14 17.45 
(21.74) (19.19) (19.10) 
(6) top5ind 26.24 39.83 14.60 
(33.36) (34.76) (27.17) 
(7) top5inst 50.59 38.49 60.95 
(33.51) (30.81) (32.24) 
(8) block5inst 9.28 11.84 7.08 
(11.64) (13.58) (9.12) 
(9) block5ind 10.93 18.25 4.66 
(17.81) (20-45) LI2.06)j 
Notes: Reported statistics are unweighted averages and in italics in parentheses unweighted standard deviations 
calculated on the unbalanced panel of 268 firms and 2395 observations over the 1985-1997 period. Small (large) 
firms have in the year they enter the sample a number of employees lower (higher) than the median firm in that 
particular year. Row I refers to topl, the proportion of equity owned by the largest shareholder, row 2 to top5, the 
largest five shareholders and row 3 to toplO, the largest 10 shareholders. Row 4 reports summary statistics for the 
Herfindahl index of concentration, calculated as described in the appendix A. 1.2. Row 5 the proportion of shares 
held in blocks greater or equal to 5%. In the second panel: in row 6 top5ind measures the proportion of shares 
held by the largest 5 shareholders in the hand of individuals. In row 7 top5inst refers to the same measure but for 
financial institutions. Row 8 and 9 report the proportion of shares held by financial institutions (row 8) and 
individuals (row 9) in blockholdings greater or equal to 5 %. 
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is more dispersed and that the presence of financial institutions among the largest 
shaxeholders is much stronger. 
Table A. 7 describes the ownership pattern in our sample over the period 1985 to 
1997. The table shows that there are changes in ownership structure over the period 
under study. This is important for two main reasons: the estimation strategy relies 
on the time series variation in the ownership variables for identification of causal 
effects; secondly, the table confirms that the assumption that ownership is constant 
over time cannot be maintained in our sample. Rows 1 to 5 show that there is not a 
clear monotonic pattern in the concentration of ownership; this pattern is reflected 
in all the measures considered. After an initial increase with a peak in 1991 there is 
a decline in concentration. Rows 6 to 12 show the pattern of concentration taking 
into account the identity of the shareholders. Rows 6 to 9 show the pattern of 
individual and institutional ownership among the largest 5 and 10 shareholders: 
the statistics confirm the steady decline of individual ownership and the increase in 
financial ownership. Row 10 confirms the same pattern looking at the proportion of 
equity held by the largest individual shareholder. Finally, rows 11 and 12 show that 
the decline in individual ownership is confirmed when looking at the proportion of 
holdings held in blocks larger than 5% of total equity. 
This table, therefore, confirms that the assumption implicit in previous empirical 
work (Curcio and Nickell et al. ) that the ownership structure remained constant at a 
fixed level for the whole time a company is present in the sample, cannot be applied 
to our sample, in paxticulax when the identity of the shaxeholders is considered. 
A possible concern with table A. 7 is that the ownership changes may simply 
reflect changes in the composition of the unbalanced panel, rather than changes 
within survival firms. I investigate this issue further. I concentrate on the pattern 
of ownership concentration in a balanced panel of surviving firms over the period 
1987 to 1993, this sample includes 130 firms. In the top panel I look at the pattern 
of the variable 'top5', i. e. the proportion of outstanding equity held by the largest 
five shaxeholders. The pattern is very similar in the unbalanced and balanced panel, 
however the level of ownership concentration is much smaller in the balanced panel, 
this is likely due to the composition of the latter. In the balance panel I include firms 
that axe present in the sample from 1987 to 1993, i. e. I systematically exclude exitors. 
In our sample, exit happens because of takeover or bankruptcy; the probability of 
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either event is higher for smaller firms. Thus, in the balanced subsample I select 
laxger firms that, as shown in previous descriptive statistics, have a less concentrated 
ownership structure. 
In the bottom panel I describe the pattern of 'inst5', i. e the proportion of shaxe- 
holdings held by institutions in blocks laxger than 5% of the total equity. Figure 2.1 
shows that the pattern and the level of this variable in the balanced subsample is 
in this case very is similar to that of the whole sample. 
These descriptive results are in line with evidence found in previous empirical 
studies (Leech and Leahy (1991); Bettoni et al. (2000), Bond and Chennels (2000) 
and Bond et al. (1997)) estimates of ownership patterns for the UK stock market. 
The ONS report on Share Ownership confirms a downward trend in the presence of 
individuals since 1960s and a sharp increase in the presence of foreign investors 12 
and shows that pension funds experiences a slow growth in the 1980s and since 1992 
the proportion of shares has slowly fallen, probably due to increased maturity and a 
diversification into bonds. This patterns are accompanied by an increased dispersion 
of shareholdings in the UK. 
Since the empirical analysis will focus on the role of ownership concentration, 
table 2.2 shows the chaxacteristics; of firms with a higher level of ownership concen- 
tration in their first yeax in the sample". The table shows that firms with a higher 
ownership concentration are smaller, less productive, both in terms of labour and 
total factor productivity, and have less output per employee ratio. They are also 
less capital intensive. 
2.5 The empirical model and estimation method 
The empirical approach consists of estimating an augmented production function as 
reduced form of a system of equations which includes a technological relationship 
and a set of behavioural equations, which axe then substituted out. I therefore 
12that are part of the other institutions category according to our classification 
131 divide our sample into two groups by ownership concentration, defining firms with high (low) 
concentration those with an above (below) median level of equity held by the largest five share- 
holders in the first year they are in the sample 
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Figure 2.1: Treii(I of ownership structure in the sample 
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of firms with low and hieh level of ownershit) concentration 
EMP VAIEMP TFP SALESIEMP KIEMP_ 
low concentration 1868.50 19.85 8.38 63.91 12.81 
(12358.59) (22.01) (8.37) (87.39) (18.58) 
high concentration 482.50 18.89 8.00 58.61 12.24 
(1198.39) (21.26) (9.13) (98.12) (25.09) 
whole sample 928.50 19.50 8.15 62.02 12.38 
(6195.50) (21.59) (8.79) (93.31) (22.18)_ 
Notes:: The table refers to the a sample of 268 firms with 2,395 observations. Figures reported are mean and 
standa. rd deviation in parentheses. Firms are defined as low(highly) concentrated if the proportion of shares held 
by the largest 5 shareholders is below (above) the sample median in the first year the firm is in the sample. 
estimate an augmented standard neoclassical production technology: 
Yit = Y[AitF(Nit, Kit)] 
and 
Ait =e 
Ownit&tt7ivitmit (2.2) 
Where Y represents firm's output, A represents a Hicks' neutral shift parameter, 
N represents the number of employees, K the capital stock of the firm calculated 
using the perpetual inventory method, Ownit is a measure of ownership concentra- 
tion and/or identity of shareholders, Jt is a time specific component which I model 
with time dummies, 71i is a time-invariant firm-specific component, mit is a (serially 
uncorrelated) measurement error component. Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology 
I obtain: 
AitF(Nit, Kit) = AitNi"t Kilot (2.3) 
As shown by Blundell and Bond (1998), one can account for lags in adjustments 
of the production process and for unobserved characteristics that axe persistent 
over time but axe not fixed, such as managerial ability, by allowing for the error 
component vit to be (first order) autoregressive 14 . 
Plugging equation 2.2 in equation 2.3 and taking logarithms I obtain the esti- 
14This specification has an additional implication that it is important in justifying the estimation 
method described below. The presence of lags of adjustments to shocks is a behavioral theory that 
justifies the use of lagged levels of inputs as instruments for their growth rates, this answer a 
general criticism in Griliches and Mairesse. 
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mating equation, where lower case letters denote logaxithms, i. e. x= ln(X): 
yit = ao + anit +jAit +, yOwnit + öt + ni + vit + mit (2.4) 
where I allow for the autoregressive component in the error term: 
vit = pvi(t-, ) + eit 
1PI <1 (2.5) 
and yit is the logarithm of output of firm i at time t, nit is log number of employees 
and kit is log capital stock. The residual of the estimated production function 
represents the relative total factor productivity of the companies in the sample. 
Plugging (2.5) in (2.4) and rearranging I can rewrite the model using the following 
dynamic representation as: 
yit = anit - pani(t-, ) +, 3kit - p, 3ki(t-, ) + -yOwnit - pyOwni(t-, ) 
+PYi(t-1) + (Jt - P8t-1) + 17i(1 - P) + eit + mit - Pmi(t-i) (2.6) 
or 
yit = 7rinit + 7r2ni(t-, ) + 7r3kit + 7r4ki(t-l) + 7r5Ownit + 7r6Owni(t-, ) 
+7r7Yi(t-1) + bt* + 77i + Wit (2.7) 
subject to three non-linear common factor restrictions: 72 ý -7177; 74 ý-- -7377 
and ir6 = -ir57r7- I test and impose these common factor restrictions using minimum 
distance. 
Labour and capital axe potentially correlated with all of the error components, 
time varying and firm specific fixed effects, and possibly affected by serially uncor- 
related measurement error and therefore are treated as endogenous. To overcome 
these problems of endogeneity in dynamic panel models, a common approach is 
GMM estimation as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and adopted in previ- 
ous UK studies on the effects of ownership structure on productivity (e. g. Curcio 
(1994) and Nickell et al. (1997)). To control for the presence of firm fixed effects it 
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takes first differences, " then performs an instrumental variable estimation, where 
it uses lagged values of the endogenous regressors as instruments for the differenced 
equations. Since consistency of the GMM estimator requires lack of second order 
correlation and significant negative first order serial correlation in the differenced 
residuals, tests for first (ml in the tables) and second order (m2 in the tables) cor- 
relation are performed. The overall validity of the instruments is tested using a 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. 
The GMM estimator has been criticised in the literature, in particular for produc- 
tion function estimation by Griliches and Mairesse and Blundell and Bond, because 
regressors' first-differences are likely to be only weakly correlated with their lagged 
levels. 16 Indeed in highly persistent time series, as it is the case here as shown by 
table A. 6 in the Appendix A. 2, and/or when the number of time series observa- 
tions is moderately small, lagged levels will be poor instruments for first-differences, 
resulting in finite sample bias and poor precision of the estimates. 
Blundell and Bond propose a system GMM estimator for data with a large 
number of firms observed for a small number of time periods. The system estimator 
uses lagged first differences of the series as instruments for equations in levels, in 
addition to the lagged levels as instruments for the equations in first differences. 17 
In respect to the GMM first-difference estimator, the GMM system estimator has 
been shown (by Monte-Carlo simulations) to perform better in terms of efficiency 
and finite sample bias. The validity of the additional instruments depends on initial 
stationarity restrictions18 that must be tested using a Difference Sargan test for 
over-identifying restrictionslo. The power of the Sargan test for overidentifying 
15Nickell (1981) shows that the within-group estimator yields downward biased estimates in 
dynamic panels. Although the bias tends to zero as T approaches infinity, it remains significant in 
small samples. 
"Griliches and Mairesse note that many economic variables evolve in a random walk like fashion 
at the micro level. I thus consider the case when xt follows a random walk to illustrate the weak 
instrument problem. xt = xt-1 + ct where et is assumed to be white noise and Axt = ct, which 
results in xt-1 not being correlated with Axt. Note that this does not entail that Axt is not 
correlated with xt. 
17Arellano and Bover (1995) also show that efficiency of the differenced GMM estimator can 
be improved using the equations in levels. The system GMM approach as also the advantage of 
estimating parameters of regressors that do not vary over time. 
18These restrictions are: mean stationarity of the process; that the initial observation is drawn 
from the same underlying data generating process and that the first differences of the instrumented 
regressors are not correlated with the fixed effects, i. e. constant correlation between regressors and 
fixed effects (Blundell et al., 2000). 
19Since I treat labour and capital as endogenous I instrument them with their value lagged two 
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restrictions in the context of dynamic panel data models may be low (see Bowsher, 
2002). Moreover it might be difficult, as it is indeed the case in our sample, to find 
valid additional instruments. 
However, Blundell and Bond show that first-differenced GMM estimates of pro- 
duction function parameters after imposing constant returns to scale (CRS) axe very 
close to the system GMM estimates: imposing constant returns to scales reduces the 
weak instruments bias problems in the first-differenced GMM estimates discussed 
above. Blundell and Bond suggest that this is likely to be due to the lower persis- 
tency or the capital-labour ratio series relative to the levels of either capital or labour 
series. They therefore justify the practice of imposing CRS in the first-differenced 
GMM estimator, even though the restriction is rejected in order to obtain reasonable 
capital coefficient estimates. 
Thus, our preferred method for estimating the production function is the panel 
data GMM differenced estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) imposing 
constant returns to scale 20 and implemented using the program DPD98 (Arellano 
and Bond, 1998). When reporting the results I always report coefficients and stan- 
dard errors robust to heterogeneity from the first-step estimation, which has been 
found to be less efficient (Blundell et al., 2000) but more reliable for conducting 
inference. 
A problem when estimating the effect of ownership on productivity is the correla- 
tion between ownership and the error term component of the augmented production 
function. The main contribution of this study is the use of the time variation of 
firms' ownership structure to attempt to identify a causal effect of ownership on 
productivity. 
One possible source of endogeneity of Ownit is its correlation with the unobserved 
company specific effect: cov(71j, Ownit) :ý 021. As long as these different unobserved 
characteristics are stable over the period of time in which the firm is present in 
and earlier periods. In the robustness checks I use as additional instruments for the equation 
in levels A(Avat-1) and assume that the firm specific effects axe uncorrelated with the second- 
differences of the endogenous variable vat used as instruments for the equations in levels. 
20The assumption of constant returns to scales in this context is equivalent to the assumption: 
a +, 0 = 1. 21There might be a possible self-selection process of shaxeholders into companies with differ- 
ent productivity levels. Shaxeholders with different access to information, for example, may sort 
themselves into firms that axe systematically different. 
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the sample they can be differenced out and the time variation in the ownership 
information used to identify the causal effect of ownership on productivity. 
A second source of endogeneity maybe caused by measurement error in the own- 
ership variable. If I allow for possible measurement error, then E(vitlOwnit) 54 
0, and ownership is endogenous. Only ownership vaxiables lagged three periods 
and before axe valid instruments for the equations in differences, since E(vi, t - 
vj, (t_j)j0wnj, (t_j_,, )) =0Vn>2. 
In the empirical analysis I control for the correlation of the ownership variable 
with firm fixed effects. Moreover in our preferred specification I assume that own- 
ership is predetermined22 However in the robustness checks I show that our results 
are robust to controlling for measurement error. 
2.6 Results 
Table 2.3 reports coefficients estimates from an OLS regression of a static model23 
of ownership concentration on productivity. Ownership structure is assumed uncor- 
related with firm fixed effects and with idiosyncratic shocks. The top panel reports 
the effect of different measures of ownership concentration on labour productivity: 
the estimated coefficients are negative and significantly so for all measures used but 
topl. In the bottom panel I control for capital intensity: the estimated effect of 
ownership concentration is negative, but not significantly different from zero, for all 
measures of concentration used. 
These results seem to contradict the predictions of principal agents models. How 
can this be explained? I have already shown in section 2.4 that ownership of smaller 
firms is generally more concentrated. This fact is confirmed in table 2.4 where I 
report the OLS estimates of a regression of ownership concentration (using the same 
measures used in table 2.3) on size measured as log employment. In all columns the 
coefficient is strongly significant and negative. 
The heterogeneity between laxge and small firms must be accounted for if one 
22i.. e I assume that ownership structure is determined by past history and is not measured with 
error. Formally: E(vitjownit) =0 but E(vi. 10wnit) :A0 Vs < t. Lagged values of this variable 
axe valid instruments for the equation in differences, since E(vi, t - vj, (t-j)jOwnj, (t-n-1)) =0V 
n>1. 
23The static model does not allow for an autoregressive component in the error term and OLS 
does not control for the endogeneity of capital and labour. 
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Table 2.3: Effect of ownership concentration on productivity. OLS estimates (Dependent vahable is log real value added per employee) (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) 
topl toP5 toplo block5 block5inst block5ind 
Concentration -0.1951 -0.3938 -0.4131 -0.3415 -0.4741 -0.3408 (0.1730) (0.1258) (0.1135) (0.0987) (0.2249) (0.1258) 
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
topl toP5 toplo block5 block5inst block5ind 
Concentration 0.0395 -0.0872 -0.0963 -0.1032 -0.1878 -0.0853 (0.1188) (0.0885) (0.0828) (0.0725) (0.1611) (0-0944) 
Ln(KIN) 0.3370 0.3320 0.3305 0.3302 0.3328 0.3326 
(0.0253) (0.0258) (0.0261) (0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0257) 
R, squared 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel of 268 firms. The observations used are 2,127 from 1986 to 1997. All 
regressions are estimated by OLS and include a set of time dummies. Asymptotic standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary form are reported In Italics. In all columns the Dependent 
variable is log real value added. Concentration variables are measured as of the nearest available date prior to the 
beginning of the accounting year and they are: in column I topl, proportion of equity held by largest shareholder, 
column 2 top5, proportion of equity held by largest 5 shareholders, column 3 top 10 proportion of equity held by 
largest 10 shareholders, column 4 block5, the proportion of shares held in blocks larger than 5%, column 5 and 6 
block5inst and block5ind, the the proportion of shares held in blocks larger than 5% by institutions and by 
individuals respectively. 
Table 2.4: OLS regressions: correlation between ownershh) concentration and size 
block5inst block5ind 
0051 
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel of 268 firms from 1985 to 1997 with 2,395 observations. All regressions 
are estimated by OLS and include a set of time dummies. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation of arbitrary form are reported in italics. The dependent variables are: in column 1 topl, 
proportion of equity held by largest shareholder, column 2 top5, proportion of equity held by largest 5 
shareholders, column 3 top 10 proportion of equity held by largest 10 shareholders, column 4 block5, the 
proportion of shares held in blocks larger than 5%, column 5 and 6 block5inst and block5ind, the the proportion of 
shares held in blocks larger than 5% by institutions and by individuals respectively. 
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wants to explore the relationship between ownership concentration and productivity. 
If this heterogeneity does not only consist of differences in economies of scale but 
includes underlying differences in technological efficiencies, managerial and organi- 
zational structures, then, controlling for size and allowing for non constant returns 
24 to scale does not fully account for this issue. 
I try to control for unobserved heterogeneity between large and small firms, by 
controlling for fixed effects and allowing an autoregressive component in the error 
term. 25 
Table 2.5 reports estimates of equation 2.6 using the first-differenced GMM esti- 
21 mator and log real value added as dependent variable, imposing constant returns 
to scale. To analyse the impact of ownership structure on total factor productivity, 
I include different measures of ownership concentration. 
All columns of table 2.5 show that ownership concentration has a positive and 
significant effect on productivity: the long-run coefficients are remarkably similax 
across all columns, and range from 0.144, when measuring concentration using the 
Herfindahl index of concentration to 0.177 for top, 5 as shown by the coefficient 
estimated when imposing the Common Factor Restriction. The P-values of the first 
and second autocorrelation tests (ml and m2) show no second order serial correlation 
and the Sargan test confirms that all instruments are accepted. The COMFAC test 
for common factor restriction shows that the restriction is not rejected by the data. 
What do these result mean in quantitative terms? Let us concentrate on only 
two measures of concentration for sake of brevity: top5 and block5. As shown in 
table A. 5 in the median firm in the sample, the largest five shareholders own 32.77% 
of outstanding equity. If they increased to the concentration level of the firms at 
the 75 th percentile of the distribution, i. e. to 49.23, they would ceteris paribus 
experience a 2.9%27 increase in productivity, given our coefficient estimates. Similar 
24Unreported results show that the bottom panel of table 2.3 remains virtually unchanged when 
including log employment as additional regressor. 
25this controls for unobserved characteristics persistent over time but axe not fixed, such as 
managerial ability. 
26As a robustness checks I report results when the dependent vaxiable is log real sales rather 
than log real value added. To deflate sales and value added I use the producer price index for 
firms in the manufacturing industries and the retail price index for firms in the service sector. I 
checked the robustness of the results to this choice by deflating sales and value added using the 
GDP deflator. 
27The result is obtained by calculating the difference between 49.23 and 32.77 and multiplying 
it by the estimated coefficient, i. e. 0.165*0.177. 
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Table 2.5: Effect of ownership on productivity 
(Dependent variable is log real value added per employee) 
(2) (3) (4) 
top5 toplo block5 Herf 
ln(KIN)t 0.134 0.135 0.141 0.127 
(0-094) (0-094) (0.093) (0.097) 
ln(KIN)(t-l) -0.017 -0.018 -0.022 -0.006 (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.073) 
Ownership Concentrationt 0.184 0.147 0.179 0.185 
(0-054) (0.055) (0-042) (0.100) 
Ownership Concentrationt-, 0.016 0.034 0.028 0.019 
(0.054) (0.053) (0-046) (0-094) 
ln(VAIN)(t-l) 0.278 0.282 0.274 0.292 
(0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097) 
Wald 0.003 0.016 0.000 0.146 
ml 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 0.178 0.175 0.147 0.185 
Saxgan 92.08 92.62 91.567 91.530 
df 84 84 84 84 
p-Saxgan 0.256 0.244 0.268 0.269 
In(KIN) 0.151 0.144 0.173 0.155 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.090) 
Ownership Concentration 0.177 0.149 0.168 0.144 
(0.051) (0.052) (0-041) (0.078) 
P 0.294 0.342 0.294 0.310 
(0.085) (0.080) (0.086) (0.084) 
Comfac 0.341 0.362 0.189 0.571 
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel of 268 firms. The observations used are 1,591 from 1988 to 1997. All 
regressions are estimated using DPD98 and include a set of time dummies. Asymptotic standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary form are reported in italics. Coefficients and robust standard 
errors are computed from the first-step estimates. 
All Columns are estimated by first-differenced GMM estimator. The instruments used for the differenced equation 
are: Vat-2, vat-3, vat-4; kt-2, kt-3, kt-4; nt-2, nt-3, nt-4 and Ownt-I, Ownt-2- MI and M2 report p-values 
of tests for first order and second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals that are distributed as N(0,1) 
under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, computed from two-step 
estimates, is asymptotically distributed as a X2 under the null of instruments validity. degrees of freedom and 
p-values are also reported. 
The second set of estimates are obtained using minimum distance estimators imposing common factor restrictions, 
that are tested using a X2 test, whose p-value is reported as Comfac. 
ownership concentration is measured: in Column I by the percentage of equity shares held by the largest 5 
shareholders; in column 2 by the percentage of equity shares held by the largest 10 shareholders; in column 3 by 
the percentage of shares held blockholdings greater or equal to 5%; in column 4 by the Herfindahl index of 
concentration (the construction of this measure is described in more detail in appendix A. 1.2. 
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calculations for block5 show that moving from the median to the 75 th percentile leads 
to an increase in productivity of 3.7%. These effects seem therefore quantitatively 
important. 
The second question I aim to answer is whether the identity of the owner plays an 
additional role for productivity. Table 2.6 reports the results. Columns 1 and 2 show 
that the proportion of shares held by institutions among the laxgest five shareholders 
has an additional positive effect on productivity conditional on ownership concen- 
tration (measured in column 1 as top5 and in column 2 as block5): the long-term 
coefficients on this vaxiables are positive and significant. This result is confirmed 
in columns 3 and 4, where to measure the additional effect of a strong presence of 
financial institutions, I look at institutional holdings in blocks laxger than 5%: in 
both columns the estimated coefficients are positive, even if the coefficient is only 
significant at the 15% level in column 4. 
The fact that the presence of controlling institutions increases productivity con- 
firm is in line with previous work of Nickell et al. (1997) and of Leech and Leahy 
(1991), but seems at odds with past evidence on British corporate governance of 
passive monitoring by institutions (Lai and Sudarsanam, 1998, Faccio and Lasfer, 
2000). However, the beneficial impact on firm performance of institutional investors 
compares favorably to evidence from the US (Caxleton et al., 1998, del Guercio and 
Hawkins, 1999). 
2.6.1 Robustness checks 
Table 2.7 reports robustness checks. In table 2.5 1 assumed weak exogeneity of the 
ownership variables and I did not control for possible measurement error. In column 
11 report the estimates obtained in column 1 of table 2.5 for reference. Column 2 
of table 2.7 shows that the result is robust to the presence of measurement error. 
Moreover, the point estimate of the top5 coefficient is not significantly different from 
the one estimated without controlling for measurement error and the differenced 
Sargan test, reported at the bottom of the column, cannot reject the assumption 
that there is no serially uncorrelated measurement error in the ownership variable. " 
281 can test the presence of measurement error using differenced Sargan test. The moment con- 
ditions axe overidentifying restrictions and the set of moment conditions under weaker assumptions 
is a strict subset of the set of moment conditions under stronger assumptions (see Bond, 2002). 
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Table 2.6: The role of shareholders' identity on productivity 
(Dependent vaxiable is log real value added per employee) 
(2) (3) (4) 
top5inst block5inst 
toP5 block5 toP5 block5 
In(KIN)t 0.138 0.146 0.138 0.143 
(0-094) (0.093) (0-094) (0-094) 
In(KIN)(t-1) -0.015 -0.020 -0.014 -0.019 (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
Ownership Concentrationt 0.217 0.198 0.148 0.153 
(0.054) (0-042) (0.055) (0.047) 
Ownership Concentrationt-1 0.018 0.025 -0.007 0.006 
(0.058) (0-049) (0.054) (0-049) 
Institutions as large ownerst 0.049 0.045 0.126 0.083 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.050) (0.053) 
Institutions as large ownerst-1 0.002 0.001 0.068 0.061 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.056) (0.058) 
In(VAIN)(t-1) 0.277 0.275 0.277 0.275 
(0.095) (0-094) (0.095) (0.095) 
ml 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 0.203 0.165 0.198 0.164 
Saxgan 91.554 90.967 92.55 92.05 
df 84 84 84 84 
p--Sargan 0.269 0.283 0.245 0.257 
In(KIN) 0.153 0.175 0.158 0.171 
(0.089) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088) 
Ownership Concentration 0.208 0.189 0.134 0.139 
(0.051) (0-041) (0.052) (0-046) 
Institutions as large owners 0.047 0.050 0.112 0.076 
(0-024) (0.025) (0.050) (0.053) 
P 0.293 0.289 0.335 0.328 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.080) (0.081) 
Comfac 0.470 0.337 0.226 0.19 
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel of 268 firms. The observations used are 1,591 from 1988 to 1997. All 
regressions are estimated using DPD98 and include a set of time dummies. Asymptotic standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary form are reported in italics. Coefficients and robust standard 
errors are computed from the first-step estimates. All Columns are estimated by first-differenced GMM estimator. 
The instruments used for the differenced equation are: vat-2, vat-3, vat-4; kt-2, kt-3, kt-4; nt-2, nt-3, nt-4 
and Ownt-j, Ownt-2- MI and M2 report p-vaJues of tests for first order and second order serial correlation in the 
differenced residuals that are distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions, computed from two-step estimates, is asymptotically distributed as a X2 under the null 
of instruments validity. degrees of freedom and p-values are also reported. 
The second set of estimates are obtained using minimum distance estimators imposing common factor restrictions, 
that are tested using a X2 test, whose p-value is reported as Comfac. 
ownership concentration is measured: in Column 1 and column 3 by the percentage of equity shares held by the 
largest 5 shareholders; in column 2 and column 4 by the percentage of shares held blockholdings greater or equal 
to 5%. The variable 'Institutions as large owners' is measured in column 1 and 2 by the proportion of equity held 
by the largest 5 shareholders in the hand of financial institutions; in column 3 and 4 by the percentage of shares 
held by financial institutions in blockholdings greater or equal to 5%. 
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Column 3 reports System GMM estimates. As discussed in section 2.5 these 
are more efficient conditional on the validity of the additional instruments for the 
equations in levels. In our sample finding valid additional instruments has proven 
extremely difficult. I finally used the lagged second difference of value added as 
additional. Both Sargan and difference-Saxgan tests do not reject the validity of the 
additional instrument. Reassuringly, the long term point estimate is not significantly 
different than the one in column 1 (estimated using differenced-GMM). 
In column 41 further check the robustness of our results to the adoption of 
different specifications of the baseline production function: following Nickell (1996), 
I estimate a dynamic production function that includes as a right-hand side vaxiable 
the lag of output. 
yit = ao + pyi(t-1) + a(1 - p)lit + ß(1 - p)kit + -yOwnit + ät + 77i + vit + mit (2.8) 
where I include the lagged dependent variable as regressor to account for adjustment 
lags in the production functions. The estimated coefficient on our preferred measure 
of ownership concentration is still a positive and significant 0.193. 
Column 5 includes 19 industry dummieS29 to take into account industry specific 
shocks. Firms in different industries might be affected by different shocks because 
of technological opportunities, specific demand shocks, competition and industrial 
relation practices. " The estimated coefficient does not significantly differ from that 
reported in column 1. 
Finally, in unreported analysis I have also checked for the robustness of my 
results to the use of real sales as alternative measure of output and to the use of the 
GDP deflator to deflate value added; the results are robust to both checks. 
Thus, I can test the validity of the additional moment conditions under the stronger assumption of 
endogeneity due to measurement error using differenced Sargan tests. I construct the differenced 
Sargan test, as the difference between the Sargan value under weak exogeneity and the Sargan 
value under endogeneity. Under the null, the statistic is distributed as aX2 with degrees of free- 
dom the difference between the degrees of freedom of the two Sargan tests. However, as a caveat, 
I notice that the Sargan test might not detect the presence of measurement error because of the 
insignificance of the coefficient on the lagged ownership variable. 
291 assign each of the firm to the sample to the industry in which it has the laxgest amount of 
sales. However, one must consider that most of our firms axe large conglomerates operating in 
more than one sector at the same time. 
301n unreported results, I try to control for industry effects both by including year industry 
interaction dummies and dividing those firms whose main industry is manufacturing from those in 
the service sector: the coefficient on ownership concentration is still positive and significant. 
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Table 2.7: Robustness checks (1) (2) - (3) (4) (5) 
top5 Meas. Effvr System Nickell Indwtry 
ln(KIN)t 0.134 0.152 0.188 0.120 0.161 
(0-094) (0.085) (0.080) (0.074) (0.088) 
Qn(K1N)(t-j) -0.017 -0.042 -0.033 -0.012 
(0-070) (0.060) (0.078) (0.072) 
top5t 0.184 0.394 0.162 0.193 0.182 
(0.054) (0.195) (0.061) (0.056) (0.055) 
top5t-1 0.016 0.063 0.003 0.021 
(0-054) (0.125) (0.059) (0.053) 
ln(VAIN)(t-l) 0.278 0.246 0.477 0.275 0.296 
(0.095) (0-094) (0.095) (0.090) (0.089) 
Wald 0.003 0.049 0.028 0.003 
MI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 0.178 0.144 0.375 0.200 0.198 
Sargan 92.08 109.044 106.916 92.886 92.047 
df 84 101 94 85 84 
p-Sargan 0.256 0.275 0.171 0.262 0.257 
In(KIN) 0.151 0.155 0.214 0.183 
(0.089) (0.083) (0.072) (0.084) 
tOP5 0.177 0.384 0.142 0.176 
(0.051) (0.192) (0-054) (0.052) 
p 0.294 0.286 0.532 0.333 
(0.085) (0.087) (0-080) (0.077) 
Comfac: 0.341 0.416 0.154 0.246 
Dif Sargan 16.967 14.030 
df 17 9 
p-Dif Sargan 0.457 0.138 
Notes time dummies are included in all models. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
Coefficients and robust standard errors are computed from the first-step estimates. Column 1 replicates estimates 
as in column 1 of table 2.5. Column 2 reports estimates of equation 2.6 controlling for measurement error. 
Instrument used in column 2 are vat-2, vat-3, vat-4; kt-2, kt-3, kt-4; nt-2, nt-3, nt-4 and Ownet-3, Ownt-4- 
Column 3 estimates equation 2.6 using system GMM. Instrument used are for the equations in differences vat-2, 
vat-3, vat-4; kt-2, kt-3, kt-4; nt-2, nt-3, nt-4 and Ownt-I, Ownt-2; for the level equations A(Avat-1) . 
Column 4 reports estimates of equation 2.8. Column 5 includes 19 industry dummies. Column 6 is estimated on a 
sample of 134 firms (709 observations) with below the median number of total employees, taking as the median the 
size reported for the firm in the first year that it is present in the sample; column 7 is estimated on a sample of 134 
large firms, 882 observations. 
Mi and M2 report p-values of tests for first order and second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals 
that are distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan and Difference Sargan tests of 
overidentifying restrictions, computed from two-step estimates, are asymptotically distributed as a X2 under the 
null of instruments validity. degrees of freedom and p-values are also reported. 
The second set of estimates are obtained using minimum distance estimators imposing common factor restrictions, 
that are tested using a X2 test, whose p-value is reported as Comfac. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
The chapter aimed to answer the question: does the separation of ownership and 
control have a negative effect on productivity, as predicted by by principal-agents 
models? 
To answer this question, I used an unbalanced panel of UK listed firms with 
detailed information on beneficial ownership. This is unique data that contain very 
detailed time series information for a cross section of listed companies on the con- 
centration and the identity of the firms' owners. 
Previous literature has analysed the relationship between ownership and firm 
market value (for example Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, and Morck et al., 1988) and 
ownership and productivity growth (Nickell et al., 1997, and Curcio, 1994). This is 
the first study that relates shareholdings' structure and firm efficiency, certainly for 
the UK and to my knowledge, in the literature. 
The results show that OLS estimates, that do not control for unobserved hetero- 
geneity among firms, are likely to find a negative or insignificant effect of ownership 
concentration on productivity. After controlling for unobserved firm fixed effects 
and the endogeneity of the inputs using GMM estimation, concentrated ownership 
has a positive effect on productivity as predicted by principal agent models. More- 
over, I find that the presence of financial institutions as laxge blockholders; has an 
additional positive effect on productivity, conditional on concentration. Finally, I 
show that these findings axe robust to alternative specifications of the production 
function and to the presence of measurement error in the ownership variable. 
These results contribute to the policy debate on the efficiency of financial institu- 
tions as shareholders. It seems particularly relevant for Europe, where the scope for 
private insurance and non-state pension funds is becoming more and more pressing, 
but might be policy relevant in less developed countries where privatisation and the 
development of a full size stock market is still taking place. 
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Chapter 3 
Multinationals and US 
productivity leadership 
3.1 Introduction 
International comparisons show that the US is the world's most productive economy' 
and much research has gone into understanding the determinants of this productiv- 
ity leadership. There are two broad categories of factors that could be responsible 
for this success: on the one hand the business environment and on the other firm 
or plant speciflc factors. The business environment comprises the quality of a coun- 
try's workforce, the efficiency of public infrastructure as well as geographical advan- 
tages. Firm and plant specific factors include more efficient production processes 
and management techniques, better marketing or more valuable patents or brands. 
Plant level studies of business units located in the same country but owned by firms 
of different nationalities can potentially distinguish between these two hypotheses. 
Since the business environment is the same for all plants in the sample, any observed 
productivity differences axe due to differences in plant or firm specific factors. 
When examining foreign ownership effects such as the suggested US advantage 
in plant level datasets we have to be careful in choosing our comparison group. For 
various countries - including the US - researchers' have found that foreign owned 
'see for example O'Mahony and de Boer (2002) 
2 For the UK Griffith (1999), Griffith and Simpson (2001), Oulton (2000) and Harris (1999) 
using the ARD; Conyon et al. (2002) using firm level data; Davies and Lyons (1991) using industry 
level data. Doms and Jensen's study 1998 for the US. Lipsey and Sjoholm's study 2002 documents 
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firms axe on average more productive than domestic ones. However, since foreign 
owned plants are by definition part of a multinational enterprise (MNE) whereas 
only a small fraction of domestic firms are multinational, this might reflect a general 
MNE advantage rather than country specific advantages. Several theoretical studies 
3 starting with Dunning (1981), have explained from where such an MNE advantage 
might derive: setting up abroad is likely to be more expensive than setting up at 
home. Factors such as language barriers and ignorance of local business networks 
give foreign firms a disadvantage. If they nevertheless manage to stay in business, 
they must have superior firm specific assets - such as better management techniques 
and better production technology - that they can share with their affiliates. 
Therefore, in order to compare like with like we need to compare US MNEs 
with other - domestic and foreign - MNEs. While foreign ownership identifiers axe 
commonly included in plant level productivity datasets, data that would allow the 
identification of domestic MNEs has been scarce. Doms and Jensen (1998) is the 
first US study that controls for the multinationality of domestic firms. They find 
that, among multinationals, plants owned by US MNEs are the productivity leaders 
in the US, whereas domestic non MNE plants lag far behind MNEs owned units. 
Using a newly available dataset - the Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct In- 
vestment (AFDI) - we are, for the first time, able to identify domestic MNEs in 
a laxge scale UK plant level productivity dataset. This allows us to make several 
contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, our study qualifies the findings of 
Doms and Jensen in one important respect: in their study they cannot rule out that 
the leadership of US MNE owned plants is the consequence of a home advantage 
rather than of intrinsic transferable firm level advantages. The first innovation of 
this chapter, therefore, is to establish the leadership of US MNEs in Britain, which 
shows that the US MNE advantage found by Doms and Jensen is not a home advan- 
tage. Secondly, we confirm with British data that the foreign ownership advantage 
is indeed by and laxge an MNE advantage. Finally, we attempt to explain the nature 
of the US and MNE advantage further using the longitudinal dimension of our data. 
We examine two questions. Firstly, are the drivers of the MNE and the US ad- 
vantage firm or plant specific? This distinction is important because the Dunning 
higher wages paid by foreign-owned firms in Indonesia. 
3For a summary of Dunning's argument see Maxkusen (1995). 
ACI--- 
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account, and many theories involving MNEs (see for example Markusen (1995) and 
Helpman (1984)), assume a firm specific advantage that multinational enterprises 
can shaxe among plants. An alternative explanation is that the MNE productivity 
advantage is driven by an ability of MNEs to takeover plants which themselves have 
superior productivity even before the takeover. We find that the MNE advantage 
consists of both firm and plant effects. On the other hand, the additional US ad- 
vantage seems to be primaxily driven by plant effects. US MNEs take over plants 
that are about 10 percent more productive than plants taken over by other MNEs. 
Secondly, we also examine if there is evidence for a causal relationship from 
4 foreign engagement of a firm to the productivity of its plants in the home maxket. 
This would be in line with theories about technology sourcing or other leaxning 
effects (Branstetter 2001 and for a review Keller 2004). To identify such effects we 
look at UK firms that start investing abroad - i. e. become multinational - during 
our sample period. However, we do not find any significant evidence for such an 
effect. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: in sections 3.2 and 3.3 we describe 
our dataset. Section 3.4 shows that US owned plants are the productivity leaders in 
the UK, both in terms of labour productivity and in terms of total factor productivity 
(TFP), and that only part of the US ownership advantage can be explained by a 
multinational effect. In section 3.5 we show that this result is robust to alternative 
classifications of the foreign group and to different specification of the production 
function. In particulax, we show the robustness of our results when we control for 
the endogeneity of inputs and accounts for imperfect competition using an approach 
on the lines of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2000). In section 
3.6 we disentangle the US productivity effect using a two-step estimation procedure. 
Section 3.7 concludes. 
4Dunning's theory would suggest a causal relation from superior productivity to foreign direct 
investment. 
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3.2 Data Sources 
Our sample is drawn from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD)5 which is the 
UK equivalent of the US Longitudinal Respondents Database (LRD). It is a dataset 
made available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) based on information 
from the mandatory annual survey of UK businesses, called Annual Business Inquiry 
(ABI). 1 The ARD's unit of observation is defined by the ONS as an 'autonomous 
business unit'. We refer to this level of observation as a 'plant'. " It is important to 
note that the ARD does not consist of the complete population of all UK businesses. 
All businesses with more than 100 employeeS8 are sampled, but smaller businesses 
are sampled randomly. Only data on British plants - i. e. excluding Northern Ireland 
- was made available to us. Each year the sampled plants account for around 90% of 
total UK manufacturing employment. 9 Our sample is an unbalanced panel of about 
19,000 manufacturing plants which we observe annually for the years from 1996 to 
2000. 
The country of ownership of a foreign firm operating in the UK - and thus the 
ability to identify foreign owned MNE plants in the UK - is provided in the ARD. 1' 
While this identifies foreign owned plants, until now it has not been possible to 
identify UK MNEs- To do this we use the Annual Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) 
register. 
The AFDI is an annual survey of businesses which requests a detailed breakdown 
of the financial flows between UK firms and their overseas parents or subsidiaxies. 
The AFDI is thus a survey run at the firm and not at the plant level. The AFDI 
5More extensive descriptions of the ARD can be found in Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin 2003, 
Griffith (1999) and Oulton (1997) 
6Annual Census of Production until 1998. 
7Some of these business units are spread across several sites and are therefore not plants in the 
strict sense of the word. In about 80 percent of all cases a business unit is located entirely at a 
single mailing address. 
8In some years the threshold was 250 employees, for details we refer to Criscuolo, Haskel and 
Martin, 2003. 
9Tb examine if our results are sensitive to the oversampling of larger plants we run regressions 
with inverse sampling probabilities as weights. These results, unreported for brevity, axe not 
qualitatively different from the unweighted results reported in the next section. 
IOThe ARD data is supplemented here with information from Dun&Bradstreet global "Who 
own's Whorn" database. According to Dun&Bradstreet, the nationality of a plant is determined 
by the country of residence of the global ultimate parent, i. e. the topmost company of a world-wide 
hierarchical relationship identified bottom-to-top using any company which owns more than 50% 
of the control (voting stock, ownership shares) of another business entity. 
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register provides the sampling frame of the AFDI and contains the population of 
all UK firms which axe engaging in or receiving foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The working definition of FDI for this purpose is that the investment must give the 
investing firm a 'significant' amount of control over the recipient firm. The ONS 
considers this to be the case if the investment gives the investor a share of at least 
10 percent of the recipient firm's capital. To conduct the AFDI, the ONS maintains 
a register which holds information on the country of ownership of each firm and on 
which UK firms have foreign subsidiaries or branches. 11 This register is designed to 
capture the universe of firms that are involved in foreign direct investment abroad 
and in the UK. We consequently define as 'multinational' each plant in the ARD 
that is owned by a firm which appears in the AFDI register. 12 A problem with 
the AFDI register is that information is not always up-to-date. If a firm engages or 
receives FDI, it will only be included in the AFDI register after the ONS learns from 
various sources, including commercial data and newspapers, that this has happened. 
Consequently, the register population has varied spuriously over the years with the 
ONS' success in identifying such firms. 
However, we believe that this problem does not weaken the conclusions that 
can be drawn from our results. If some of the plants which we record as non- 
multinational are actually multinational plants and we still find that multinationals 
are more productive than non-multinational plants then this means that this result 
would be even stronger if we measured the status of all plants correctly. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the number of multinational plants that we can identify in the 
population and in the sample and their relevance in terms of employment and value 
added. Column 1 reports the number of domestic plants with no FDI, (defined as GB 
I' The ONS distinguishes between subsidiaries and branches as follows: a 'subsidiary' is a com- 
pany where the parent company holds more than 50% of the equity shaxe capital; a 'branch' is a 
permanent establishment as defined for UK corporation tax and double taxation relief purposes; 
companies where the investing company holds between 10% and 50% of the equity shaxe capital, 
i. e. does not have a controlling interest but participates in the management, axe defined as 'asso- 
ciates'. The country of ownership is identified using the nationality of the immediate owner, Office 
for National Statistics (2002) p. 120. 
12Details of the procedure followed to merge the AFDI and the ARD axe reported in Criscuolo 
and Martin (2003). 
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Table 3.1: Importance of MNE 
(Average numbers and shares, 1996-2000) 
number of plants shares emp share va share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
POP. sample POP. sample POP. sample wghtd unwghtd 
GB Non NINE 158,868 8,394 0.96 0.75 0.59 0.41 0.44 0.31 
GB MNE 3,062 1,427 0.02 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.32 
us 1,172 615 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.19 
FOR 1,708 825 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.18 
Notes: Figures reported are annual averages. Population refers to all businesses in the register, sample refers to 
businesses in the ARD (all large plants plus a sample of smaller plants). Column 5 uses employment information 
from administrative data for non-surveyed plants. Column 7 and 8 use value added at factor cost. Column 7 
weights surveyed observations using employment weights calculated as described in Appendix B. 1 to yield 
statistics representative of the whole population. GBnonMNE denotes domestic plants with no FDI; GBMNE is 
one for all domestic multinationals; US is one for all plants owned by a US multinational and FOR is one for all 
plants owned by non US foreign multinationals. 
Source: Authors' calculations using matched ARD-AFDl data over the 1996-2000 period. 
Non MNEs), British MNEs (GB MNE), US MNEs (US) and non US foreign owned 
plants (FOR) in the whole population. Column 2 shows the number of plants in each 
group for the sample of plants surveyed by the ONS to compile the ARD. Columns 
3 and 4 translate these numbers into shares. Column 3 shows that 1 percent of all 
plants in Britain are US owned, almost as much as all other foreign owned plants 
combined. Indeed, US MNEs represent more than 40 percent of all foreign owned 
plants in Britain ((615+825)/825). Similar figures hold for the share in employment 
(column 5) and value added (column 7), where US owned plants represent 47 and 
51 percent of FDI, respectively. These figures are consistent with the fact that the 
most productive companies are also likely to have the highest market shaxe. Also, 
since US MNEs axe on average laxger, the relative shaxe of US MNEs in the selected 
sample is much higher: whereas in the total population US MNEs take a shaxe of 
about 1 percent, in the sample the same figure rises to 5 percent. 
Table 3.2 reports averages and standaxd deviations for relevant vaxiables. Panel 
1 shows the US owned plants' labour productivity lead: averaging over the whole 
production sector and not controlling for industry we find that plants owned by US 
firms have an advantage of 26 percent ((46.57 - 36.87)/36-87) over British MNEs 
and an advantage of 8 percent ((46.57 - 43.10)/43.10) over other foreign MNEs. In 
terms of gross output per employee (panel 2) the ranking changes: foreign non-US 
owned plants axe the most productive and in general the foreign advantage becomes 
more dramatic. Panels 3 and 4 suggest that the figures in panel 2 can be paxtly 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics in the 1996-2000 pooled sample 
GB non MNE GB MNE us FOR 
1 VA/Emp 27.96 36.87 46.57 43.10 
(183.47) (39.30) (80.79) (51.43) 
2 GO/Emp 76.55 105.35 146.23 156.39 
(207.92) (132.22) (232.02) (283.73) 
3 Mat/Emp 50.54 69.78 99.16 114.43 
(85.04) (85.91) (163.67) (221.25) 
4 K/Emp 38.23 65.43 85.54 108.92 
(92.78) (73.07) (125.61) (366.37) 
5 Employment 142.15 475.02 537.00 445.62 
(264.51) (954.81) (1394.88) (1134.80) 
6 AverageWage 17.25 21.35 24.13 23.40 
(7.89) (10.13) (8-53) (8.21) 
7 VA/Sales 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.33 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Notes: Figures are unweighted averages over the sample period. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Figures in 
panels 1 to 4 and 6 are in thousands of pounds. Figures in panel 5 are head counts. The number of observations in 
all panels is 38,501. GBnonMNE denotes domestic plants with no FDI; GBMNE is one for all domestic 
multinationals; US is one for all plants owned by a US multinational and FOR is one for all plants owned by non 
US foreign multinationals. 
Source: Authors' calculations using matched ARD-AFDl data over the 1996-2000 period. 
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dep. var 
us 
FOR 
MNE 
InK L 
In "L 
InL 
age 
age2/10 
agec. n. 
0.349 0.144 
(0.018)*** (0.022)*** 
0.261 0.055 
(0.016)*** (0.020)*** 
0.261 
(0.015)... 
(4) 
ln! ý 
(5) 
0.076 
(0-007)*** 
0.041 
(0.006)*** 
0.045 
(0.008).. 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.04T 
(0.006)*** 
0.070 
(0.003)*** 
0.625 
(0.005).. 
-0.014 
(0.002)*** 
0.044 
(0.008)... 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.047 
(0.006)*** 
0.072 
(0.003)*** 
0.622 
(0.005)... 
-0.010 
(0.002)*** 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
0.071 
(0.003)*** 
0.626 
(0.0()5)*** 
-0.010 
(0.002)*** 
obs 38501 38501 1 38501 38501 38501 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between unobservables for plants in 
the same firm. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is log real value added (at factor cost) per employee. In 
columns 4-6 dependent variable is plant's real gross output per employee. Both value added and gross output are 
deflated by 4-digit annual output price deflators. Agee,.. equals one if the plant exists since 1980. All regressions 
include region and 4-digit industry time interaction dummies. US equals one if a plant is owned by a US 
multinational, MNE is one for all plants part of MNE firms and FOR is one for all plants owned by non US 
foreign multinationals. * significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent level. *** significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
explained by the fact that non US foreign owned plants have much higher material- 
to-labour and capital-to-labour ratios than all other plants. Panel 5 shows that US 
plants are on average larger and pay higher wages. This might imply that at least 
part of the US advantage is the consequence of scale effects 13 and employment of 
higher skilled workers. Thus, the US advantage might not be due to technological 
or managerial superiority but simply to different input choices. 
3.4 Foreign or Multinational Effect? 
The labour productivity advantage of multinationals, US and non US, reported in 
row 1 of table 3.2 might reflect the fact the MNEs tend to operate in highly produc- 
13Here we refer to scale effects at the plant level. In our study we cannot control for the scale of 
the global operations of MNEs, e. g. we do not have information on 'global employment'. 
(1) 
Table 3.3: Relative productivity of MNE (estimates of Equation 3.2) 
(2) 1 (3) 
In 
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
O-P, 
Ingo- O-P Const. 14 TFP obs L 
ra 
MNE 0.047 0.148 0.166 0.054 11826 
(0.006)*** (0.016)*** (0.038)*** (0.004)*** 
us 0.044 0.065 0.110 0.033 2589 
(0.008)*** (0.023)*** (0.062)* (0.006)*** 
EUnorth 0.016 -0.031 0.024 -0.002 798 
(0.012) (0.050) (0.152) (0.009) 
EUsouth 0.012 -0.024 -0.094 -0.016 80 
(0.025) (0.527) (0.204) (0.024) 
France 0.011 -0.004 -0.059 0.005 452 
(0.012) (0.049) (0.163) (0.011) 
Germany -0.020 0.018 0.116 -0.024 523 
(0.010). - (0.053) (0.143) (0.009)-- 
Japan -0.022 -0.011 0.036 -0.033 364 
(0.014) (0.072) (0.167) (0.013)*** 
Netherlands 0.027 -0.041 -0.029 -0.021 385 
(0.016) (0.042) (0.144) (0.012)* 
Tax -0.106 -0.194 -0.083 -0.069 75 
(0.026)*** (0.066)*** (0.099) (0.022)*** 
other -0.038 -0.093 -0.041 -0.050 136 
(0.026) (0.052)* (0.134) (0.021)** 
otherEurope 0.062 -0.032 -0.004 0.013 338 
(0.028)** (0.092) (0.111) (0.020) 
otherOECD 0.055 -0.016 -0.065 0.019 222 
(0.019)... (0.079) (0.165) (0.016) 
obs 38501 37850 10326 38253 
Notes: All regressions include a quadratic polynomial in age, age dummy, time and region dummies not reported 
in the table for brevity. Columns I and 4: robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation 
between unobservables for plants in the same firm. Columns 2 and 3: bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
MNEs takes value I if plant is part of an MNE group. US is one if the MNE group is US-owned. Similarly for the 
other country groups. Details on the country group classifications are in the appendix B. 1. In column 1 the 
dependent variable is log real gross output per employee. Column 1 estimates a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Unreported regressors include log capital per employee, log materials per employee, log employment, and 
time 4-digit industry interaction dummies. Columns 2 and 3 report the second stage estimates using a modified 
version of Olley and Pakes approach described in section 3.5. Column 3 restricts the sample to plants in sectors 
where the test of constant markupsu could not be rejected (see appendix B. 3). In Column 4 the dependent 
variable is log real TFP calculated using a factor share method as described in section 3.5.5. * significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. *** 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Column 5 row 1 reports the number of observations for all 
MNEs in the sample, row 2 reports the number of observations for US MNEs, row 3 to 13 report the number of 
observations from MNEs in each country group reported in column 1. 
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tive industries and/or tend to cluster in particulax regions with special geographical 
advantages. 
Thus, we start our econometric analysis by controlling for interacted 4-digit 
industry time fixed effects and regional dummies. The results of this exercise are 
reported in column 1 of table 3.3, where we regress labour productivity, measured 
as real value added per employee on 4-digit industry year dummy interactions, 10 
regional dummies and two ownership dummies US, which equals 1 when a plant is 
a subsidiary of a US multinational, and FOR that takes value 1 when a plant is 
owned by a foreign, non US, corporation. 
We find that US and other foreign owned plants axe on average 42 percent and 
30 percent respectively more productive than British domestic plants. 14 This size- 
able advantage is in line with previous results for Great Britain (e. g. Oulton (2000). 
But, how much of this advantage is due to these plants being part of a multinational 
enterprise? Column 2 answers this question by including a multinational dummy 
MNE that is one whenever a plant is owned by a multinational firm. If this multi- 
national is US owned the dummy US will be one as well. Consequently, in column 2 
the US coefficient measures the advantage of US MNEs over British MNEs and the 
FOR coefficient represents the advantage of non US foreign owned subsidiaries over 
British MNEs. 15 The coefficients' estimates reported in column 2 show that MNEs 
enjoy a productivity advantage of 30 percent, the US have a significant additional 
advantage of 15 percent, while non US foreign owned plants enjoy a smaller but 
significant 5 percent advantage relative to their British counterparts. 
Table 3.2 has shown that both US and foreign MNEs have much higher capital 
intensity than UK firms. This suggests that paxt of the observed foreign ownership 
advantage could be driven by this higher capital intensity. To examine this we need 
to estimate total factor productivity (TFP). The literature has suggested a vaxiety 
of different approaches to estimating plant level TFP. We start in this section by 
estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function by OLS. Thus, we assume that 
output, Q, is produced using the technology 
14 The percentage differences reported in the text axe calculated from the coefficients of the 
dummy variables in Table 3.3 according to the formula diff = (e 1) e. g. for the US 
0.42 = (e 0.349 1). 
15The performance of US MNEs relative to domestic plants can, therefore, be calculated as the 
sum of the coefficients on MNE and US and the advantage of other foreign-owned plants as the 
sum of the coefficients on MNE and FOR. 
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qit y 1: a.. x., it + ait 
ZEZ 
where qit is the logarithm of output produced at plant i in period t, -Y is the 
returns to scale coefficient, Z is a set of production factors - labour, physical capital 
and intermediate inputs - a. are the production function parameters, and ait is 
TFP. We examine if TFP systematically varies between various types of MNEs and 
domestic plants by estimating the following equation 
rit-PIt-XLit " 7FzEza, (Xzit-XLit)+a xLit 
+PIUSj(i, t) +, 32FORj(i, t) +, 83MNEj(i, t) (3.2) 
+OIt + OR + Eit 
i. e. we regress deflated revenue, rit - pit, per worker, XLit, on indexes of inputs, 
dummies referring to ownership16 and interacted dummies, Olt, controlling for 4 digit 
sectors time effects and 10 regional dummies OR to control for location effects within 
Britain. This approach - although standard practice - raises a number of concerns, 
such as imperfect competition, endogeneity, the lack of plant specific price indices 
etc. We discuss these issues and their importance for our results in the following 
section, and argue that the qualitative results do not change relative to the simple 
regression described in equation 3.2. We therefore start by discussing these results, 
reported in the last three columns of Table 3.3. 
In column 3- besides capital and material intensity and regional and industry 
time fixed effects - we only include US and non US foreign ownership dummies and 
find that US owned plants are significantly the most productive plants in Britain en- 
joying a strong and significant TFP advantage of almost 8 percent (with a coefficient 
of 7.6 as shown by row 1 of column 3) and non US foreign owned plants follow with 
an advantage of 4 percent relative to the reference group of all British plants. This 
confirms previous results (e. g. Griffith (1999), Oulton (2000) and Haxris (1999)). 
Column 4 shows that once we include a sepaxate dummy for being paxt of an 
MNE, the advantage of non US foreign MNEs drops to an insignificant 1 percent. 
US plants maintain a significant advantage of 4.5 percent relative to British MNEs, 
who, in turn, are 4.8 percent more productive than non MNE plants. This result 
16USj(i, t), for example, would be equal to 1 if plant i is owned in period t by US firm J. 
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shows that only part of the US productivity advantage is actually a multinational 
effect. 
Finally, column 5 extends the results of the previous column: it accounts for 
age effects by including a quadratic polynomial in age, 17 to account for possible 
differences due to the plants' life cycle, learning effects and/or the age of physical 
assets. The coefficient of US MNE remains virtually unchanged, while the foreign 
non US advantage relative to GB MNEs is a non significant 1 percent. Finally, 
MNEs are on average 4.6 percent more productive than British non MNEs. 
Our results thus suggest the following. Firstly, controlling for capital intensity, 
material usage, scale and age effects, US MNEs are the productivity leaders, with 
British and non-US foreign MNEs having a comparable productivity advantage with 
respect to British plants that are not part of an MNE. Secondly, much of the US 
and all of the non US foreign productivity advantage found in previous studies 18 
appears to be an MNE effect. 
3.5 Are our results robust? 
Several issues arise when estimating Equation 3.2. These include our simple group- 
ing of countries into US and all other non UK countries and issues about estimation 
and interpretation of TFP, such as the perfect competition assumption underlying 
equation 3.2, the inflexibility of our production technology and endogeneity prob- 
lems. These are addressed in this section. Our main tool to account for endogeneity 
is a modified version of the framework suggested by Olley and Pakes, (1996), which 
is new to the literature. 
3.5.1 Country grouping 
The aggregation of all non-US foreign owned plants in one group might hide consid- 
erable heterogeneity. In column 1 of table 3.4, we differentiate the 'non US Foreign' 
17Since our age variable is left censored in 1980, we include an age censoring dummy. We 
have tried alternative specifications for the age effect. We also experimented with including age 
categories and the logarithm of age which leads to the same conclusions as obtained under the 
current specification. 
18cited in footnote 2. 
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group further into various country groups. " We see that US MNEs are still the 
productivity leaders together with Norway, Switzerland and other OECD countries 
(mainly Canada and Australia), but as a first glance at the following columns shows, 
only the US leadership is robust to further checks. 
3.5.2 Imperfect competition 
As pointed out in the previous section, an implicit requirement for the foreign dum- 
mies to reflect a purely technological advantage is perfect competition. To examine 
the implications of removing the perfect competition assumption we find it useful 
to follow the model originally introduced by Klette and Griliches (1996). Staxt by 
simply recalling the definition of deflated revenue, our actual observed dependent 
variable at the plant level: 
rit - pit = qit + pit - pit (3.3) 
i. e. revenue is quantity times prices (all variables in logs), qit +pit, since we 
do not observe prices at the plant level, we deflate nominal sales using (four-digit) 
sector level price deflators pIt. Given that plant level prices axe not observed we 
need some way of controlling for them with variables we actually observe. This can 
be done by specifying a demand function which links prices to output. A possible 
specification of the demand function is (see also Melitz 2000): 
( Pi t 
17 
A'j7, ý'Gjt (3.4) Pit)- it 
where subscripts i denote firm and I industry; Ait is a firm specific demand 
shock, 77 is the industry demand elasticity and Ojt is a sectoral shock to demand. 20 
Taking logs of Equation 3.4 and inverting gives: 
Pit - Pjt =1 Ait -1 qit +1 Ojt (3.5) A 77 77 
where 7'T is the maxkup of price over marginal cost implied by profit 
maximizing behaviour and lower case letters denote logarithms. 
19details of the country groups classification can be found in Appendix B. 1. 
2'This demand function can be derived by assuming monopolistic competition b. la, Dixit-Stiglitz 
(see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) in the product market. 
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Combining equations 3.5 and 3.1 with 3.3 gives: 
rit - pit a.. x,. it + wit +1 OR (3.6) /-I 
ZEZ 77 
where wit (ait + Ait). Equation 3.6 is the equivalent of Equation 3.2 under 
imperfect competition. A number of things are worth pointing out. Firstly, - 
as stressed by Klette and Griliches (1996) - the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients on the various production factors changes: they axe now all divided 
through by the markup coefficient ji. Secondly - and more importantly for our 
purpose - without plant level price information it is no longer possible to regard 
TFP, here denoted as wit as a shift parameter relating solely to technical efficiency. 21 
Rather, wit (ait + Ait) is a composite of both technology shocks ait, demand 
shocks Ait and mark-up p. In the light of equation 3.6, how do we interpret the 
MNE, US and FOR dummies? Let us start by assuming that within 4-digit sectors 
p is constant. In this case a higher wit for US and MNE plants reflects better product 
quality or consumer valuation or higher technical efficiency. However, as some recent 
papers 22 have pointed out, revenue based measures of TFP (wit) might vary between 
plants for reasons other than product quality or consumer valuation and technical 
efficiency. In particular, variations in market power - i. e. /. I not being constant 
across plants in the same industry- might explain some of the variation. Market 
power might well be positively related to the composite of technical efficiency and 
product quality. This would introduce a bias to TFP estimates which is negatively 
correlated with true TFp. 21 In the worst case - if e. g. market power derives from 
government regulation and restrictions to entry for example - there might be no 
systematic relation between market power and biases to TFP estimates. 
We have three reasons which suggest that our results are not driven by market 
power effects. Firstly, while there are surely some sectors of the UK economy in 
21Melitz (2000) stresses this point. 
22see for example Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson 2003, Syverson 2004 and Katayama, Lu and 
I)rbout 2003. 
23jf in equation 3.6 the coefficients on factor inputs vary because of variation in market power 
across plants(pi) but our estimation model uses fixed coefficients FA E [mini fpi}; maxillti}] and 
Cov(p, ait +Ait) > 0, then for plants with high ait +Ait we attribute too much output variation to 
production factors. More intuitively, this is the case because our regression model does not control 
for the fact that for plants with larger p an increase in factors would depress prices more. 
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which government regulation rather than competitive pricing determine the market 
share of different companieS24 it is hard to believe that this is a general phenomenon 
in the manufacturing sector as a whole. Consequently we expect, that variations 
in market power are generally driven by variations in product quality or consumer 
valuation (A, t). 25 Following the argumentation in the last paragraph, the biases 
from variations market power would then strengthen our main conclusions: if we 
tend to underestimate TFP of the better plants such as US MNEs but we still find 
that they are significantly better, then the result would be even more clear-cut if we 
would correct for these biases. Moreover if regulation favours certain firms then this 
should in particular lead to advantages for domestic firms rather than MNE firms 
in general or US firms in particular. Secondly, large variations in market power 
might be a particular problem when comparing MNEs with non MNEs. Following 
the argumentation in the last paragraph, the biases from variations market power 
would then strengthen our main conclusions: If we tend to underestimate TFP of 
the better plants such as US MNEs but we still find that they are significantly 
better, then the result would be even more clear-cut if we would correct for these 
biases. However, this should be less of an issue when comparing (British) MNEs, 
with other (US and other foreign) MNEs. Thirdly, we have devised a simple test 
based on over identifying restrictions of the assumption that P in equation 3.6 is 
constant . 
21 The hypothesis that It is constant is rejected in a large number of sectors. 
However, if we re-compute our earlier regressions for the sectors in which a constant 
y cannot be rejected, i. e. in those sectors in which market power should not affect 
the estimated ranking, we come to the same qualitative conclusions on the relative 
position of various groups of MNEs. 
24Sectors where this might be the case include petroleum and nuclear fuel (SIC 23) and Utilities 
(SIC 40/41) which we exclude from the analysis. 
25A positive relationship between maxket power and consumer valuation is also the finding of 
Foster et al. (2003) who investigated the issue on one of the few productivity datasets which 
includes firm level prices. 
26The details of this test are reported in Appendix B. 3 
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3.5.3 A more flexible production function allowing for im- 
perfect competition 
An additional worry might be that a log linear production function is inappropriate. 
Klette (1999) has proposed a methodology that integrates a flexible production 
function into an imperfectly competitive setting. The starting point is a homogenous 
differential production function: 
Qit = Ait [f (Xit)]" (3.7) 
where Xit is a vector of factor inputs and f () is a linear homogenous general dif- 
ferentiable function. Using the mean value theorem we can write output relative to 
the median firm as: z 
dit = ait +Ea... f. -it 
Z=l 
(3.8) 
where small letters with a tilde denote log deviations from the median plant (M) 
in a given year, 27 and the a.. represent the partial derivatives of the log production 
function evaluated at some point Rit in the convex hull spanned by Xit and XMt, 
so that xzit 
-yf, (Xit) - f NO 
(3.9) 
where f., (. ) represents the partial derivative of f (. ) with respect to production factor 
z. The first order condition of profit maximization implies that 
Pitoy Qit fz(xit) = lLwzit (3.10) 
i. e. prices are such that the marginal value product is p times the marginal cost W 
of each factor. Our demand function implies that 
1 
p= 
As pointed out by Klette (1999), equation 3.10 can only be expected to hold for 
production factors which axe easily adjustable. We assume that this is the case for 
27 e. g. qit = InQit - InQmt 
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intermediates and labour, but not for capital so that we get: 
a. = 
WzXz't 
- AsZit PitQit 
where s,, it is the revenue shaxe of factor z and zE IL, M}. Further, because of 
homogeneity of degree y of the production function we get 
aK = ^I - aL - am (3.12) 
and therefore in equation 3.8: 
4it = iiit + Avzit + -Ikit + iiit (3.13) 
where 
Wit gjt(izit - 
kit) (3.14) 
z54K 
is an index of all variable factors. These results allow us to rewrite 3.6 as 28 
ly - 
rit - wit = -kit + Cvit (3.15) it 
The variable factor index mit can be directly observed from the data, since all 
29 
that is required axe vaxiables for factor inputs and revenue shares of the factors. 
3.5.4 Accounting for endogeneity 
Equation 3.15 suggests that the final element required to derive an estimate for 
Cvit is to find an estimate of PK the ratio between the scale and the markup 
coefficient. Since plant level capital stocks - like all other inputs - axe presumably 
highly correlated with ýDjt this is not a trivial undertaking. " We address this problem 
28AII aggregate expressions such as p1t and Ojt in 3.6 disappeax because the equation is now 
written in terms of deviations from the median plant in the sector. 
29Equation 3.9 suggests that we should evaluate the derivatives - and thus the factor shares - 
at 'some point in the convex hull'. Since we do not know the exact location of this point and 
of course we do not know the functional form of the derivative, we follow common practice and 
approximate by averaging over the factor shaxe at plant i and the factor share at the median plant 
M to calculate the shares in viit; i. e. git = "W+`C. See also Bally et al. (1992) on this. 2 
30see Griliches and Mairesse (1995) for a summary on the endogeneity problem and potential 
solutions. 
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using a modified version of the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996). Following them 
we assume that Cjit evolves as a first order Markov Process: 
cDit = EjýDjtlcDjt-j} + Pit (3.16) 
We also assume that capital is only correlated with the expected component of 
Coit but not with F/it. " Then we can estimate equation 3.15 if we find a control for 
EjCvjtjev'jt-j}. In section B. 2 we show that conditional on capital and assuming that 
maxkups p are constant across firms in a narrowly defined sector (four digit) there 
is a monotone relationship between profits - defined as revenue minus variable costs 
- and Cv. Consequently we can invert the profit function and write 
wit (kit) ftit) (3.17) 
We do not know what functional form E{Cvjtj-} takes, but in equation 3.17 we have 
found a way to express it in terms of observables so that we can rewrite 3.15 as 
rit - Wit = -kit + g(kit-1, IIit-, ) + fit (3.18) A 
where g(-) = EjcDjt1O(-)} is a function of unknown form. To estimate 3.18 we can 
either employ a semi-parametric procedure or approximate g(-) by a third order 
polynomial which, for simplicity, is our strategy. An estimator for Coit can then be 
obtained as 
Wit --.,: rit - 
jiit - kit 
Compared to Olley and Pakes (1996) the main innovation of our approach is to use 
profits and not investment as predictor for Cvit. This has a number of advantages. 
First, a major criticism of the Olley and Pakes framework is that investment might 
be a very poor predictor of the fixed component of Cvit. 11 If firms axe essentially in the 
steady state - and the capital stock in period t reflects the firm's knowledge about 
cDit at t-1- then the variation in investment reflects primarily adjustments to news 
31011ey and Pakes assume that investment in t can only be used for production in t+1. We 
follow a different strategy. We assume that investment is predetermined. Although this would be 
problematic in the Olley and Palms methodology, it does not affect our estimation procedure. 
32see Griliches and Mairesse (1995). 
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about cD from period t. Our approach - similarly to Levinsohn and Petrin's 2000 
who use material inputs instead of investment - does not suffer from this problem. 
Plants with high CD will have higher profits whether or not they axe in the steady 
state. Second, differently from Levinsohn and Petrin, we can identify all relevant 
parameters from a moment condition on capital without having to assume sepaxabil- 
ity in intermediate inputs or relying on instrumental variable techniques. Also, we 
do not require any assumptions on the substitutability between variable production 
factors. 33 
Finally, to examine if measured TFP (cDit) is systematically different between 
various types of MNEs we run a regression of estimated Cvit on our ownership dum- 
mies. 
(Dit =, 8, USj(i, t) +, 32FORj(i, t) + fl3MNEj(i, t) + git (3.20) 
Column 2 of table 3.4 reports the results of this exercise. We see that controlling 
for endogeneity and allowing for imperfect competition, non constant returns to 
scale as well as for a very flexible production technology has no qualitative and only 
small quantitative implications for our results. Column 3 shows estimates computed 
with the same method, but including in the second stage regression - equation 3.20 
- only those sectors for which our test34 of constant maxkups A could not be rejected. 
This suggests the same qualitative conclusions as before. 
3.5.5 Other approaches to TFP estimation 
The simplest way to handle the endogeneity problem in production function esti- 
mation is to follow a factor share approach which involves no regression analysis at 
all. In table 3.4 - for completeness - we also report our results from using such 
an approach. Following Bally et al. (1992) and adopting a strategy similax to the 
one used to calculate the vaxiable factor index viit in the previous subsection 35 we 
33For a more detailed discussion of our approach see Martin (2003). 
34as described in Appendix B. 3 
3, 'This approach is equivalent to imposing 1 which rules out imperfect competition and 
nonconstant returns to scale. 
14 
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calculate TFP as 
- BHC W, t = rit - smitmit - gLitlit + (1 - gmit - gLit)kit (3.21) 
Column 4 shows that even under this specification our main results of a general 
MNE advantage and a further US advantage prevail. Note, however, that the point 
estimates found for the MNE and US effects are considerably smaller compared to 
results in columns 1 and 2. This is a consequence of imposing 1 which we 
implicity do in equation 3.21. If we use the TFP estimation strategy described in 
the previous sections we typically find .2<1 suggesting the prevalence of imperfect JA 
competition. Now if there is a positive correlation between performance and capital 
input (Cov(wit, kit) > 0) then standard TFP assigns too much of the variation in 
rit - Wit (see equation 3.15) to capital so that better performing plants look worse 
than they axe. 36 
To summarize, the results shown in table 3.3 seem to be robust: US MNEs are 
the most productive with British MNEs and foreign non US MNEs alternating each 
other in the second position. British plants that are not part of an MNE axe the 
least productive. In the next section we shed more light on the factors, which drive 
these differences. 37 
3.6 Explaining the US productivity leadership 
In the previous sections we have been able to establish two main results. Firstly, 
plants owned by MNEs are on average more productive than non MNE plants'and 
secondly, plants owned by US MNEs are more productive than all other MNEs. 
Using the longitudinal dimension of the current data we try to distinguish between 
36An alternative method to estimate TFP controlling for the endogeneity of Inputs would be 
Difference GMM (Arellano and Bond (1991)) and System GMM (Blundell and Bond (1998)), We 
attempted to use these estimation methods on our sample, but we encountered two problems: 
firstly the time period of our sample is too short, 5 years, with less than 7 percent of the plants 
observed over the whole time period; secondly, due to the fact that the ARD surveys small plants 
randomly, only 12 percent of the plants have continuous time series Information. 
370ther unreported robustness checks Include weighted regressions and regressions that control 
for unobserved skill level in the firm. In the latter we Include in equation 3.2 plant average wage as 
a proxy for the average skill level of workers; we cannot further distinguish between average wage 
for operatives and average wage for administrative employees unlike previous studies (e. g. Griffith 
and Simpson (2001)) because since 1996 this information has not been reported in the ARD. 
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Table 3.5: Sources of MNE and US advantage (ProductivitY is residual of gross output regression) (1) (2) 
all change to NINE 
(3) 
currently domestic 
MNE 0.007 0.007 0.007 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
ever NINE firm 0.066 0.018 
(0.013)*** (0.012) 
ever NINE plant 0.155 0.160 
(0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
ever US firm -0.002 -0.023 (0.017) (0.020) 
ever US plant 0.098 0.120 0.121 
(0.016)*** (0.032)*** (0.024)*** 
ever other for firm 0.017 0.009 
(0.014) (0.019) 
ever other for plant 0.048 0.017 0.035 
(0.015)... (0.026) (0.020)* 
green dom -0.007 0.022 0.001 
(0.010) (0.033) (0.012) 
green mult 0.037 0.081 
(0.016)** (0.057) 
green US 0.006 -0.087 (0.030) (0.072) 
green other 0.001 -0.010 (0.024) (0.072) 
obs 38501 2501 25558 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Row 1 (MNE) reports first-stage estimates of the going 
global effect. Row 2 and below: coefficients and standard errors are from the second-stage of our estimation 
procedure. Dependent variable is fixed effects estimated in the first step. ever NINE flrm equals I if the plant 
belongs at time t to a firm which is MNE. ever MNE plant is I if the plant has ever been owned by a MNE over 
the course of the sample period. Similarly for the ever US and ever FOR dummies. green dummies take value 
one for all plants that are established during the course of the sample period (1996-2000), green GB non NINE 
is one for plants owned by domestic firms when established. green MNE is one for plants owned by MNE firms 
when established. green US (green FOR) is one for plants owned by US (other foreign) firms when established. 
Column 1 use the whole sample of 38,501 observations. Column 2 only includes plants that incur a change in 
status over the period they are present in the sample. Column 3 only keeps observations of non MNE plants and 
of MNE plants when owned by non MNE firms. 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
*** significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
three hypotheses on the sources of the MNE and US advantages. 
A first hypothesis is that plants owned by MNEs might be more productive 
because multinational firms takeover the best plants in any country. We call this 
the plant picking effect. This might be because multinational corporations have 
more resources to finance takeover activity or because they are simply better at 
spotting top performing plants. 
A second hypothesis is that multinational firms are characterised by superior 
38 shaxed assets that improve the performance of any plant they takeover. Examples 
include international distribution networks, special management techniques, patents, 
blueprints, trade secrets, and reputation effects. We refer to this as the best firm 
38we can think of this effect as the 'ownership specific' factors in Dunning's explanation of FDI 
or the 'knowledge capital' of the firm in Markusen. 
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Table 3.6: Status changes in the data 
(Transitions in ownership and MNE status in sample 1996-2000) 
(1) 
GB non MNE 
(2) 
GB MNE 
(3) 
us 
(4) 
FOR 
Status changes 
GB Non MNE 11164 589 225 304 
GB MNE 251 3170 101 46 
us 155 62 1290 48 
FOR 138 42 26 1857 
GB Non MNE 1511 255 225 304 
GB MNE 164 51 101 46 
us 155 62 131 48 
FOR 138 42 26 246 
Notes: GB non MNE denotes domestic plants with no FDI; GB MNE is one for all domestic multinationals; US 
is one for all plants owned by a US multinational and FOR is one for a plants owned by non US foreign 
multinationals. The table reports in panel one the number of plants that change their MNE status; In panel two 
the subset of these that also experienced an ownership change. For example Row 1 Column 2 reports that there 
are 589 transitions from GB non MNE to GB MNE. Row 5 Column 2 reports that in 255 cases these transitions 
also involved a takeover. Number of observations in the sample is 38,501. The period considered is 1996-2000. 
Source: Authors' calculation using the ARD AFDl matched data. 
effect. 
Finally, plants owned by firms that start investing abroad might experience pro- 
ductivity improvements as a direct consequence of FDI, because of, for example, 
firm-level scale economies, cheaper options to hedge against exchange rate risk, tech- 
nology sourcing from abroad or other learning effects((Branstetter 2001 and Keller 
2004)). We call this the going global effect. 
we represent these hypotheses formally as follows. " Productivity, Prodit, of 
plant i at time t can be written BS: 40 
Prodit : -- ai + (t, j(i, t) + cit (3.22) 
where (t, j(i, t) = CJ(i, t) + OMNEMNEj(i, t); i. e. productivity can be decomposed in 
an effect (t, j(i, t) due to the parent firm of plant i at time t and a plant specific effect 
aj. 41 (tj(i, t) is then decomposed further in a time invariant firm specific effect Cj(i, t) 
and an effect which allows a causation from becoming multinational to productivity, 
39For simplicity at this stage we do not separate the MNE group further into sepaxate US and 
foreign other (FOR). We reintroduce those in the empirical analysis below. 
401n principle we can decompose any productivity measure in this way. In our actual estimations 
below we use TFP calculated as the residual from equation 3.2 as reported in column 5 of table 
3.3. 
41For simplicity we abstract from differences between various types of MNEs. 
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PMNE- In this setting the best firm effect can be represented as 
E{(j(i, t)IMNEj"'» = l} > E{(j(i, t)IMNEj"" = 01 (3.23) 
where MNEj... is a time invariant dummy variable that is equal to one if firm J 
is a multinational, British42 or foreign, i. e. for MNEs we expect a higher firm fixed 
effects than for other firms. The plant picking effect, on the other hand, can be 
represented as 
E{a, IMNE, eve" = 11 > E{a, IMNEe = 01 (3.24) 
where MNEj" is a dummy that is equal to 1 if plant i is being owned at some 
point in the sample by a multinational firm in the periods when this firm is actually 
investing abroad. " Finally, the going global effect, is represented as PMNE > 0. To 
explain how we identify these various effects from our data we introduce an example 
in figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: An example 
2345 
ABC 
DOM DOM MNE 
t+l 
ABc 
DOM MNE MNE 
Suppose our sample consists of 6 plantS44 which axe owned by 3 different firms 
(A, B and C). We observe them for two periods, t and t+1. In period t firms A 
and B axe domestic, whereas firm C is an MNE. In period 2 firm B starts investing 
42Note that, for a given firm, MNEjeer is time invariant characteristic. So for a UK MNE it 
would be equal to 1 even in the years where it has not yet started investing abroad. 
43This latter qualification is of relevance for British MNEs in periods where they have not yet 
started investing abroad. Plants which they sell or close down before investing abroad would be 
classified as non MNE plants owned by an MNE. 
44numbered 1 to 6 in figure 3.1. 
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abroad and thus becomes an MNE whereas A stays domestic. 45 Moreover, we have 
the following takeover events: plant 2 is acquired by C and plant 4 is sold off to firm 
A by firm B before it staxts investing abroad. " How can we differentiate between the 
various MNE effects discussed earlier with the variation in this example? Consider 
first the plant picking effect. The one plant in the example that was taken over by 
an MNE is plant 2. If we found that in year t plant 2 had a higher productivity than 
plant 1 this would be evidence of a plant picking effect. To examine the existence 
of best firm effects we can compaxe the productivity of plant 2 in year t+1 relative 
to yeax t. If its productivity increases after it is taken over by firm C this would be 
evidence of best firm effect. 47 Finally, for the going global effect we have to look at 
firm B and examine if the productivity of its plant 3 increases from t to t+1. 
How do we implement this econometrically? Our estimation strategy proceeds in 
two steps. In the first step our objective is to obtain a consistent estimate of aMNE- 
Given the assumptions of our model, the source of endogeneity is the potential 
correlation between the unobserved effects ai and (j and the vaxiable of interest 
MNEi(i, t) . 
4' Note that if we take deviations of the dependent and explanatory 
variables from the mean across all observations of a specific firm plant combination, 
the two fixed effects vanish: 
xit -1E xir 
(3.25) 
#it li(il Ol 
r s. t. J(i, r)=J(i, t) 
where #it [-] is a function that returns the number of periods plant i is owned by 
the firm J(i, t) - This corresponds to the fixed effects transformation where the cross 
sectional units axe not the plants nor the firms but each firm-plant combination in 
the dataset. Consequently, running a least squares regression on 
Prodit = MNEj(i, t), 3 + Fit (3.26) 
4SIn terms of our eaxlier dummies we would thus have MNEAever = 0, MNEever =1 (both, in 
year t and t+1) and MNEbver = 1. 
B 
46Consequently MNEje'er =0 and MNE4, er =0 whereas for all other plants MNEjIver =1 
Vi = 2,3,5,6. 
47Equally, we could look if the productivity of plant 4 decreases once it is taken over by A in 
period t+1. 
48Note that we are assuming E(cjtjMNEj(j, t), Cj(j, t), aj) = 0, i. e., conditional on the fixed 
effects, changes in MNE status are not correlated with the time varying shocks. We discuss this 
assumption in more detail later in this section. 
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will give us a consistent estimate Of BMNE- " This, in turn, can be used to obtain 
an estimate of the fixed effects for all firm-plant combinations 
Cj(i, t) + ai = Prodit - 
ýMNEMNEj(j, 
t) (3.27) 
Our second stage proceeds by running a regression of the predicted fixed effects on 
the MNEj"" and MNEi"" dummies: 
Cj(i, t) + ai = ojeverMNEiev(iert) + pieverMNEiever + Vt (3.28) 
The plant picking effect is in this setting represented as 6,, ver >0 and the best firm 
effect as Oj"" > 0. 
Table 3.5 shows results from this regression exercise. Start by considering column 
1 where we regress both stages on the complete sample. Note first that, as in section 
3.4, we control separately for US MNEs and other foreign effects with dummies that 
are constructed according to the example of MNEj,, r and MNEiever. Moreover, 
we include a set of dummies that are equal to one if a plant is setup as a greenfield 
investment during our sample period by either a domestic or an MNE firm. 50 This 
is to control for a potentially important source of heterogeneity in the data that 
could bias our estimate of the best firm effect: if any MNE's shared assets' effects 
could only be realised in plants which are setup as greenfields by multinationals then 
ignoring these greenfield dummies would bias our firm effects downwards. Consider 
now the results in column 1. Firstly, row 1 reports the coefficient PMNE estimated in 
the first step. The positive but insignificant coefficient's estimate of 0.007 suggests 
that there is no strong going global effect. 51 Rows 2 and 3 show that the MNE 
490ne crucial assumption required is that the change in MNE status is not correlated with the 
time varying part of the error term. Thus, we axe implicitly assuming that the timing of the 
MNE status change is exogenous. A scenario where this might be violated is the following: plants 
could have a higher probability of being taken over in years where they suffer from idiosyncratic 
large negative shocks. To examine the relevance of this scenario we run probit regressions of the 
probability of changing status to MNE on time dummies and TFP growth in the previous year. 
The results show that productivity growth is not significantly correlated with the probability of 
being taken over by an MNE. Also, since we do not have good instruments for changes in MNE 
status we thought of controlling for the endogeneity of MNE status changes using GMM methods. 
However, we cannot use these estimation methods as explained in footnote 36. 
5OThe reference category for this set of dummy variables are the plants which were set up before 
our sample started so that we do not know who set them up. 
"This first row result is the same in all column , because the various column only differ with 
respect to the second stage regression 
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advantage seems to be due to both a plant picking effect and a best firm effect. We 
find significant coefficients' estimates of 0.066 and 0.155, respectively. Looking at 
rows 4 and 5 we also have evidence that the additional US advantage is a consequence 
of plant picking rather than a best firm effect: plants that axe at some point US 
owned have an average advantage of about 10 percent over all other MNE plants. 
Row 7 shows a significantly positive foreign non-US plant effect of 4.8 percent, which 
is lower than the US plant effect. 
Finally, rows 8 to 11 report the 'greenfield' effects. Row 9 shows that plants 
that are setup by MNEs enjoy a 3.7 percent advantage relative to non greenfield 
domestic plants, significant at the 5 percent level; rows 10 and 11 show that there 
is no additional advantage from being setup by a US or a foreign MNE. 
What could be a potential concern with our estimates in column 1? Note that 
eye, in terms of the example in figure 3.1 the MNE firm coefficient,, 8j 11 is calculated 
as a weighted average of all observations of plants currently owned by an MNE firm 
minus a weighted average of observations of all plants that are not owned by an 
MNE. 53 
Thus, 851111 could be high for two reasons. Firstly, if plants such as 3,5 and 6 
which throughout the sample period axe owned by multinationals are very productive 
or secondly, if plants such as 2 which change their ownership over the course of our 
sample had a strong increase in productivity after being taken over by an MNE. 54. 
To examine which of the two is more relevant is interesting because it gives us an idea 
of the time span which might be necessaxy for MNEs to increase the productivity 
of the acquired plants. Note, that a particular characteristic of plants such as 5 
and 6 is that they have been owned by an MNE for longer than plants such as 2. " 
Consequently, in column 2 we restrict our sample for the second stage regression to 
MNE plants which had a transition from domestic to MNE over the course of our 
sample. 56 If we still find significant MNE firm effects this is an indication that MNE 
firms axe very quick in improving the productivity of acquired plants. However, in 
52And by analogy all other firm coefficients in column 1. 
53i. e. in terms of the example in figure 3.1, the best firm effect is calculated as 
WeightedAverage{2t+i, 3t, 3t+1,4t, 5t, 5t+1,6t, 6t+, )-WeightedAverage{lt, lt+1,2t, 4t+, }. 
54 Or if plants such as 4 had a dramatic drop in productivity after being sold off 
55Since we have a sample period of 5 yeaxs and for plants such as 2 we must observe at least one 
takeover, the longest time such a plant could be owned by an MNE is 4 years. 
"Like plant 2 in the example. 
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column 2 the MNE firm dummy reduces to less than a third relative to column 1- 
from 0.066 to 0.018 - and is only borderline significant. 57 
Equally, there might be an issue with our estimates of the plant picking effects in 
column 1. The MNE plant picking effect - and by analogy the US and other foreign 
plant picking effects - are computed as the weighted average of all observations from 
MNEever plants minus a weighted average of all observations from non MNEeve'* 
plants. 58 
Therefore, our calculations also include observations from periods in which some 
of the plants axe owned by an MNE.... firm. " Thus, the robustness of our plant 
effects estimator thus depends on our ability to correctly control for any firm effect 
that the plants are subject to in those periods. An easy way to scrutinize our results 
is to restrict the second stage regression to the sample of observations in which plants 
are owned by non MNE firms-60 This is done in column 3. As in column 1 we find 
strong MNE and US plant picking effects suggesting that MNEs and especially US 
MNEs pick the better plants. In contrast to column 1, we cannot find an additional 
plant picking effect for plants which axe taken over by non US foreign firms. 
What other potential concerns arise concerning this analysis? A strong assump- 
tion in our identification strategy is that all unobserved heterogeneity can be cap- 
tured by our two fixed effects. There might be important deviations from this model. 
For example plants might be acquired by MNEs not according to their productivity 
level but according to their future growth potential. To investigate this in more 
detail we would require a dataset covering a longer time period than we have at 
present. Also note that if this issue is important it would lead in our framework to 
an overestimation of the firm effects, especially in column 2 were we focus on plants 
that were taken over by MNEs during the sample period. 
Another possible source of endogeneity is related to the possibility that the 
takeover by an MNE is correlated with time varying shocks as well as the plant 
571n unreported results, we explore this issue in more detail. We find that if we restrict this 
analysis to plants that we observe for at least two years after takeover, i. e. to 692 observations, 
the MNE firm dummy coefficient is estimated to be 0.035 with a bootstrapped standard error of 
0.022. 
58Thus, in terms of our example, the plant picking effect is calculated as Weighted Average 
{2t, 2t+,, 3t, 3t+,, 5t, 5t+,, 6t, 6t+l} - Weighted Average 11t, 1t+j, 4t, 4t+, } 
59in terms of the example these axe (2, t+ 1) and (4, t) 
10i. e. identify the plant effect from Weighted Average {(2, t)} - Weighted Average {(1, t), (1, t+ 
1), (4, t+ 1)}- 
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fixed effects. For example, the transition to foreign ownership might not only de- 
pend on fixed chaxacteristics of plants but also on temporary negative shocks which 
make the plant temporaxily weak and thus a target of e. g. a hostile foreign takeover. 
Alternatively, one might think of a case in which the MNE gains interest in a pax- 
ticular plant because of a positive productivity shock. It is therefore not clear in 
which direction the bias will go. 
Apaxt from our estimation strategy, a general concern might be that our dataset 
does not have sufficient movement of firms between multinational states and of 
plants between different types of firms. This is the topic of table 3.6 which reports 
the occurrence of all these changes in our dataset. The upper panel reports the 
number of status changes for each possible transition between GB non MNE, GB 
MNEs, US MNEs and Non US Foreign MNEs (FOR). For example the cell in row 1, 
column 2 reports that in our sample there are 589 transitions from GB non MNEs 
to GB MNEs. The lower panel reports only the number of status changes that also 
involved an ownership change. Therefore, the cell in row 5 column 2 reports that 255 
of the 589 British plants that became multinational did so by means of an ownership 
change, i. e. a takeover. This implies that the remaining 334 plants became part of 
a British MNE because the firm they belonged to started investing abroad. This 
is the vaxiation we use to identify i3MNE- In total, the upper panel shows that we 
have 1,118 changes between non MNE and MNE status. " The lower panel shows 
that 784 of these changes involved a change in ownership, i. e. a takeover. Overall 
panel 1 of table 3.6 shows that about 10 percent of all the transition events we can 
observe in the data involve a change in multinational status. " From panel 2 we can 
derive that about 40 percent of all ownership changes in our sample involve changes 
between multinational status. 63 Thus, while the majority of plants do not switch 
status, in the data there is still some non negligible amount of status changes. 
To summarize, our results suggest the following. First, in line with the predic- 
tions of Dunning, we find evidence for an MNE firm effect. This evidence is stronger 
when we consider plants which have been paxt of an MNE for a longer time period. 
This suggests that MNE firm specific advantages require some time to materialise 
61we obtain this figure by summing the off diagonal elements of row 1 and column 1 in the upper 
panel. 
62This is computed as the share of all off diagonal elements to the sum of all cells of table 3.6. 
63once again computed as the share of all off diagonal elements this time of panel 2 
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at the plant level. Second, we find strong and robust evidence of plant picking by 
MNEs. Third, the US seems to be the best at "cherry picking" the most productive 
plants in Great Britain, and indeed this seems to be the source of the additional 
US advantage found in the OLS regressions. Fourth, there seems to be a small ad- 
vantage of foreign non US MNEs firms in acquiring better plants, although this is 
significantly smaller than for their US counterparts and not robust across different 
specifications. Fifth, we do not find any evidence that FDI of British firms has a di- 
rect short run beneficial effect on the productivity of plants they own in Britain, but 
again this result might be driven by the rather small length of our sample period. 
3.7 Conclusions 
International comparisons show that the US is the world's most productive econ- 
omy. The US productivity leadership found in cross-country studies is mirrored 
by microevidence when comparing US-owned plants with other foreign owned and 
domestic plants. 
However, when examining foreign ownership effects such as the suggested US 
advantage in plant level datasets care needs to be taken that one is comparing like 
with like: we need to compare US MNEs with other - domestic and foreign - MNEs. 
Doms and Jensen (1998) is the first US study that controls for the multination- 
ality of domestic firms. They find that, among multinationals, plants owned by US 
MNEs axe the productivity leaders in the US, whereas domestic non MNE plants 
lag far behind MNEs owned units. 
Using a newly available dataset - the Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Invest- 
ment (AFDI) - we axe the first to identify domestic MNEs in a large scale UK plant 
level productivity dataset. This allows us to contribute to the existing literature in 
three different ways. 
Firstly, we can show that the productivity leadership of US owned plants relative 
to all other multinationals, British and foreign, remains after controlling for industry 
and observable firm characteristics. Our study, therefore, qualifies the findings of 
Doms and Jensen in one important respect: in that we can exclude that the leader- 
ship of US MNE owned plants is the consequence of a home advantage rather than 
of intrinsic transferable firm level advantages. 
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Secondly, we show that, except for the US, the foreign ownership advantage in 
Britain is indeed by and large an MNE advantage. For non US foreign owned plants, 
multinationality explains most of the foreign advantage; once we control for their 
capital intensity they are as productive as domestic MNEs. 
Finally, we go further and analyse the sources of two advantages: that of MNEs 
and that of US owned plant relative to other MNEs. Using the longitudinal dimen- 
sion of our data, we examine three hypotheses. 
First, the literature has suggested that the superior perfomance of MNEs, are 
driven by specific firm level assets - such as managerial skills, patents, branding and 
production processes - which MNEs can transfer to any plant they own across the 
globe (Markusen 1995 and Dunning 1981). Second, MNEs are believed to be better 
at picking the best plants in the host country. Thirdly, plants owned by British firms 
that start investing abroad might experience productivity improvements as a direct 
consequence of FDI, because of, firm-level scale economies, technology sourcing from 
abroad or other learning effects (see Branstetter (2001) for evidence on technology 
sourcing between Japan and the US). 
We find evidence confirming that the MNE advantage can be attributed to both 
MNEs having higher firm fixed effects and MNEs owning plants with better plant 
fixed effects. This suggests that the MNE advantage is driven by both, the shaxing 
of superior firm level assets across plants and the ability to select the better plants in 
a country. Thus, our results support the idea that MNEs have unobserved superior 
assets that they can share with their subsidiaries, as outlined by Dunning, Markusen 
and Caves, but they also suggest that MNEs takeover strategy might be significantly 
better than other firms. 
With regard to the US leadership, we find that the additional superiority of US 
firms over all other MNEs seems to be entirely driven by a paxticulax ability of US 
firms to takeover the best British plants rather than improving the productivity of 
acquired plants any more than other MNEs do. 
Finally, our data does not find any robust evidence for an ex-post productivity 
increase in domestic plants of British firms that start investing abroad. This might 
be due to the short time series available to us. 
Future reseaxch might, therefore, focus on the as yet unanswered question: why 
axe US firms better than all other MNEs at obtaining the best plants? There axe 
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several possible explanations. One hypothesis is that managers of US MNEs pursue 
more aggressive takeover strategies and have specific skills that make them more 
successful in this activity. A second explanation is related to the particular time 
period considered. Indeed, in the second half of the 1990s, the US Stock market 
experienced a boom with equity prices registering a spectacular increase. During 
that period, the S&P5OO, the Dow Jones Industrial and the Nasdaq Composite 
indexes more than doubled. US MNEs, overvalued in the US stock market, and 
thus with access to low cost capital, might have found it more profitable to use 
this capital to target firms abroad (e. g. in the UK) not affected by the same stock 
market bubble, rather than in the home country (the 'cheap capital' view of FDI 
(Baker et al., 2004)). 
With the data at hand, we cannot thoroughly investigate these hypotheses, but 
this is an area of research that deserves further exploration. 
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Chapter 4 
How do Multinationals innovate 
more? 
4.1 Introduction 
Why do different firms and countries produce different amounts of new knowledge? 
This question is central to a number of literatures in economics, most of which ap- 
proach the question with the "knowledge production function7' (KPF) framework. 
Commonly attributed to Griliches (1979) and to Griliches and Pakes (1980), this 
framework posits that output of new knowledge depends on investment in discov- 
ering new knowledge - e. g. research and development (R&D) activity - and on the 
flow of ideas from the existing stock of knowledge - i. e. the base upon which to 
make innovations. Different research areas typically make different use of the KPF. 
In the macro-growth literature, the existing stock of knowledge is often assumed 
to be a public good. For example, Jones (2002) assumes: "Ideas created anywhere 
in the world are immediately available to be used in any economy. Therefore, the 
[stock of ideas] used to produce output corresponds to the cumulative stock of ideas 
created anywhere in the world and is common to all economies. " And in much of the 
theory work, steady-state output growth and levels hinge crucially upon the returns 
to scale in the KPF to both knowledge investments and flows (see Jones, 2003). 1 
10ther examples include Paxente and Prescott (1994), In which "World knowledge Is meant to 
represent the stock of general and scientific knowledge In the world (i. e., blueprints, Ideas, scientific 
principles, and so on), We assume that all firms have access to this knowledge. Thus, general and 
scientific knowledge spills over to the entire world equally. " 
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Much of the industrial organization literature starts from a different point; 
namely, that knowledge stocks do not flow perfectly and that efforts to innovate 
depend importantly on the degree of success in learning from these stocks. Impor- 
tant research areas include measuring knowledge output and flows from knowledge 
stocks, with much work using R&D capital stocks, patents and patent citations. 
There is also interest in whether knowledge flows across firms via "sPillovers" or via 
market-mediated transactions, and on the impact of new knowledge on productivity 
in making goods and services. 
The international trade literature suggests that globally engaged firms axe partic- 
ulaxly "knowledge intensive". In recent years a growing body of empirical evidence 
confirms that firms that axe multinational and/or exporters are particularly knowl- 
edge intensive. 
For example, in the manufacturing sectors of the United States (Doms and 
Jensen, 1998) and the United Kingdom (see Chapter 3) it is multinational firms 
- parents and also affiliates of foreign-owned firms - that show the highest levels of 
total factor productivity (TFP). Similarly, exporters in many countries exhibit high 
productivity levels and/or growth (see the survey of Tybout, 2000). There is also ev- 
idence that multinationals use more knowledge inputs: e. g., multinationals seem to 
do more advertising (Brainard, 1997), or the evidence in Bernard et al. (2004) that in 
recent decades the parents of U. S. -based multinationals have consistently performed 
about two-thirds of all U. S. private-sector research and development (R&D) despite 
accounting for barely 1/20th of 1% of all firms. Motivated by this body of empirical 
evidence, the now-standard trade models of multinationals (Maxkusen, 2002 for an 
extensive treatment, or Carr et al., 2001 for an abridged summary) make the crucial 
assumption that these firms axe particularly knowledge intensive relative to purely 
domestic firms. Indeed, in this "knowledge capital" model multinationals arise via 
foreign direct investment (FDI) largely because of the desire (and ability) to deploy 
firm-specific knowledge assets in multiple countries despite the co-ordination and set- 
up costs of multi-plant production with parents predominantly creating knowledge 
assets, and these assets flowing within firms, mainly from parents to affiliates, There 
is ample evidence of this cross-border intra-firm knowledge transfer (e. g. Mansfield 
and Romeo, 1980, and Moran, 2001). There is mixed evidence, at best, whether this 
knowledge somehow "spills over" from affiliates to domestic firms in host countries 
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(e. g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999 and Haskel et al., 2002). 
Although these approaches have a somewhat different emphasis they have all 
encountered common serious measurement and econometric problems. First, mea, 
suring new knowledge is difficult. Some studies use changes in TFP, but this can 
of course change for other reasons (most notably mismeasurement of real physical 
inputs e. g. labour hours, capital quality and deflator problems). Other studies use 
patents but, as is well-acknowledged, by no means all new knowledge is patented. As 
Griliches has pointed out, the service sector of the economy, for example, has very 
little patenting, but, many axgue produces new knowledge in the form of unpatented 
product and process innovations: new brand names and new retailing formats for 
example. Second, measuring use of the existing knowledge stock is also problematic. 
What is required is the importance-weighted stock and hence a key indicator that 
has been developed is citations. This refers to patented innovations and so might 
not cover the knowledge flows from other sources e. g. marketing information from 
head offices etc. Recent work has also highlighted the problem that citations axe 
entered both by the inventor and patent examiners potentially obscuring the idea 
flows used by the inventors themselves. 
Our approach in this paper is to use a new data set on innovations, R&D and 
innovation-related knowledge flows., We use two waves of the Community Innova, 
tions Survey (CIS), an EU-wide survey set up following the guidelines agreed in the 
OECD Oslo manual. The survey asks firms to report a number of different knowl- 
edge outputs, such as patenting, product and process innovations and organisational 
innovations. It also asks firms to report on inputs. There axe two main types of 
inputs: spending on R&D and other innovation-related inputs and the importance 
of knowledge flows, in particular from within the firm or enterprise and from outside. 
Thus, whilst these data have their problems, which we discuss below, we think they 
are of interest in that they do confront the two existing data problems mentioned 
above. First, they use other measures of innovations beside patents and TFP growth 
and second, they do have different measures of knowledge flows to patent indicators 
that are importance weighted. 
We match these data to indicators of global engagement and study three Issues. 
Firstly, on these data, are more globally engaged firms more innovative, measuring 
innovations in different ways? Secondly, do globally engaged firms use more inputs 
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to innovation such as scientists or information flows? We find the answer to be yes 
to both these questions. This leads to the third question, namely how much of the 
innovation output advantage of globally engaged firms is explained by the increased 
use of inputs? The answer to this question varies according to the output measure 
used. 
There axe (at least) two key objections to our data. Firstly, whilst it might 
be thought desirable to have wider data on innovations than patents, data on self- 
reported product and process innovations might be regarded as inaccurate. For this 
reason we use a number of different measures of innovations, including the more 
conventional one of patents. Secondly, the information flow variables are responses 
to questions asking firms to rate the importance of various sources of knowledge. 
Such reports might also be felt to be inaccurate and, being qualitative, of dubi- 
ous value. We discuss this more in the analysis but briefly the question is what 
would be the best measure of knowledge flows, especially between plants within a 
firm? Knowledge flows are presumably many and various, consisting of the sharing 
of technological and marketing information, advice over the telephone, videocon- 
ferencing, site visits by company experts etc. Little of this would be captured by 
patent citations, either because marketing knowledge is not patentable, or because 
only additions to knowledge might be patented which would not capture the sharing 
of information about existing patentable innovations. More quantitative evidence 
might be gleaned from payments within firms, e. g. patent royalties, but within-firm 
monetary transfers might be poorly measured due to transfer pricing incentives, 
as well as missing the other types of knowledge flows due to within-firm contacts. 
Other quantitative data might be generated by collecting information on e. g. email 
traffic, phone calls and travelling by purpose but such forensic data has not, to the 
best of our knowledge, been collected. Thus qualitative evidence might be, for the 
moment, a useful summary measure of the plethora of information flows within the 
firm. 
The findings confirm the prediction of the traditional multinational theories (e. g. 
Caves (1996) and Markusen (2002)) that multhiational firms are more innovative 
and share knowledge within the enterprise group more than other firms. The results 
also seem to suggest that foreign affiliates use knowledge produced by other firms 
in the group, more than UK MNEs do, again in line with the predictions of the 
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knowledge capital theory of multinationals. We also find evidence that exporting 
firms have an innovative lead over non-exporting firms. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the data de- 
scription and summary tables; section 3 describes the econometric framework for 
estimating the Knowledge Production Function using a number of different innova- 
tion measures. Section 4 sets out our results and section 5 concludes. 
4.2 A Theoretical Framework of Knowledge Pro- 
duction 
4.2.1 A KPF organising framework for summary statistics 
Like a production function for goods and services, the innovation production func- 
tion relates inputs into the innovation process to outputs. Following Griliches (1979), 
we can model AK, the change in knowledge stock as: 
AKi =f (Hi, K) (4.1) 
where AK is the change in knowledge stock, K' is flow of ideas to the plant 
from the existing stock of ideas into the change in the knowledge stock and H is 
inputs into the process of knowledge creation - e. g., equipment or the human capital 
of R&D scientists. The subscript I is used to Index variously countries, industries, 
or plants; for our study, it will index plants within a country (for us, the United 
Kingdom). Unlike physical equipment knowledge can potentially flow across firms. 
Thus KI might usefully be written: 
A Ki =f (Hi, Ki', K-' j) (4.2) 
where Kil and K-'j indicate the flow of ideas from within and outside the plant. 
Thus for example an idea developed elsewhere in a multi-plant firm which plant i 
shares in would be part of Kj'. Some specifications of 4.2 are special cases. For ex- 
ample, some specifications write K rather than K. This assumes that each existing 
idea is equally important to all firms. Consider, for example, the stock of knowledge 
at an industry trade fair or at a university. Each firm visiting the trade fair or 
83 
co-operating with a university may or may not gain ideas from such forums because 
not all ideas are of equal importance to all firms. For patentable innovations this is 
the motivation for using citation-weighted patents. Other specifications do not sub- 
script K by i, meaning that scientists in unit i all have access to the same knowledge 
stock. In the light of 4.2, we wish to explore different measures of AK, Hi, Kj' and 
KI i and the extent to which differences in AK are explained by differences in the 
inputs Hi, Kj' and KLj - 
4.3 Data Description and Summary Statistics 
Our empirical analysis uses data on U. K. firms constructed from three key data 
sources. First is the U. K. Community Innovations Survey. This is an EU-wide 
survey developed to measure both innovative output and inputs of firms. It also 
collects data on exporting. The other two data sources are the Annual Inquiry into 
Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) and the Annual Respondents Database (ARD), 
both of which axe used to identify each of our U. K. CIS observations as a parent 
of a UX-based multinational or an affiliate of a foreign-owned multinational. We 
briefly discuss each data source. 
4.3.1 CIS Data 
The U. K. CIS is part of an EU-wide survey that asks companies to report the output 
of their innovation efforts (introduction of innovative new products and/or processes; 
percentage of sales arising from new and improved products; and "soft" innovations, 
such as organisational change); the firm's inputs to innovations (R&D, scientists, 
etc. ) and the sources of knowledge for innovation efforts. There have been three 
waves of U. K. CIS surveys: CIS1 (covering the period 1991-93), CIS2 (1994-96) and 
CIS3 (1998-2000). Our work covers CIS3 and CIS2 (the response rate on CIS1 was 
axound 10% and is not suitable for analysis). 
The CIS is a voluntaxy postal survey caxried out by the Office of National Statis- 
tics (ONS) on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). ONS selects 
survey recipients by creating a stratified sample of firms with more than 10 employees 
drawn from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) by SIC92 two-digit 
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classes and eight employment-size bands. The survey covers both the production 
and the service sectors. 2 CIS3 was in the field twice: the first wave sampled 13,340 
enterprises, and the second top. -up covered 6,285 to make the sample representative 
at the regional level. Of the total 19,625 enterprises to which the survey was sent, 
8,172 responded (3,605 in services and 4,567 in production), for an overall response 
rate of 42%. For CIS2 5,892 were sampled and 2,342 responded; accounting for 
bankruptcy, this was a response rate of 43.2%. Manufacturers and service sector 
companies were sent very slightly different questionnaires ; replies and response 
rates were 1,596 and 743,41% and 37% respectively. 3 
Two important issues immediately axise from the sample design of the CIS. First 
is the question of non-response. 4 Since the survey is voluntary and postal, there is 
the risk of low-response and thus of non-response bias. For CIS3 (we were not 
provided with the sampling frame for CIS2) we investigated the characteristics of 
respondents and non-respondents using the CIS survey universe matched with the 
ARD data. Non-respondents were on average laxger than respondents, both in terms 
of turnover and employment. In our regressions below we control for size. In the 
summary statistics we do not weight so the averages therein should not be regaxded 
as representative of the whole economy. 
Second, the survey was conducted at the enterprise level; where enterprise is 
defined as "the smallest combinations of legal units which have a certain degree 
of autonomy within an enterprise group. " Thus, an enterprise is roughly a firm, 
where each firm can have more than one business establishment and can also be 
part of a larger multi-enterprise business entity called an enterprise group. For 
our interest in globally engaged firms, by construction any U. K. enterprise that is 
part of a multinational firm has at least one other enterprise in its enterprise group 
somewhere in the world. One might worry about reporting error due to respondents 
not answering at the desired enterprise level. We were able to identify small numbers 
of such probable cases through data checking and cleaning; our results appear to be 
2Production includes manufacturing; mining; electricity, gas and water; and construction. Ser- 
vices includes wholesale trade; transport, storage, and communication; and financial intermediation 
and real estate. 3A final response rate of 40% is in line with response rates to CIS in other European countries, 
where answering the survey was not compulsory (e. g. Germany, Spain and Belgium). 4To boost response enterprises were sent the survey, posted a reminder, posted a second reminder 
(with the survey again) and finally telephoned. 
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robust to this issue. 5 
Regarding the contents of the data, the essential idea of the survey is to get en- 
terprises to retrospectively report separately "technological" and "organisational" 
innovations (with separate questions for each group). In turn, technological inno- 
vations are split into process and product innovations. Appendix C sets out the 
survey questions for both product and process innovations and patents. For prod- 
uct and process innovations, the CIS questionnaire provided additional information 
to respondents (e. g., providing an example of what is and is not an innovation) to 
clarify definitions and thereby improve response quality. A potential problem with 
this approach is its subjective nature. Since companies are asked about products 
or processes that are "technologically new", there is obvious scope for differences 
in interpretation even with guiding information provided in the questionnaire. For 
example, some firms might report "yes" to all questions to not be seen as somehow 
backward which induces measurement error in the innovation measure and possibly 
an artificial positive correlation between innovation outputs and inputs. There are 
a number of points worth noting in this regard. First, as we shall show 70% of 
firms report performing no innovation at all, so there is at least some reporting of 
zero innovations. Second, of those reporting no innovation at all, about 26% report 
positive innovation inputs, suggesting that for these respondents at least they do 
not "boost" their replies to every question. Third, we shall also present results for 
6 patents which are less likely to be so subjective. 
Finally, one might worry that the person answering the questionnaire might not 
have the knowledge to represent accurately the true position of the firm. Some 
researchers have recommended multiple sampling of persons within the organisation 
to overcome this but with a sample of almost 20,000 enterprises this is infeasible. 
The ONS does keep on its mailing list specific contact persons to whom it addresses 
data requests and the CIS was sent to these people where identified. We do not 
however have access to the mailing list to check on responses from firms with a 
5These robustness checks consist, for example, in leaving in the sample only single-plant firms. 
Indeed, a misunderstanding can axise only for multi-plant firms and/or firms that are part of an 
enterprise group. 
60ne check on these responses is that companies are asked to fill out in long-hand their "most 
important product or processr. The long-hand response rates were not high (about 30%) but our 
casual inspection of these responses relative to the guidelines provided indicated that enterprises 
were able to report technological innovations. 
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specific addressee and those addressed to e. g. the company secretary, so this remains 
an open question. 7 
4.3.2 AFDI and ARD Data 
The CIS measures one dimension of the global engagement of firms in that it asks 
whether and how much firms exported in 1998 and again 2000. But it does not have 
any information on the other key dimension of global engagement: being part of a 
multinational firm. Accordingly, to add this information to the CIS data we merged 
in nationality of ownership data from the AFDI and ARD. 
The AFDI is an annual survey to businesses which requests a detailed break- 
down of the financial flows between UK enterprises and their overseas parents or 
subsidiaries. It contains an "outward" part that measures outward FDI by U. K. 
parents and also an "inward" part that measures FDI into the U. K. by foreign- 
owned firms. To run the AFDI, ONS maintains a register that holds information 
on the country of ownership of each enterprise and on which U. K. enterprise has 
foreign subsidiaries or branches. This register is designed to capture the universe of 
enterprises that axe involved in FDI abroad and in the UK, where a 10% ownership 
stake is applied in both directions. It is continuously updated from a variety of 
government and private-sector data sources. 
The ARD provides an alternative source of information on the country of own- 
ership of foreign-owned firms operating in the U. K., where here the underlying data 
source is solely Dun & Bradstreet Global "Who Owns Whomý' database. The AFDI 
and ARD methods differ in two potentially important respects: AFDI tracks the 
nationality of direct owners using a threshold of 10%; ARD tracks the nationality of 
ultimate owners using a threshold of 50%. In principle then, these two different data 
sets can yield different answers as to whether a U. K. firm is foreign owned and if so, 
by a firm in which country. In practice, there were very few such discrepancies in our 
data: only about two dozen firms classified as foreign owned by AFDI but not by 
ARD. We chose to use the AFDI categorization in these "conflicting cases", both to 
maximize the number of foreign-owned observations and because its 10% ownership 
criterion is widely used by statistical agencies in other countries (e. g., the United 
7However, the problem of biased response is perhaps more important in attitudinal surveys e. g. 
questions about the friendliness of industrial relations. 
87 
States' Bureau of Economic Analysis). In practice, our results are robust, to giving 
precedence to the ARD scheme. We were able to inerge accurately the AFDI ind 
ARD data into the CIS data since the ONS used the saine core set of firin and group 
identifiers for all three (lata sets. With all this information combined, we created 
four categories of global engagement for our firins: parents of U. K. multinationals; 
affiliate of foreign multinationals; non-imiltinational firins that export; and "purely 
domestic" firnis that neither export nor are part of a multinational. ' 
4.3.3 Summary Statistics 
Figure 4.1: Average Patents per R&D Employee 
1) 7 
06 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
For our benchinark sample of 7,385 enterprises we ended ill) with the. following 
distribution: 577 multinational parents (7.8% of the sample); 653 multinational affil- 
iates (8.8%); 1,776 non-multinational exporters (24.0%); and 4,379 purely doinestic 
enterprises (59.3%). Consistent with many of the studies cited in the introduction, 
ill our sample there are basic performance differences across these four groups. For 
example, mean size (either sales or employment) and capital intensity are highest 
for the parents and the affiliates, then the exporters, and finally the purely donies- 
tics. There are also differences in the industry and regional distribution of these 
8There were also a small number of firins that were classified as U. K. parents in the AFDI data 
but also U. K. affiliates in the ARD data. In principle, such complicated ownership structures can 
be found given the nature of the two data sets. In practice, to maximize our number of U. K. 
parents we placed this sinall number of firms in the U. K. -parent category. Our results below were 
robust to the alternative of placing them in the U. K. -affiliate group. 
88 
NU. Innal ý. d 11-ol, Multinal-al AttilLaICI LXFw- P"', 
Table 4.1: Summarv Statistics on Knowledae OutDuts 
SubSample Innovate Patent % New and improved Patents 
Protect Sales 
Multinational Parents 0.45 0.32 0.1 10.02 
(N = 577) (0.5) (0.47) (0.20) (159.64) 
Multinational Affiliates 0.42 0.37 0.1 2.78 
(N = 653) (0.49) (0.48) (0.21) (15.54) 
Non-Multinational Exporters 0.38 0.23 0.1 0.82 
(N = 1,776) (0.49) (0.42) (0.21) (5.58) 
Purely Domestics 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.1 
(N = 4,379) (0.39) (0.23) (0.15) (2.03) 
All Enterprises 0.27 0.15 0.06 1.37 
(N = 7,385) (0.45) (0.36) (0.18) (46.64) 
Notes: For each cell, indicated summary statistics are means (and standard deviations in 
parentheses). Innovate is an indicator variable equal to one if enterprises reported any process or 
product innovation. Patent Protect is an indicator variable equal to one if enterprises reported 
either applying for new patents 1998-2000 or using existing patents to protect innovations. Zo 
New and improved Sales is the share of enterprise sales in 2000 accounted for by new and 
improved products. Patents is the number of patents applied for over the 1998-2000 period. The 
7,385 total enterprises in this table corresponds to the number of observations in the benchmark 
regressions in Table 2. See text for data details. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics on Knowledge Inputs 
SubSample % R&D % Scientists Intramural R&D 
Personnel Intensity 
Multinational Parents 0.04 0.1 0.016 
(N = 577) (0.1) (0-17) (0.057) 
Multinational Affiliates 0.04 0.12 0.012 
(N = 653) (0.12) (0.18) (0.048) 
Non-Multinational Exporters 0.03 0.08 0.016 
(N = 1,776) (0.08) (0.17) (0.059) 
Purely Domestics 0.01 0.04 0.006 
(N = 4,379) (0.07) (0.13) (0.042) 
All Enterprises 0.02 0.06 0.01 
(N = 7,385) (0.08) (0.15) (0.05) 
Notes: For each cell, indicated summary statistics are means (and standard deviations in 
parentheses). R&D Personnel is number of enterprise workers involved in R&D activities in 2000. 
% R&D Personnel is the share of enterprise employment in 2000 accounted for by R&D workers. 
% Scientists is the share of enterprise employment accounted for by degree-level or above workers 
in science and engineering subjects. Intramural R&D intensity is the ration of the value of R&D 
performed by the enterprise in 2000 over sales in 2000. The 7,385 total enterprises in this table 
corresponds to the number of observations in the benchmark regressions in Table 4.4. See text for 
data details. 
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Table 4.3: Summaxy Statistics on Knowledge Flows 
SubSample Internal Internal Vertical Competitor Free University 
Self Group 
Multinational Parents 
(N = 577) 
Multinational Affiliates 
(N = 653) 
0.51 0.32 0.5 
(0.67) (0.33) (0.67) 
0.29 0.39 
(0.33) (0.33) 
0.29 0.38 
(0.33) (0.33) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.2 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.49 0.4 0.48 
(0.67) (0.33) (0.67) 
Non-Multinational Exporters 0.45 0.19 0.46 
(N = 1,776) (0.33) (0-00) (0.67) 
Purely Domestics 0.23 0.1 0.3 
(N = 4,379) (0-00) (0.00) (0.00) 
0.25 0.35 
(0.00) (0.33) 
0.15 0.23 
(0.00) (0.00) 
AR Enterprises 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.2 0.29 0.1 
(N = 7,385) (0-00) (0-00) (0.33) (0.00) (0-00) (0.00) 
Notes: For each cell, indicated summary statistics are means (and medians in parentheses). 
Each variable is a categorical indicator of how important a different knowledge source is to the 
enterprise's innovation activities. Each variable takes possible values of 0,1/3,2/3, and 1; higher 
values indicate greater importance for an information source. Internal Self measures * 
knowledge 
inside the enterprise itself. Internal Group measures knowledge inside the broader business group 
of affiliated enterprises. Vertical measures knowledge from customers or suppliers. Competitor 
measures knowledge from competing firms. Free measures knowledge from professional 
conferences and exhibitions. University measures knowledge from universities. See text for data 
details. 
91 
firm types. These sorts of performance differences will be accounted for in our 
econometric analysis, but not in our simple summary statistics. 
Tables 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 present means and standard deviations or medians (as 
reported in the notes) on innovation outputs, inputs, and flows for our entire sample 
of enterprises and also our four sub-samples by global engagement. There are three 
important messages from these tables. Firstly, globally engaged enterprises create 
substantially more new ideas than do purely domestic enterprises. Our broadest 
and thus benchmaxk measure of knowledge output is Innovate, an indicator variable 
equal to one if enterprises undertook any process or product innovation. Appendix 
C reports the exact survey question for these two parts of Innovate, as well as for 
all the other variables. About 45% of all multinationals and 42% of all exporters 
report having innovated. In contrast, only 18% of purely domestic enterprises report 
innovating. A similar contrast appears for alternative measures of knowledge output. 
Column 2 shows a similar pattern for Patent Protect, a binary variable equal to one 
if the enterprise either applied for new patents during 1998-2000 or used existing 
patents to protect its innovations. In column 3 the knowledge measure is Z New 
and improved Sales, the share of enterprise sales in 2000 accounted for by new and 
improved products. Column 4 again shows a similax pattern for the number of new 
patents applied for over the 1998-2000 period, Patents. 9 We found many of the 
two-way differences (for brevity, not reported) to be statistically significant. For 
example, for all four measures multinational parents create more knowledge than do 
domestic enterprises. We note that for all sub-samples and all knowledge measures, 
the median enterprise reports no knowledge outputs. That said, the distribution of 
innovation is less skewed for our broader measures than for Patents. For example, 
the number of all enterprises reporting "yes" for Innovate is neaxly twice the number 
that have some patent protection, and about four and a half times the number that 
applied for new patents. As discussed eaxlier, we think one of the merits of our 
study is not just its multiple measures of innovation, but also that many of these 
measures look broader than the commonly used counts of patents. 
The second important message of Table 4.2 is that globally engaged enterprises 
9Note that Patent Protect we regard to be a broader output measure than Patents. Given that 
many enterprises generate patentable innovations infrequently, an enterprise might protect exiting 
patents-and thus be considered innovative-even if it did not recently apply for new patents. 
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use more inputs for making new ideas. Column 1 and 2 of Table 4.2 show this for 
R&D Personnel and scientists and engineers: column 1 reports % R&D Personnel, 
the shaxe of enterprise employment in 2000 accounted for by R&D workers. The 
same pattern applies: this shaxe is three to four times greater for globally engaged 
enterprises. Innovative activity is often thought of as the domain of workers in 
science and engineering occupations. This may be true for some enterprises and 
sectors, but is likely false for others in our data. In paxticular, innovation in many 
service sectors such as finance and retail trade is likely performed by non-science, 
non-engineering occupations. Despite this preference for using R&D personnel as 
our "headcount" measure of innovation inputs, column 2 reports % Scientists, the 
shaxe of enterprise employment accounted for by degree-level or above workers in 
science and engineering subjects. This is not quite the same as science and engineer- 
ing occupations (as workers in these occupations could have different educational 
backgrounds, and/or workers with such education need not work in those occupa- 
tions). That said, the same pattern appeaxs here as for share of R&D workers: for all 
three categories of globally engaged enterprises about 10% of workers have science or 
engineering degrees, versus just about 4% for domestics. The last column of Table 
4.2 reports Intramural R&D intensity, the shaxe of sales spent in R&D by the enter- 
prise in 2000. This measure of knowledge inputs captures not just expenditures on 
personnel but also on the complementary capital (see Appendix C). Multinational 
enterprises and exporters average 0.16%, versus 0.06% for purely domestic firms. As 
with Table 4.1, many of the two-way differences (for brevity, not reported) we found 
to be statistically significant. For example, for all four measures both multinational 
parents and affiliates use more knowledge inputs than do domestic enterprises. The 
production-function framework motivating our analysis suggests that some of the 
variation in knowledge outputs in Table 4.1 can be accounted for by variation in 
knowledge inputs in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.3 suggests that this is not the whole story. Here we report both where 
enterprises learn information for innovation and how important axe these sources. 
For each of the information categories across Table 4.3, each enterprise was asked to 
report whether any information from this source was used in its innovative activities 
and, if so, whether the importance of this source was low, medium, or high. This 
information was codified from 0 to 3 on a 4-Likert-Scale. We rescaled the responses 
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into a categorical vaxiable of values 0,1/3,2/3, and 1 going from no information to 
information of high importance. 10 Mean (and median) responses are reported. The 
first two columns of 4.3 cover information internal to the enterprise itself (Internal 
Self) and information internal to the enterprise's broader enterprise group (Internal 
Group). By definition, any enterprise that is paxt of a multinational has a broader 
enterprise group elsewhere in the world. For Internal Self, we see that globally 
engaged enterprises report much higher mean (and median) importance for this 
information source. The same is true for Internal Group - where it is also very 
notable that the mean value for affiliates is higher (statistically significantly so) than 
that for paxents. This accords with the now-standard knowledge-capital model of 
multinationals in international trade, which assumes both that knowledge is created 
predominantly by parents and that intra-firm knowledge flows are predominantly 
from parents transferring knowledge and related firm-specific assets to affiliates. 
Looking across all columns of Table 4.3 shows the same pattern of globally engaged 
enterprises learning more than do their domestic counterpaxts. Indeed, the medians 
across all columns are striking: the median globally engaged firm learns at least 
something from five information sources, whereas the median purely-domestic firm 
leaxns nothing from all six. 
We conclude that firms differ along all three dimensions of the knowledge produc- 
tion function: knowledge outputs, knowledge inputs, and access to flows of existing 
knowledge. This last difference contradicts the assumption of some literatures that 
in equation 4.2 all firms have equal access to the same flows of knowledge. It sug- 
gests that in estimating knowledge production functions it will be important to 
account for these differences. We can visualize this important point about access to 
knowledge. Much theory work on ideas in the macro-growth literature assumes both 
a single world knowledge stock and a Cobb-Douglas formulation for equation 4.2, 
in which case it follows that all knowledge workers should have the same average 
labor productivity (adjusted as needed for the Cobb-Douglas technology parameter 
on labor; see Jones, 2003). Is this true in the data? Tables 4.1 to 4.3 suggest that 
the answer is no. Figure 4.1 shows that it is not. For each of the four groups of 
globally engaged firms, this figure plots the average number of patents per R&D 
worker. The important message is that globally engaged firms have more patents 
IOThe details of the construction of this variables axe described in more detail in Appendix C. 
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per knowledge worker than do the purely domestic firms; this is consistent with the 
evidence in Table 4.3.11 
4.4 Econometric Strategy and Estimation Results 
4.4.1 Econometric Strategy 
In this section we describe our measures of AK and the different implications for 
econometric work. The next section sets out the results. 
Our first measure is a binary vaxiable that takes value one whenever the firm 
reports either a process or product/service innovation. Since this is a dependent 
binary variable we estimate our KPF using probits. This raises a number of issues. 
Firstly, the coefficients of a probit equation do not measure maxginal effects. Thus, 
we report the marginal effects calculated as: 
OE(ylx) 
(9xj . 
8i 0 (0) 
where 0 is the normal density function and we estimate the marginal effects at 
the mean values of the regressors. We report the standard errors of the marginal 
effects calculated using the delta method. A second issue concerns the possibility of 
calculating elasticities from either the probit coefficients or the marginal effects. As 
noted by Wooldridge (2002), it does not seem possible to recover a formula for the 
elasticity in respect to the underlying latent variable y*. The only parameter that 
one might be able to recover is the partial effect of the regressors on the probability 
that the observed binary variable takes value one. 
Finally, a third concern is endogeneity. Regressors such as H may be correlated 
with the regression error if an unobserved effect on innovation also affects H. Such 
effects could be due to an underlying unobserved firm fixed effect and/or an idiosyn- 
"For each of the four firm groups Figure 4.1 reports that group's total number of patents (i. e., 
the sum across firms of Patents) divided by that group's total number of R&D workers. Alternative 
methods for calculating each group's average productivity (e. g., calculating the productivity per 
firm and then averaging these productivities across all firms) yield very similar results. Figure 4.1 
implicitly assumes constant returns to knowledge workers for the Cobb-Douglas version of equation 
4.2. If one assumes greater degrees of decreasing returns to scale to knowledge workers, then the 
analogous differences in Figure 4.1 become even larger (because the number of R&D workers needs 
to be raised to a power less than one before dividing into number of patents). 
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cratic shock. The bias could be positive or negative depending on whether the effect 
on innovation increases or reduces the marginal product of staff. We estimate all 
our regressions with industry dummies so control for fixed effects that are common 
within industries. We go further in two regaxds, instrumental vaxiables and panel 
regressions. Concerning the first, the use of IV with a limited dependent variable 
(discrete or censored) is not straightforward. We use the ACLS method as pro- 
posed by Amemiya and implemented by Newey (1987) (see also Maddala (1983) pp. 
247-252). 
To construct an instrument for H we used information from the CIS2 survey 
namely the unweighted averages of the level of R&D employees at the 4-digit industry 
level and the unweighted averages of the proportion of R&D employees at the 4- 
digit industry. Note that these instruments axe built excluding those firms that 
axe both in CIS2 and CIS3. The rationale behind the choice of the instrument 
is that the lagged level (and proportion) of R&D employees at the 4-digit level 
is likely correlated with each company's "normal" demand for R&D workers but 
hopefully uncorrelated with company-specific unobservables (e. g., management or 
productivity shocks) that would cause differences in R&D personnel from its normal 
level that would also be correlated with innovation outcomes. The rationale behind 
excluding the firms that axe both in CIS3 and CIS2 is that if the source of the 
endogeneity is the correlation between the firm fixed effects and the R&D personnel 
variable, lagged level of R&D personnel at the 4-digit industry levels, which include 
lagged R&D personnel at the firm level, will not be valid instruments. We did 
experiment with different aggregation levels (e. g. 3-digit rather than 4 digit, use 
averages within regional and size cells as well as industry, etc. ). An evident trade- 
off with the instruments is that the more refined the IV the higher the predictive 
power of the instrument, but the less overlap of cells between CIS2 and CIS3. We 
did test for the strength of these instruments by regressing our endogenous variable, 
level of R&D personnel on a set of exogenous variables (regional dummies, 2-digit 
industry dummies, the GE variables, exporter, UK MNE, and foreign; size and the 
information variables) and the two instruments proposed. The coefficients on the 
instruments were both strongly significant. 
A second approach to addressing the endogeneity problem is to use panel data 
methods. We constructed a CIS panel using the overlap of about 780 firm between 
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CIS2 and CIS3 (see Appendix C for details). However, there are both data related 
and econometric issues with this approach. Regaxding data issues, first the ordering 
and the phrasing of the questions have changed somewhat between the two surveys. 
For example, in CIS3 firms are asked about patents applied for and also whether 
they used patents to protect their innovation, in CIS2 they are not asked the lat- 
ter. Regarding econometric issues, first the set of firms present in both CIS2 and 
CIS3 is a self-selected sample of surviving firms. Suppose that the relation between 
innovation output and innovation inputs is positive and that survival is greater for 
innovating firms. Then selecting a group of surviving firms selects, among the firms 
with low innovation and human capital, only those firms who have had a positive 
shock to innovation. This then flattens the expected relation between innovation 
and innovation inputs. Thus the possible reduction in the effects of innovation in- 
puts due to controlling for fixed effects might be overstated by the reduced effect 
due to selection. The second set of econometric issues axise from the incidental 
parameters problem in non-linear models. 12 The fixed effects maximum likelihood 
estimator is inconsistent when T is fixed. As Greene (2004) notes, how serious these 
problems are in practical terms remains to be established - there is only a very small 
amount of received empirical evidence and very little theoretical foundation. How- 
ever, his simulations suggest in T=2 very substantial bias (of the order of 100%) 
to coefficients in probit models. Thus there axe a number of ways forward. One is 
to use the pooled estimator, rather than the random or fixed effect models(Greene, 
2004). Another is to use the conditional logit model (Chamberlain, 1984), where 
the functional form allows one to estimate the paxameters of interest without having 
to estimate the incidental paxameters. Note that in the conditional logit identifi- 
cation is provided only by firms who switch their innovation status: all firms with 
unchanged innovation output drop out of the conditional likelihood function. In our 
sample of 787 "panel" firms we observe 361 changes. Thus, the number of useful 
observations is smaller, and hence estimation less precise for the conditional logit 
estimator. Note too that another limitation is that we cannot estimate maxginal 
effects in this model. 
The second measure of innovation outcome of firms we use is the number of 
121n lineax models, the incidental parameters i. e. the fixed effects are eliminated by differencing 
or by taking deviations from group means. This option is unavailable in non-linear models. 
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patents applied for. This variable only takes on non-negative integer values, thus 
we can use count data models to estimate the innovation production function in 
this case. In particular, we decide to use a negative binomial model (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1986), which, relative to a Poisson model, relaxes the variance-mean 
equality assumption. 
In the negative binomial model, the estimated coefficients corresponds to semi- 
elasticities. Thus, we can derive both the marginal effects and the elasticities from 
the estimated coefficients. For x continuous, 
iOE[ylx] 1 
axj E(ylx) 
the marginal effects is: 25ý1 = exp(xo), Oj OXJ 
and similarly we can calculated the elasticity at the sample mean by multiplying 
the coefficient by the average xj in the sample. As for endogeneity, we used panel 
data methods and we estimate a fixed effect negative binomial model, by conditional 
maximum likelihood. 
4.4.2 Estimation Results 
The estimation results of equation 4.2 for the two measures of innovation used, Inno- 
vate and Patents are reported in tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. As discussed earlier, 
these two dependent vaxiables present a basic trade-off of breadth versus quantifica- 
tion. We have a qualitative measure of knowledge output, Innovate, which enjoy the 
advantage of measuring innovation more broadly. We have a quantitative measure 
of knowledge output, Patents, which is a count variable, rather than dichotomous, 
but it measures knowledge output more naxrowly than the previous one. We will 
start with the broader measure. 
Table 4.4 reports regression results for several specifications of the knowledge 
production function in equation 4.2, all of which use as the regressand our baseline 
knowledge-output measure Innovate. Columns 1-5 and 7-8 of Table 4.4 are estimated 
via probit, column 6 by IV probit, and column 9 by conditional logit. All rows in 
a column report the marginal impacts (and robust standard errors, clustered on 
firm within an enterprise group) for the indicated regressor, except for column 9 
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which reports coefficients not marginal effects (see above). All specifications in 
Table 4.4 include a common set of control regressors (not reported for brevity) to 
help control for plausibly important cross-firm sources of innovative heterogeneity: 
a full set of two-digit industry dummies (approximat'ely 50 controls), a full set of 
regional dummies (12 controls); firm size (measured as total employment), and a 
categorical indicator for enterprise's Structural Changes (to account for patterns 
such as newly-born start-up firms being more likely to innovate a lot). 
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Column 1 estimates the knowledge production function with only the GE dum- 
mies. They are all statistically significant. Furthermore, they axe quantitatively 
significant. The coefficient on MNE parent for example indicates that MNE parents 
are 22 percentage points more likely to innovate relative to the domestic firms (the 
omitted category). Recall from Table 4.1 that in the raw data such firms are 27 
percentage points (0.45-0.18) more innovative on average, so the dummies in this 
regression are explaining the bulk of this difference. Note too that all these regres- 
sions include employment numbers and industry, region and start-up dummies; as 
we shall see later these variables account for almost all of the vaxiation in patents 
but little of the variation in this broader innovation measure. 
Column 2 adds to the production function in Column 1 our H indicator, namely 
R&D personnel. This is positive and statistically significant, but reduces the co- 
efficients on the dummies only slightly. To get some idea of the quantitative signif- 
icance, the gap between R&D employment in domestic and MNE parents is 26.16- 
0.62=24.53 (data from Table 4.2). Multiplying this by the coefficient in Table 4.4 
column 2 (0.0073) gives an implied probability difference of 19 percentage points, 
which is quantitatively significant. 13 
Both these specifications omit however the information flow variables that the 
KPF suggests are important determinants of AK and are plausibly correlated with 
H and GE. Thus in column 3 we add the information flow variables, here using 
only reported internal information from the own enterprise. Columns 4 and 5 add 
information flows from the enterprise group and from both enterprise and group 
respectively. A number of common findings appear in these columns. First, the 
coefficient, although not the significance of the GE dummies is cut to about one 
third of its previous value. Second, there is a similar reduction in the coefficient on 
H. Thus including these information flow measures matters greatly. Third, many 
of the information dummies are statistically significant. Internal information from 
the own enterprise for example has a higher marginal effect than information from 
the enterprise group and vertical information is positive and significant as well, 
13Note in passing that this column allows one to test a maintained assumption in some of the 
macro/growth literature, namely that the global stock of knowledge is equally accessible to all 
firms. If this were so then these global-engagement indicators should be individually and jointly 
insignificantly different from zero, with differences in AK explained only by differences in H. The 
data reject this hypothesis. 
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echoing the finding of vertical spillovers in micro-level productivity studies. Finally, 
regulatory information is negative which might be expected, whereas information 
from competitors is also negative, which might not be expected. One possibility is 
that conditional on all these other sources of information enterprises learning from 
their competitiors might be innovation laggards. The remainder of the table explores 
these results further. Column 6 shows an IV estimate of column 5, instrumenting 
H with the industry averages derived from CIS2 set out above. The coefficient on 
H does not change although the precision of the estimate falls somewhat, as might 
be expected with IV estimation. Column 7 estimates the same regression for CIS2, 
where note there axe many fewer observations. The overall coefficient estimates 
look very similar indeed with only one coefficient changing sign (that on commercial 
information) 14 but the precision of the estimates is reduced, in line with the smaller 
sample size. Column 8 then pools CIS2 and CIS3 together and returns quite precisely 
estimated effects, similax in magnitude to the CIS3 cross-section in column 5. " 
Finally, column 9 shows the coefficient estimates (not the marginal effects) for a 
fixed effects conditional logit model. The number of observations is 494; recall that 
this model relies on enterprises who changed from innovating to not innovating 
(or vice versa) which in this case is 247 enterprises (observed twice making 494 
observations). Thus the number of observations is small and selected, as discussed 
above. Recalling that we cannot compare the magnitudes of the reported coefficients 
since they are not marginal effects, the following points are worth noting. Firstly, 
the only statistically significant vaxiable is learning from one's own enterprise, which 
is strongly significant. Secondly, all the other variables are statistically insignificant 
at conventional levels, with the only variables to have t statistics in excess of unity 
are multinational parents (positive coefficient), vertical information (positive), and 
competitor's information (negative). Thus one possibility is that innovation and its 
inputs axe highly serially correlated and that we simply have too few observations 
14This might be due to this variable being slightly differently defined in the two surveys, due to 
changes in the survey question (see Appendix CIA for details. 
15We also comment here on the unreported regressors. The dummy on expanding startups 
generally has a positive coefficient, as we would expect. Many industry dummies are individually 
significant, and all are jointly significant. Regional dummies largely insignificant individually and 
jointly. Size almost always significantly positive, as we might suspect. Finally, the CIS3 wave 
dummies in the pooled and fixed effect specifications are negative implying a fall in AK in 1998- 
2000 relative to 1994-96. This is entirely consistent with the fall in UK TFP between the early 
and late 1990s documented by Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan (2003). 
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of switchers to pick up statistically significant effects (the other possibility is of 
course that the innovation process is truly dominated by factors not measured by 
our regressors aside from internal information). To get some idea of this we ran a 
pooled regression on the 247 enterprises over the two years and found again that 
none of the coefficients were statistically significant, suggesting that the source of 
the problem is the small sample. 16 
We would not wish to rely on one measure of innovation however, and thus we 
turn to Table 4.5 where AKj is measured as the numbers of patents the firm has 
applied for during the 1998-2000 period. The pattern of findings is similar to that 
of Table 4.4, but with some interesting differences. Regaxding the similarity, firstly, 
the coefficient on the GE dummies falls when the information flow variables axe 
included (compare column 3 to columns 1 and 2). Secondly, the coefficient on R&D 
personnel is consistently positive (although not significant in column 9). Thirdly, 
the information flow variables are also statistically significant, in particular the two 
internal flow variables. Finally, in both tables the significance levels in the fixed 
effects regressions are rather low. There axe at least two interesting differences. 
First, Table 4.1 shows very substantial differences in the number of patents applied 
for between GE and domestic firms: MNE parents applied for on average 10.02 
patents and domestics 0.10 patents. Yet the coefficients on the GE dummies in 
table 5 column 1 suggest differences of between 0.2 and 0.7 of a patent. Recall 
however that this regression includes industry dummies, which if dropped, render 
the GE coefficients similax to the raw GE/domestic differences in Table 4.1. This 
emphasises that much of the variation in patents is industry-specific. Additionally, it 
is interesting to note that the university information variables axe highly significant 
which one might expect given the innovation measure is patents. The coefficient on 
vertical information, contraxy to table 4.4, does not enter the equation in a consistent 
way, for one specification is significantly positive, for some insignificant and in one 
case is significantly negative. In column 9, we report the coefficients of the negative 
binomial fixed effects. The sample is very small (n=198), as expected the coefficients 
present the same broad patterns as in the previous columns but the standard errors 
16Note also that we checked the robustness of the results to having chosen probit rather then 
logit as our preferred estimator. Unreported logit estimates of column (1)-(8) yield very similar 
results to the ones presented. 
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have increased dramatically for most regressors except for the internal information 
- self vaxiable which stays very significant. 
A number of points are worth highlighting from these results. First, what is the 
status of our estimated coefficients given the problems of endogeneity? As in almost 
all studies of production functions, there is bound to be an unobserved variable, such 
as managerial talent, that affects both outputs and inputs. Regarding our study the 
following points are worth making. 
First, whilst we expect omitted variable bias from omitted managerial inputs our 
main focus in this paper has been the omitted variable bias from omitted knowledge 
flow inputs, which are often unavailable in many data sets. We have, we believe, 
documented substantial bias from this source, which we think to be of interest. 
Second, there is then of course remaining bias from unobservable managerial 
variables. To some extent the GE dummies capture this, since a body of evidence 
has documented that such firms have higher productivity controlling for all other 
observable inputs. Thus, the omitted variable bias to our explanatory variables arises 
from that part explaining differences in AK over and above the average effects of the 
status of domestic, home and affiliate MNE and exporter status. The quantitative 
impact of this remaining bias is unclear. A solution to it requires more data: more 
cross sections to control for the fixed part of it and more data to better identify 
exogenous variation in the regressors. Finally, we have attempted to control for this 
bias by instrumenting the H variables and to the extent that the information flows 
variables are exogenous to the firm (e. g. information from universities) bias should 
be less of a problem-" Second, although in all specifications the GE dummies are 
reduced by the inclusion of information flows, they typically remain statistically 
significant, and so contribute at least some explanatory power to the variation in 
AKj. This then raises the question of how much of the variation in AKj is explained 
by differences in GE status and how much by these inputs. 
From these tables, we can now set out, for both AK measures, the proportion of 
the innovation advantage of MNE parents accounted for by a number of factors. For 
example, we find that a higher level of R&D personnel explains almost 14% of the 
observed within industry-region domestic multinational advantage (from column 1 of 
17However, these information flow variables are weighted by their importance which is plausibly 
correlated with managerial ability. 
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Table 4.4, and 20% of the foreign affiliates innovative advantage. ". The knowledge 
flows explain an additional 58% of the domestic multinational advantage and 60% of 
the foreign affiliates advantage-19 The figures for the Patents variables are similar, 
although now the number of R&D employees explains 19% of the domestic MNE 
lead in patenting activity and only 6% of the foreign affiliates'. Information flows 
explain an additional 69% of the MNE innovative advantage and almost 73% for the 
foreign affiliates. 
4.4.3 Robustness Checks 
The results in Tables 4.4 through 4.5 are robust to a number of measurement and 
specification choices. In particular, the general impacts of our global-engagement 
and information-source regressors do not change when we vary the exact H measure 
of firm use of innovation-producing workers: e. g., if we use the level of scientists, 
or the total level of graduate workers instead of R&D personnel or shares of either 
of these measures rather than level. Results also do not change when we vary the 
set of control regressors: e. g., using firm sales instead of firm employment for size, 
or including age. 'O We also estimated a large number of specifications interacting 
our global-engagement indicators with other regressors-e. g., with our measures of H 
to see if globally engaged firms enjoy higher marginal productivity from knowledge 
inputs. These interactions almost always were insignificantly different from zero. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have tried to quantify how much of the superior innovative output 
of globally engaged firms in the UK is due to R&D investments and how much to 
external knowledge flows. Our approach has been to estimate knowledge produc- 
tion functions on a data set of U. K. firms in both the manufacturing and service 
sectors for which we have detailed information on knowledge outputs, inputs, and 
18Note that in column 1 we also control for size and structural change. These figures are calcu- 
lated as: 14%=(0.2204-0.1902)/0.1902 and similarly, 20%=(0.1871-0.1496)/0.1871 
1958%=(0.19-0.06)/0.22, and similarly for 60%. 
20The main reason why the vaxiable age is not included in the main specification is that for the 
service sector firms, this variable is censored at 1997, the first year the ARD data is available for 
this sector. 
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- importantly - flows from various knowledge stocks. We focused in particular on 
the hypothesis from the trade literature that globally engaged firms - either multi- 
nationals or exporters - have access to laxger knowledge stocks. We found that 
globally engaged firms do generate more ideas than their purely domestic coun- 
terparts. This is not just because they use more knowledge inputs. Importantly, 
it is also because they have access to a laxger knowledge stock through two main 
sources: their upstream and downstream contacts with suppliers and customers, 
and, for multinationals, their intra-firm worldwide pool of information. 
These results offer an initial step in the direction recommended by Jones (2003) 
in his forthcoming literature survey of economic growth: examining real-world data. 
As such, the results suggest that future modelling needs to think harder about 
possible pitfalls from assuming a seamless global stock of knowledge to which all 
actors have easy and equal access. These results also inform the growing literature 
in trade on multinational firms. For example, the now-standard knowledge-capital 
model of multinationals is laxgely silent on how these firms optimally structure intra- 
firm knowledge shaxing. In future work, we aim to apply our data to issues such as 
these. 
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Chapter 5 
Innovation and productivity 
growth 
5.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on innovation, investigating both its determinants 
and its contribution to firm performance (measured as productivity growth or as 
maxket value) - 
Since the seminal papers by Criliches (1979) and Griliches and Pakes (1980) a 
widespread approach is to frame the relationship between innovation and its deter- 
minants in a knowledge production function and the contribution of innovation to 
productivity growth in an output production function. The knowledge production 
function approach described in Griliches and Pakes (1980) assumes that the produc- 
tion of new knowledge depends on current and past investment in new knowledge 
(e. g. current and past R&D expenditures), and other factors such as knowledge 
flows from outside the firm. 
A first order measurement problem that economists have had to face is how to 
measure 'new knowledge'. There axe broadly two ways to approach the problem. 
A first approach is to use patent data to measure 'inventive output'. Although 
patents are a direct measure of the output of the innovation process, by no means all 
innovations are patented and there is great heterogeneity in the propensity to patent 
among firms, because of great differences in the relative importance of patenting as 
a baxrier to imitation both between sectors and among different type of innovations. 
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A second stream of the literature measures additions to knowledge capital indi- 
rectly using total factor productivity growth and relates this directly to R&D stock 
constructed using perpetual inventory methods (see for example Hall and Mairesse 
(1995)). The main limitations of this approach are that productivity growth is a 
noisy measure of innovative/inventive output and that R&D, though typically well- 
codified, is only an input to the innovation process and what really matters for total 
factor productivity growth is the output of this process. 
Both approaches use, as proxies for investments in knowledge capital stock, mea, 
sures based on past and present R&D expenditure of the firm. The strengths and 
weaknesses of this measures are well-known; measures of R&D axe reasonably well 
codified. However, firms, in paxticular small and in the service sector, might gener- 
ate technological advance outside formal R&D laboratories which R&D expenditure 
might not capture. 
A similar measurement problem arises in the attempt to capture knowledge flows 
or knowledge spillovers that, because of the public good aspect of knowledge, con- 
tribute to the production of innovative output. There are two approaches. One 
uses patent citations to measure knowledge flows (see e. g. Jaffe (1986) and Jaffe 
et al. (1993)). Once again, a strength of this literature is that patents and citations 
axe well-codified. However, it is likely that patents do not measure all innovations. 
Furthermore, there has recently been some criticism of the use of citations. ' A sec- 
ond stream of literature uses aggregate level of R&D within the firm's industry to 
capture horizontal knowledge spillovers, or across industries weighted using input- 
output tables to capture backward and forward linkages ('vertical' spillovers) (see 
e. g. Bernstein and Nadiri (1989); see also Griliches (1992) for a survey). 
This chapter attempts to build on a third approach which tries to overcome some 
of the problems discussed above in the measurement of both innovative output and 
knowledge flows. It should be stressed at the outset that given the deep measurement 
problems no approach, including the one discussed here, is perfect. Therefore this 
approach is to be considered as a complement to those above and this analysis is 
I The issue of concern is the noise that examiners' citations add to estimated flows of knowledge. 
Using newly available US patent data showing citations added by examiners, Alcker and Gittelman 
find that examiners add 40 per cent of all citations and two-thirds of citations on the average patent 
are inserted by examiners. Purthermore, examiners' citations differ systematically from inventors' 
citations. This may bias estimates of the parameters of interest. 
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very much of an exploratory exercise into whether the new data used might be 
helpful in confirming or adding to the insights the current literature has generated. 
This approach endeavors to model the links between innovation inputs, external 
knowledge flows, innovation outputs and productivity growth using new information 
from firm level innovation surveys. 
As in chapter 4 the data is based on the UK Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS), a survey carried out in EU countries in the early, mid and late 1990S2 along 
the lines set out in the Oslo manual (1992). This company survey attempts to mea- 
sure innovations directly by asking firms about their product and process innovations 
and their innovation inputs by asking about expenditure on R&D and other knowl- 
edge investments and the relative importance of various knowledge flows. Thus, 
the key contributions of these data is that one can estimate the knowledge produc- 
tion function using a different output; rather than patents, I use the proportion of 
sales generated by new products and the presence of process innovations. Also I 
use different inputs; not only R&D but all innovation expenditure (including e. g. 
investment in training and design activities). Of course, a host of other issues arise, 
such as accuracy of measurement, use of self-reported data, etc., which is why this 
approach is also not immune to measurement problems. 
A significant limitation of the CIS questionnaire is that it has no labour pro- 
ductivity /TFP information on it. Thus, one cannot examine the relationship be- 
tween the CIS innovation measures and productivity without linking the survey with 
other data sources which can provide information on productivity. The matched 
innovation-productivity data quantifies the performance effects of the innovation 
processes that the CIS describes. 
This chapter implements this linking for the UK manufacturing sector. The UK 
CIS was carried out using the same sampling frame (the Interdepartmental Business 
Register, IDBR) as the one used to conduct the ABI. We have therefore obtained the 
raw innovation data and corresponding production data and matched them. The 
ABI provides a wealth of information on output, employment, material use, capital 
etc. Thus the matching allows me to relate productivity/TFP with innovation. To 
the best of my knowledge this study is the first to use this matched information for 
2For the UK there have been three CIS surveys, CIS1 (covering the period 1991-3), CIS2 (1994- 
6) and CIS3 (1998-2000). 
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the UK. 3 
The main objectives of this chapter are the following. Firstly, since these data 
have not been analysed before the study carefully analyses, identifies and corrects 
inconsistencies in the data. Secondly, the study develops a framework that explains 
the different stages of the development of both product and process innovation and 
links them with the productivity growth of the firm. Thirdly, I apply this theoretical 
framework to find consistent patterns in the data. 
The results show the following. Firstly, the firm's decision whether and how 
much to invest in innovation is positively correlated with international competition, 
the availability of skilled workers and with the availability of methods of protection 
of innovations. Secondly, internal innovation expenditure is only one of the factors 
associated with successful innovation. The results show that cooperation and knowl- 
edge from other firms in the enterprise group and from suppliers and customers have 
a positive correlation with successful innovation. However, I need to point out that 
when drawing conclusions from these results I am faced with data limitations: whilst 
firms axe asked about the sources of their external knowledge they are not asked if 
such sources axe paid for. Thus, I cannot define such sources as 'pure spillovers'. 
Thirdly, my results show that it is important to distinguish between product and 
process innovation, as well as novel and incremental (non-novel) innovations. Some 
of the self-reported estimates of innovation axe correlated with TFP growth and 
some are not: in paxticular the negative correlation between novel process inno- 
vation and productivity growth might appear counterintuitive. This might reflect 
reality, since process innovations take time to feed through to productivity growth, 
or the fact that firms that face a decrease in demand or are going through financial 
difficulties axe more likely to implement process and that this improvements will be 
reflected in increased productivity with some delay (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990, 
and Nickell et al., 2001) but it might reflect the weakness of the measures used. I 
investigate this issue further in the chapter. I try to control for the delay in the 
effect for process innovation using information on the success of process innovation 
using self-reported information from the innovation survey. I find that process inno- 
3Haxris and Robinson (2001) has matched the UK CIS with the UK Census of production, 
but has not analysed the matched data. Examples of matched CIS/Census data are, for France, 
Crepon et al. (2000); for the Netherlands, Klomp and van Leeuwen (2001); for Sweden, Loof and 
Heshmati (2002) and for Finland, Leiponen (2000). 
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vations that firms report as being successful in improving production flexibility are 
correlated with positive productivity growth. 
I also show that organisational and managerial change is positively correlated 
with productivity growth conditional on technological process and product innova- 
tions. 
Finally, I show that the rate of returns to R&D are, as in previous studies, quite 
imprecisely estimated when the R&D sales ratio is included in a productivity growth 
equation. In a regression of firm reported innovation on own R&D, I find that the 
returns to R&D are much more precisely estimated. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.2 1 describe the data. Section 
5.3 relates my approach to the previous literature and in particular to previous 
empirical studies that have used the CIS and matched Innovation-Production data. 
Section 5.4 sets out an organising framework. Section 5.5 reports the empirical 
results. Section 5.6 concludes. In the Appendix DI report more details on the data, 
the cleaning procedures and the definition and construction of the main variables of 
interest as well as additional results. 
5.2 The Data 
5.2.1 The ARD 
The ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) is described in some detail in 
Criscuolo et al. (2003), so only a brief description is included here. The ARD 
consists of the micro data from the Annual Census of Production (ACOP) up to 
1997 and the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) thereafter. The micro data axe the 
replies to the Census forms, response to which is mandatory under the 1947 Statis- 
tics of Trade Act. These forms are sent out to firms who are on the UK business 
register (the Inter-Departmental Business Register, IDBR) and requests information 
on inputs and outputs. Information is also collected on plants' industry, region, and 
nationality of ownership. Each unit who replies is assigned a unique identification 
number. Units also have another identification number corresponding to the entity 
that owns them (the firm) so units under common ownership share the same firm 
identifier. 
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To limit reporting burdens on businesses, the ACOP/ABI axe both stratified 
sample surveys. All laxger enterprises over a threshold number of employees are 
surveyed, but a sample is taken of smaller enterprises (with the sampling rules 
changing every so often (see Criscuolo et al., 2003 for details). These surveyed 
businesses form what is called the "selected" sample and they account for over 80% 
of total employment in manufacturing (Oulton, 1997). The rest of the units on 
the register are not sampled (the "non-selected" sample), and their information on 
industrial classification, region and employment comes from the business register. In 
addition to those units that were "non-selected" for the survey, some units that did 
not respond also have only register data available. Register employment information 
comes from separate inquiries and may, for firms below 10 employees, be imputed 
from turnover data (Perry, 1995). 
In my analysis, the main concerns axe related to the level of aggregation. Surveys 
are conducted at the "reporting unit" level. This may be an individual "local unit", 
where a "local unit" (in the manufacturing survey) is a production facility at a single 
mailing address, which corresponds to a production unit or plant (in retailing for 
example it would be a shop). However, in multi-plant or multi local unit firms, the 
"reporting unit" may be a group of local units, where the grouping is agreed by the 
ONS and the firm (along similax product lines for example). 
In the measurement of productivity growth problems may axise when "reporting 
units" decide to change over time the number of local units they report on. To 
minimise measurement error I use a cleaned 4 dataset that excludes all unrealistic 
growth rates for output and inputs of the production process. Secondly, given the 
"selected" vs. "non-selected" structure of the data, the ARD panel is unbalanced 
panel and with gaps, Le. reporting units productivity measures (e. g. value added 
and material inputs) are only available for the years when the reporting units axe 
in the "selected sample". In Appendix D. 3 I describe in detail how I constructed 
the growth measures to account for this. Moreover, I concentrated my attention 
to calculating growth variables for the latter half of the '90s, since in 1993 and 
1994, a complete recoding of local, reporting and firm identification numbers was 
undertaken. 
Additional issues arise when matching the ARD to other datasets, such as the 
4Details of the cleaning procedure are given in the Appendix D. 
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Community Innovation Survey (CIS). We will discuss these after having described 
the CIS. 
5.2.2 The Community innovation Survey 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is a voluntary postal survey carried out by 
ONS on behalf of the DTI. Eurostat proposed an initial questionnaire and the DTI 
added questions. The CIS began in 1993 (CIS1) and was repeated in 1997 (CIS2) and 
2001 (CIS3). As the response to the first CIS survey was poor, the CIS2 is the first 
survey I can use to conduct analysis. Each time a stratified sample of firms with 
more than 10 employees is drawn from the Inter-Departmental Business Register 
(IDBR) by industry, region and size. The survey covers both the production and 
the service sectors. Fieldwork for the second Community Innovation Survey took 
place between August 1997 and March 1998 and firms were asked to complete data 
referring to the period 1994 to 1996. At the time of selection, 5,892 were sampled 
and 2,339 responded (Table 1, column 1, row 1 and 2; accounting for bankruptcy, 
this was a response rate of 43.2%. Manufacturers and service sector companies were 
sent very slightly different questionnaires ; replies and response rates were 1,596 and 
743,41% and 37% respectively. The Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3) 
was in the field twice. The first wave sampled 13,340 enterpises, the second top-up 
covered 6,285 to make the sample representative at the regional level. The CIS 3 
covers the period 1998-2000. Of the total 19,625 enterprises to which the survey 
was sent, 8,172 responded, achieving a response rate of 42%. Table C. 1 sets out the 
details the composition of the innovation surveys. 
Since the CIS is a voluntary and postal survey, one of the main problems for 
this sort of surveys is the risk of low-response and thus of non-response bias. To 
boost response, enterprises are sent the survey, posted a reminder, posted a second 
reminder (with the survey again) and finally telephoned. Although data custodians 
have reported no bias for both CIS2 and CIS3, when looking at the chaxacteristics of 
both respondents and non-respondents I find (in unreported analysis) that in both 
CIS2 and CIS3 non-respondents axe on average significantly larger than respondents, 
both in terms of turnover and employment. 
A second issue is that the survey was conducted at the enterprise level; where 
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enterprise is defined in the questionnaire as "the smallest combinations of legal units 
which have a certain degree of autonomy within an enterprise group". This corre- 
sponds to the "reporting unit" level at which the ABI is carried out thus facilitating 
matching. However, there might be discrepancies between the two surveys due to 
different people within the firm responding to either survey and to the CIS responses 
being retrospective. 5 
The third issue is that the answers to a survey are necessarily subjective. The es- 
sential idea of the survey is to try to get enterprises to report separately technological 
change/innovations as opposed to organisational innovations. In turn, technological 
6 innovations are split into process and product innovations. Since companies are 
asked about products or processes that are "technologically new" there is obvious 
scope for differences in interpretation of "technological" and "new". The question- 
naire does however give extensive guidance on both these terms, but there is always 
the problem of misinterpretation or indeed reporting yes to all questions for fear of 
a company being seen as in some way backward. All this introduces measurement 
error into the level of innovations, biasing us against finding a significant relation 
between productivity growth and innovations if firms are randomly mis-reporting or 
biasing down the expected relation if firms report positively innovations when they 
5We chedc the robustness of my result to this issue in two ways: firstly I estimate productivity 
growth regressions only on the subset of single firms-plants; secondly I only keep those firms for 
which the ratio of the turnover reported in CIS to the turnover in ABI either for 1998 or 2000 is 
within the [0.5,1.5] range. 
6The questions concerning product and process innovation are as follows. Regarding product 
innovation, the survey reads "For this survey product innovation covers both goods and services 
introduced to the market which are either new or significantly improved with respect to fundamental 
characteristics. The innovation should be based on the results of new technological developments, 
new combinations of existing technology or utilisation of other knowledge by your firm. For ex- 
amples of product innovations see inside front cover. We are interested in products new to your 
enterprise - even if already on the market - as well as those that are new to your market. " And the 
question is: "During the three year period 1998-2000, did your enterprise introduce any technolog- 
ically new or significantly improved products (goods or services) which were new to your firm? ". 
Similarly for process innovation, "For this survey process innovation is the use of new or signifi- 
cantly improved technology for production or the supply of goods and services. Purely organisational 
or managerial changes should not be included. For example of process innovations see inside front 
cover. We are interested in processes new to your enterprise - even if already in use in your in- 
dustry - as well as those that are new to your industry. " and the question: "During the three 
year period 1998-2000, did your enterprise introduce any new or significantly improved processes 
for producing or supplying products (goods or services) which were new to yourfirm? ". Reported 
examples of process innovations - derived from real examples from previous surveys - axe: Link- 
ing of Computer Aided Design station to parts suppliers; Introduction of Electronic Point of Sale 
equipment in Garden Centre; Digitising of pre-press in printing house; Robotised welding 
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axe not actually innovating. 7 Companies are asked to describe their most important 
product or process. The response rates are not high (about 30%) but a casual pe- 
rusal of the responses indicated that, except a hand full of respondents, enterprises 
were able to identify technological innovations. 
Fourth, the survey asks for innovation in the period 1998-2000 (1994-96 for CIS2), 
but innovation expenditure in 2000 (in 1996 for CIS2). If innovation expenditure 
is highly serially correlated this should not be too much of a problem, but I ac- 
knowledge this is a limitation, especially when estimating the knowledge production 
function. 
In the next section, I describe the issues related to the matching of innovation 
and production data. 
5.2.3 Matching CIS and ARD 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) maintains a register of businesses designed 
to capture the universe of activity. Before 1994 this was for production activity, but 
since 1994 it has covered services as well. The pre-1994 register was drawn from a 
variety of sources including historical records, tax returns and other surveys. Since 
1994 it is based on the Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR). 
Since both the Community Innovation Survey and the Annual Business Inquiry 
use as sampling frame the IDBR, matching of the two datasets is based on the 
common greporting unit' identifiers. However, in the matching process care must be 
taken because of inconsistencies across the two surveys. 
Businesses are asked to provide reporting unit level information for the CIS and 
I therefore matched at the reporting unit level. However, for multi-plant estab- 
lishments the "reporting unit" level in the ARD does not always seem to perfectly 
match the reporting unit level in the CIS survey, according to variables present in 
both surveys such as employment and turnover. Although there is no easy solution 
to these problems, I identified those reporting units for which differences across sur- 
vey suggest differences ion levels of reporting information and checked the robustness 
7An alternative is that firms are always too optimistic or pessimistic e. g. they systematically 
over- or under- report both innovations and inputs to innovations (R&D, knowledge flows etc. ) 
leading to a spurious correlation between the two, however since it is likely that different people 
within the firm answer the two questionnaires and that the forms axe distributed at different point 
in time, this problem seems less likely to be a major issue in my case. 
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of my results to the inclusion of these observations. 8 
The second source of discrepancy lies in the industrial classification. In those 
cases (less than 100) where there was a discrepancy between the industrial classifica- 
tion in the Innovation survey and that of the ARD, I use the classification from the 
ARD. 9 Moreover, since the innovation survey is the same for both production and 
service sectors, I decided to include in the sample the few enterprises that were in 
the manufacturing sector according to the ARD but in the service sector according 
to the CIS. " 
In the next section I describe the features of the CIS sample and the matched 
CIS-ARD sample that I use for the empirical analysis. 
5.2.4 Some Features of the Data 
Table 5.1 reports characteristics of both the CIS3 sample and the CIS3-ARD matched 
sample. 
In both panels, looking at the top row, the median firm in CIS3 does no patenting, 
although the mean firm in the CIS3 sample did apply for 1 patent in the 1998/00 
period and in the CIS3-ARD matched sample did apply for 3 patents. The second 
row shows the median firm in CIS3 spends zero percent of its sales on R&D, with 
again slightly a higher mean figure of 0.6% (0.7% in the bottom panel). Both these 
results reflect the well-known skewness in patents and R&D: Bloom and van Reenen 
(2002), report that the 12 largest UK firms account for 72% of patenting and 80% 
of R&D expenditure. 
Row 3 to row 9 widen the scope of innovation data. Firstly, row 3 reports the total 
spending in innovation, i. e. inside and outside R&D laboratories (for acquisition of 
external knowledge, design, training, maxketing and machinery). Here, the median 
firm spends 0.3% (0.7% in the bottom panel) of its sales on innovation and the mean 
8S! nce the CIS3 is asked retrospectively and the persons answering the questionnaire are likely to 
be different from those responsible for answering the ABI, I do not expect the values of turnover and 
employment reported to be exactly the same in the two surveys. We decided to consider problematic 
observations those for which the ratio of employment in 2000 in CIS3 and on employment in 2000 
from the ARD is either smaller than 0.5 or larger than 1.5. 
9In unreported regression results I checked the robustness of my result to this choice. The 
results were virtually unchanged. 
IOThis choice was also supported from the direct information from the enterprises available in 
CIS3 ("please briefly describe your enterprise's main product "), which was available for some of 
these reporting units 
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Table 5.1: Summary of innovation measures, CIS3 and CIS3-ARD matched sample 
CIS3 sample 
medians means sd 
1 Number of patents applications 0 1.215 (8.242) 
2 R&D spending (% of turnover 2000) 0 0.006 (0.032) 
3 Innovation expenditure (% of turnover 2000) 0.003 0.027 (0.070) 
4 Novel process (0/1) 0 0.083 (0.276) 
5 Process Innovation (0/1) 0 0.241 (0-428) 
6 Novel product (0/1) 0 0.132 (0.339) 
7 Product Innovation (0/1) 0 0.278 (0-448) 
8 %Turnover new and improved products 0 0.080 (0.191) 
9% Turnover novel products 0 0.022 (0.095) 
matched ARD-CIS3 sample 
1 Number of patents applications 0 2.770 (13.220) 
2 R&D spending (% of turnover 2000) 0 0.007 (0.021) 
3 Innovation expenditure (% of turnover 2000) 0.007 0.026 (0-048) 
4 Novel process (0/1) 0 0.121 (0.327) 
5 Process Innovation (0/1) 0 0.346 (0-476) 
6 Novel product (0/1) 0 0.191 (0.393) 
7 Product Innovation (0/1) 0 0.386 (0-487) 
8 Murnover new and improved products 0 0.095 (0.196) 
9% Turnover novel products 0 0.029 (0.107) 
Notes: Reported statistics axe unweighted medians, means and standard 
deviations. In panel 1, the CIS3 sample used contains 2687 observations. The 
matched CIS3-ARD sample used in panel 2 contains 708 observations. Both 
samples only include manufacturing firms. For a definition of the variables I refer 
to the appendix. 
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firm 2.7% (2.6% in the bottom panel). The fifth to ninth rows of the table give some 
evidence on whether the firm reports any process or product innovation. Although 
the median firm still reports zero innovation using these innovation indicators, on 
average 24.1% (row 5, top panel) and 27.8% (row 8, top panel) of firms have process 
or product innovated. Thus the distribution is much less skewed and the CIS3 seems 
to be capturing something broader than R&D or patents. As well as just data on 
process and product innovation, the CIS3 also asks respondents to differentiate 
between product and process innovation that is "new and improved", or"novel", 
the latter being defined as new to the market (product innovation) and new to the 
industry (process innovation). Row 4 and 6 in the table show, not surprisingly, that 
fewer firms engage in novel innovation, both product or process. Finally the table 
shows the shaxe of innovation expenditure in total output, which although small, is 
larger than just R&D expenditure and less skewed. Figures in the top and bottom 
panel provide the same qualitative picture, which is also very similar in quantitative 
terms. This gives us reassurance regaxding the representativeness of the matched 
sample relative to the whole CIS3. 
CIS3 adds information on the internal and external sources of knowledge. " As 
described in detail in the appendix, we distinguish among various sources of inno- 
vation. Table 5.2 reports the importance of these sources of information for firms 
with below and above median innovation expenditure. Two interesting facts emerge. 
Firstly, looking down the columns gives an indication of what sources of informa- 
tion are more highly rated. Internal and vertical information is highly rated by 
both groups of firms as is free and regulatory information. Secondly, firms with 
innovation expenditure above the median i. e. who axe investing more in generating 
innovations also report higher importance of other knowledge flows. For example, 
the importance of internal and vertical knowledge flows'triples in firms with above 
median innovation expenditure. This suggests that returns to innovation expendi- 
ture estimated in studies that cannot account for the role of external knowledge 
flows might be affected by a (upwaxd) omitted variable bias. 
III would like to stress that our measure of external knowledge should be viewed as wide mea- 
sure of knowledge flows, that include two different mechanisms of transmission: 'pure knowledge 
spillovers' that do not entail a market transaction and knowledge acquisition for which the firm is 
paying a price. Given the nature of the question, however, I think our measure does not encompass 
'rent spillovers', defined as pecuniaxy gains because of improved or cheaper inputs. 
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Table 5.2: Information sources for firms with below median and above median in- 
novation expenditure, CIS3 sample 
information sources below median above median 
1 internal 0.176 0.663 
(0.315) (0-351) 
2 from the group 0.093 0.323 
(0.232) (0.362) 
3 vertical 0.222 0.683 
(0.336) (0.307) 
4 competitors 0.119 0.368 
(0.236) (0.312) 
5 commercial 0.080 0.296 
(0.196) (0.310) 
6 free 0.175 0.513 
(0.287) (0.311) 
7 regulation 0.195 0.558 
(0.320) (0-340) 
8 university 0.058 0.210 
(0.174) (0.282) 
9 government 0.048 0.171 
(0-152) (0.255) 
Notes: Reported statistics are unweighted means with standaxd deviations in parentheses. 
means. Column 1 for a sample of 1,344 observations and column 2 for a sample of 1,343 
observation. The sources of information vary between 0 and 1. The definition of the sources of 
information is as follows: row 1 refers to information from within the enterprise; row 2 'group' 
refers to sources with other enterprises within the enterprise group; row 3, 'vertical' sources from 
clients, customers, suppliers; row 4 from competitors; row 5 'commercial' to information from 
consultancy enterprises, research association or commercial R&D laboratories; row 6 'free' from 
professional conferences, meetings and journals; row 7 'regulation' from health and safety and 
environmental regulations and from product standards; row 8 from universities; row 9 
&government' from government institutes; training and enterprise councils; Business links. 
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Table 5.3: Relative TFP, market share and productivity growth for non-innovators, 
incremental and novel p rocess and prod uct innovators 
Process Innovation none new to firm new to industry 
Initial relative TFP 0.014 0.015 0.045 
(0.203) (0.209) (0.204) 
Initial market share 0.026 0.026 0.031 
(0.069) (0.053) (0.065) 
LP growth (1997-2001) 0.022 0.045 0.011 
(0.178) (0-141) (0.168) 
TFP growth (1997-2001) 0.007 0.011 -0.001 
(0.065) (0.072) (0.068) 
Product Innovation none new to firm new to the market 
Initial relative TFP 0.004 0.016 0.066 
(0.205) (0.188) (0.212) 
Initial market share 0.022 0.038 0.030 
(0-047) (0.101) (0.065) 
LP growth (1997-2001) 0.020 0.033 0.038 
(0.174) (0-147) (0.175) 
TFP growth (1997-2001) 0.005 0.008 0.013 
(0.065) (0.052) (0.086) 
Notes: Reported statistics are unweighted means with standard deviations in brackets. Number 
of observation is 678 for productivity levels and 708 for productivity growth. Of these 708,458 
did not process innovate, 161 did only incremental process innovation and 89 introduced a novel 
process. The figures for product innovation axe: 434 did not product innovate, 142 introduced a 
product new to the firm and 132 introduced a product new to the industry. 
One final question of interest relates to whether firms spend nothing on inno- 
vation but can still successfully innovate because they can get information for free. 
I therefore computed how many firms report having innovated with no reported 
innovation expenditure. In the raw data some firms report unquantified spending, 
so I treated this as a positive expenditure; in the whole manufacturing sector (i. e. 
including tobacco and nuclear fuel) including Northern Ireland, there were 29 firms 
who report having innovated with no reported expenditure. Note that this is an 
upper bound on the true number since the questionnaire asks for innovations from 
1998-2000 but innovation expenditure in 2000. On a sample of 3,440 firms this is a 
bit under 0.84% of firms. Thus I decided to treat these observations as outliers and 
drop them from the analysis. 
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Table 5.3 sets out the productivity levels, market share and productivity (labour 
productivity and TFP) growth of innovating and non-innovating firms. Looking at 
the top panel for process innovators, the group of firms who do no process inno- 
vation have on average a relative TFP of 1.4% above the industry median level, 
those reporting non-novel process innovation have a similar mean level of 1.5%. In 
the third column we report the relative TFP of novel innovators: they are very 
much the best firms, in terms of relative TFP with an average level of 4.5%, both 
economically and statistically significant higher than the firms in the previous two 
columns. The figures for market share follow a similar pattern, although the lead of 
novel process innovators is not as strong. The picture is reversed when we look at 
productivity growth: here the novel process innovators are the worst performs, with 
negative TFP growth. The data for product innovation shows a similar pattern in 
terms of initial relative TFP, with the novel innovators being the best firms and 
the 'imitators' 12 better than the firms who do nothing. In terms of market share 
there is no significance difference between novel and non-novel product innovators. 
Regarding productivity growth, the picture is the opposite of what we saw in the 
top panel: the novel product innovators are also the enterprises with the highest 
(labour and TFP) growth. 
5.3 How do we fit in with the previous literature 
The main difference between this chapter and much of the previous literature is 
that changes in knowledge stocks are typically assumed to be either not measured, 
or measured by vaxiables such as R&D (e. g. Klette (1996)) and/or patents. 
Many studies use, as a proxy for innovation output, R&D intensity, measured 
either as percentage of expenditure on R&D on total sales or as the proportion of 
R&D employees. The main advantages of using R&D as innovation measure are 
that the definition of intra and extramural R&D is well codified and internationally 
harmonised in the Frascati manual and many subclassifications of R&D are avail- 
12We define imitators those who did not answer yes to the following question: "During the three 
year period, did your enterprise introduce any new or significantly improved products which were 
also new to your enterprise's market? " But did answer yes to the following question: "Did your 
enterprise introduce any technologically new or significantly improved products (goods or services) 
which were new to your firm? " I also call them non-novel innovators. 
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able (product vs process; development vs applied; intra vs extramural). Long time 
series are available both at the macro and micro level in many countries. One of 
the main criticisms in the literature is that R&D is an input to innovation, whose 
outcome is extremely uncertain. Secondly, R&D is only one of the inputs, indeed 
R&D measures do not account for technological activities generated outside R&D 
laboratories (e. g. in Design offices and Production engineering departments). This 
means that it captures very imperfectly the development of technology in small firms 
and in the service sector and underestimates process innovation and the develop- 
ment of (mainly software) technology related to information processing. Thirdly, for 
large multinational corporations reported R&D in one country might not reflect the 
actual changes in knowledge that the firm is experiencing. Finally, some see as a 
drawback that R&D projects differ greatly in their economic value (Freeman, 1982). 
A different approach is to use patent data as a measure of the output of the 
innovation process. The advantages are again the laxge availability of data, which is 
publicly (and electronically) available, and the long time-series dimension of patent 
information. However, this innovation measure has been criticised because both 
patents application and granting axe not exogenous. There are major intersectoral 
differences in the relative importance of patenting in acting as a barrier to imitation, 
and thus different incentives to use patents as protection methods. This implies that 
patenting rates by sectors will be negatively correlated with imitation costs in that 
sector. Major differences exist also amongst countries in procedures and criteria 
for granting patents. Finally, some see as a drawback that patents differ greatly 
in their economic value (Schankermann and Pakes, 1986). To overcome this latter 
limitation recent studies have also developed methods to rank patents according to 
their economic relevance using forward citations (Hall et al., 2001), but also this 
approach is not free from criticisms. 
Both patents and R&D expenditure suffer a drawback: the distribution of both 
patenting and R&D activity is highly skewed. Thus, firms with positive R&D spend- 
ing or with some patenting activity are likely to represent a very small percentage 
of the whole population, thus making estimation of their relationship highly depen- 
dent on few observations. Also, studies that match performance data with R&D 
or patent data have two drawbacks. Firstly, they cannot estimate all the stages of 
the process: R&D - productivity studies cannot estimate the knowledge production 
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function; patents-productivity studies can only estimate the last stage of the model, 
i. e. the innovation productivity growth relationship. Secondly, studies that use both 
R&D and patents data axe only able to measure part of innovation expenditure in 
the case of R&D and paxt of changes in knowledge stock in the case of patents, since 
there are other expenditures on innovation besides R&D and not all innovations are 
patented. 
The CIS survey attempts to develop a wider definition of innovation expenditure 
as well as new indicators of innovation outputs. On the input side, the CIS ques- 
tions cover a wider range of input into the innovation process, both as quantitative 
measures (R&D, machinery, training and design expenditure) and as qualitative 
variables (importance and nature of information flows, cooperation agreements). 
On the ouput side, the main strength of the CIS is to attempt to measure inno- 
vation outputs directly as new or improved product introduced on the market and 
innovative process implemented in the firm. It also attempts to measure innovation 
"height" (Duguet, 2004), distinguishing between innovations new to the market 
(that we define novel innovation) and new to the firm (incremental or imitative in- 
novations) and, for product innovations (both novel and incremental), its success, 
using a weighted measures of innovation sales in firm's total turnover. For process 
innovation, to measure success, we can use additional qualitative information on the 
impact of process innovation on improving production flexibility. 13 
Innovation measures derived from the CIS, however, are also not free of flaws. 
Firstly, the CIS is a retrospective self-reporting survey covering a three year period, 
so that measurement error, due to "rough guesses" (in paxticular for quantitative 
variables e. g. the sales share innovation measure or the innovation expenditure 
variables) or subjective interpretation (especially for qualitative vaXiables e. g. im- 
portance of information flows, effect of innovation) is likely to be an important issue. 
Also, a possible criticism is that expenditure in innovation, as any other investment 
might be lumpy 14 and the sales weighted measures axe affected by both the business 
and firm life cycle. Moreover, the CIS is affected by a timing issue: the questionnaire 
130ther effects include reduction of labour and material/energy costs, and increasing capacity. 
We concentrate on the effects on production flexibility because we believe that they are the ones 
that will show up in TFP growth analysis, since the other effects will be already incorporated in 
the material and labour vaxiables. 
14This is likely to be more of a problem for expenditure in machinery and equipment, rather 
than for other type of innovation expenditure that according to previous evidence axe quite sticky. 
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asks for innovation introduced over a three year period, but then it asks quantitative 
information on the innovation inputs only for the last of the three years; similaxly it 
asks for the distribution of turnover between new, improved and unchanged prod- 
ucts only for the yeax 2000. Finally, a general issue with CIS itself. the UK version 
of the questionnaire is about 14 pages long, thus relative response's quality across 
questions might be affected by where the question is in the survey form. 
The CIS itself has no performance data and so analysis conducted using purely 
information from the Community Innovation Survey cannot investigate the rela- 
tionship between innovation and productivity growth. Recently, a new strand of 
the literature has developed full structural models of the innovation process and 
the relationship between innovation and productivity using direct measures of in- 
novative output from CIS type surveys matched with production data. The first 
to develop such a model were Crepon et al. (2000), from now on CDM, that use 
the French Community Innovation Survey. Different versions of their model have 
been applied on data from other countries: Nordic Countries (Loof and Heshmati, 
2002), Chile (Benavente, 2004) and China (Jefferson et al., 2004). Klomp and van 
Leeuwen (2001), from now on KvL, use an alternative model to analyse matched 
CIS - census of production data for the Netherlands. I, therefore, discuss in more 
detail the CDM and the KvL models. 
CDM estimate the link between R&D, innovation output and labour productiv- 
ity as a system of simultaneous equations with a recursive structure using the first 
CIS for France. The first equation of the system is an R&D investment equation, 
the second is a knowledge production function, while the third is a value-added pro- 
ductivity equation. CDM estimate this system using the Asymptotic Least Squaxe 
method (ASL). The estimation is restricted to successful innovators, and thus the 
R&D investment equation is estimated using a generalized tobit specification. This 
choice is likely to be dictated by the structure of French version of the CIS1, which 
has a filter question at the beginning of the form which determines whether firms 
answer the rest of the survey. " Using only firms with positive R&D expenditure 
likely introduces a problem of selection, since R&D expenditure only covers for- 
mal innovation activity, smaller firms who conduct their innovative activity more 
informally might have zero R&D activity but still spend on innovation. 
15In the appendix they show the robustness of their results to this choice. 
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CDM have two versions of the knowledge production function depending on 
whether innovation output is measured by the proportion of sales due to new and 
improved products or by patents. The Cobb-Douglas productivity equation esti- 
mated in CDM has as left hand side variable the level of labour productivity. In- 
deed that the CDM study does not study the relationship between innovation and 
productivity growth. Finally, the identifying restrictions are for the innovation ex- 
penditure equation market shaxe and diversification, and, for the innovation output 
equation technology push and demand pull dummies, categorical variables based on 
whether innovation are determined by 'technology specific dynamics' or 'through the 
impetus given by the market', respectively. 
KvL estimate a system of simultenous equation using the Second CIS for the 
Netherlands. Differently from CDM, KvL look at the effect of innovation on output 
growth, and rather than using a production function framework, they estimate the 
effect of innovation on sales and employment growth. As input into the innova, 
tion production function they use the total innovation expenditure rather than just 
R&D. This is likely to improve on the selection bias introduced in the CDM model 
from including in the analysis only firms with positive R&D expenditure. In the 
KvL model, the dependent variable in the innovation production function is again 
product innovation, but measured as the log-odds ratio of the share of innovative 
sales. As noted by Wooldridge (2002), however, the use of the log-odds transfor- 
mation has two main disadvantages. First, the choice of the adjustments for the 
boundary values 0 and 1 is necessarily subjective; secondly the interpretation of the 
estimated coefficient is not straightforward without making any further assumptions. 
An additional difference relative to CDM, consists in the relevance given to process 
innovation, that was absent from the CDM model. KvL include process innovation 
as an additional control both in the product innovation function and directly in the 
performance growth equation. As in the CDM model, KvL allow for the endogeneity 
of both input and output of the innovation process. As instruments for estimation 
they use for innovation expenditure exogenous financial resources, i. e. cash-flow 
sales ratio and innovation subsidies; a dummy for R&D laboratories, cooperation 
and two indices of information sources, 'science' based, and 'other' sources, includ- 
ing suppliers, customers, journals and fairs and exhibitions, calculated using factor 
component analysis. The main effect of controlling for endogeneity and selection is 
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to boost hugely the coefficient on innovation expenditure in the Innovation equation 
and the effect of product innovation in the productivity growth equation. 
The analysis in this chapter differs from these studies in that it models the rela- 
tionship between innovation and productivity growth rather than productivity levels 
and it does so by using a gross output productivity equation rather than a value- 
added one. Regarding the output production function specification, I also allow for 
non constant returns to scales and imperfect competition, following the approach 
suggested by Klette and Klette and Griliches. In the specification of the innova- 
tion production function I look at a broader definition of innovation expenditure 
that includes more than R&D intensity. Concerning the methodology I estimate 
the innovation investment and innovation output equations simultaneously using a 
two step limited information maximum likelihood method, but I estimate separately 
the productivity growth equation and check the robustness of the result to allowing 
the innovations variables to be endogenous. Also, I explicitly model a knowledge 
production function where the dependent variable is process innovation. 
5.4 Estimating framework and Econometric Model 
5.4.1 The productivity growth equation 
assume that there is a Cobb Douglas output production function which relates 
physical output Y to a given state of knowledge capital K, and real physical non- 
capital inputs, material (M) and labour inputs (L), Xj for j=L, M, and physical 
capital input C. Thus, the production function in plant i at time t is: 
Yit = Ae\`e"Kj"tCo 11 X? ý (5.1) it 'Jit 
j=L, M 
where A is an efficiency parameter and A measures the rate of disembodied 
technical change. 
As has been done extensively in the literature (see Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991, 
and Griliches, 1998) 1 take first differences of the log of equation 5.1 to obtain: 
Ayit =A+ aAkit +, OAcit +E -IjAxjit (5.2) 
j=L, M 
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where a Ay- -1ý is the elasticity of physical output to knowledge capital. Thus: dK Y 
dY AK AK AK 
aAkit = dK T--y- = P-T-it 
Previous papers have assumed that knowledge capital can be calculated using 
a perpetual inventory method, so that AKt = Rt - JKt-1. Furthermore, assuming 
J sufficiently small, one can include the ratio of net investment in R&D to total 
output in equation 5.2 to estimate the rate of return to reseaxch expenditures, p. 
So that the estimating equation becomes: 
R Ayit =A+ P(T; )it + flAcit +E -YjAxjit (5.3) j=L, M 
This simplification comes at a cost (Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991), since I can 
only estimate the net returns to R&D, and it is not clear how net and gross returns 
relate to each other. " One must also account for the fact that the level of knowl- 
edge of firm i depends on own R&D investment and, given the public good nature 
of knowledge, on the knowledge stocks of other firms and institutions that it can 
access. A major problem of measurement in the literature is how to determine what 
knowledge is accessible to the firmI7 and much effort has gone in devising methods 
of capturing the accessibility, or distance, of this external knowledge. 
As noted in the literature, however, R&D is an investment in knowledge capital, 
whose results are not directly observable, and what matters for productivity growth 
is the output of this investment. As noted in Griliches (1998): 
the lack of direct measures of research and development output intro- 
duces an inescapable layer of inexactitude and randomness into my for- 
mulation. 
Only if direct measure of innovation output are available it is possible to solve 
this issue. The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) provides such information and 
"Alternatively one needs to assume that 8 the depreciation rate of knowledge is nihil, to estimate 
a gross rate of return. 
17FoUowing Griliches (1979) i is possible to include the effects of spillover effects in a model such 
as 5.1 by adding a term K.,, so that the model becomes Yit = Ae, 
\t+eit 'K, 0 Kit IlitPit 
flj=L, M Xjit i 
where K. i wijKj is a weighted measure of the knowledge that firm i access from source j, 
where the weights depend on some measure of distance between firm i and source j. 
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studies such as Cr6pon et al. (2000) and Klomp and van Leeuwen (2001) use it in 
structural models to estimate the contribution of innovation to productivity (Cr6pon 
et al., 2000) and to performance growth (Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001). 
In this chapter I assume that changes in the knowledge capital stock are mea- 
sured by reported innovations and investigate whether there is a link between such 
innovations measures and (total factor) productivity growth. Our data distinguishes 
between product and process innovation. 
As Hulten (2000) remarks, changes in TFP, all else well-measured, should be 
process innovations. How do product innovations enter the picture? As shown by 
Klette (1996) and Klette and Griliches (1996) since the -yj axe unobservable, the first 
order conditions for the choice of input Xj is 
Wj =R 
ay' 
iaxj 
where it is the mark-up of firm-specific prices, Pi, over maxginal cost. This 
implies that 
7i ----: sitl 
where s is the share of costs of input j in output. Since Pi is unobservable, in order 
to proceed, one can assume that the demand curve facing the firm is: 
Yi 1/04-1) i) CNA pi - Di ji) K, 
(5.4) 
Y, p 
where I am assuming that knowledge capital affects demand through improved 
product quality. Di scales the share of industry output earned by the firm at a 
given relative price. -S- is the elasticity of demand in respect to firm's relative 
product quality and C is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of demand to 
quality. Indeed, earch producer can gain market power for her products, depending 
on the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goodsq = 1"j., the number 
of firms operating in the market and the sensitivity of demand to product quality. 
Since I do not have firm-specific deflators for output, I cannot measure yj = ri - pi 
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where ri is log plant revenue, but rather: 
ri -p, = yj +pi -p, (5.5) 
where small letters denote logaxithms. Substituting equation 5.4 in equation 5.5 and 
adiusting, I can write 
ri -pi = yi + iý+ i+ yi (5.6) 
where the left hand side is the output I can observe, that is sales deflated using 
industry level prices. Taking logs of 5.1 and substituting into 5.6 gives: 
0+ 
S-X- ri-pi- EII -ci + 
ý-+-2kj 
+1 di +AY, + ci (5.7) 
j=M, L 
AA 
Time differencing gives: 
AInTFPii= 1-ý Acj+ý+aAkj+lAdj+E-: --(Ayj)+A6j (5-8) 11) A It it 
where 
A In TFPjj =A (ri - pi) -E gjiAxji - 9ciAci 
j=L, M 
the bar over the s denotes the time average share. 18 In equation 5.8, the left 
hand side is close to conventional TFP, in that it subtracts share-weighted inputs 
from deflated output. It is written AlnTFPjj to denote the fact that output is 
deflated by industry level price deflator, PI, since firm level prices Pi are unavailable. 
Secondly, the inclusion of Aci on the right-hand side allows for non-constant returns 
to scale and imperfect competition. Thus, AlnTFPjj is due to Aki, thanks to its 
effects both on decreasing costs and on increasing demand through improved product 
quality, Adi, changes in the demand shifter, plus any effects due to expansion of the 
industry Ayi. In the empirical analysis we can actually model separately the effect 
of Aki on demand, as product innovations, and the effect of Aki on the efficiency of 
production inputs as process innovations. Thus, the empirical equation becomes: 
IsNote that this ignores changes in p. This is probably one of the biggest limitations of this 
approach, since innovative behavious is very much likely to chage p over time. 
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A In TFPjj = 8o + 81 Aci + 82PROCESSINNOVATION (5.9) 
+83PRODUCTINNOVATION + 84AYI + Vi 
where I expect 92 =2>0 and J3 =I>0. 
The impact of innovation might depend on the 'height' of innovations" and the 
data at hand provides different heights of process and product innovations which 
might have different effects on AlnTFPjI. Firms are asked if innovations are new 
to the market/industry or new to the firm. I take this as a measure of whether firms 
are novel innovators (i. e. an innovation new to the market/industry) or innovation 
imitators (i. e. an innovation new to the firm but new the market/industry). Thus 
I estimate: 
A In TFPjj = Jo + blAci + J2, Process,,,,,,, + J22PrOCeSSimitate (5.10) 
+J31 Product,,,,,,,, + J32ProduCtimitate + J4AYr + ui 
In estimating equation 5.10 1 face a timing issue. The data for the innovation 
variables refer to any innovation between the three year period 1998 and 2000. This 
leads to a number of different possible dates for the TFP measure. If innovations 
take time, one might want to use post-2000 data, but this might introduce addi- 
tional measurement error and attenuate the true effect of innovations. 'O If there is 
measurement error in the production variables used to calculate TFP, one might 
want to average over a number of pre and post years. Finally, adding extra years 
in the calculation of annualised growth rate means more chance that firms who 
had missing TFP growth information due to sampling are now included into the 
sample, boosting sample size, but in a selective way since smaller firms are those 
19sm also (Duguet, 2004) for a similar argument, but without distinguishing between product 
and process innovation 
20Especially if innovations reported in the survey had been in place since 1998. Also, while the 
existence of adjustment costs might explain the lagged effect of process innovation, it is not clear 
that the effect of 'realised' product innovation might have a lagged effect on productivity, rather, 
especially in industries that are highly competitive or have low appropriability levels, the demand 
lead due to novel product innovation is quiddy eroded by imitators 
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who typically join and leave the selected sample. In the empirical analysis I have 
experimented with different timing in the calculation of the TFP growth measure 
and the results do not change according to the timing used. 21 
In the empirical analysis I also include dummies that identify the years when 
the firm is observed. This should at least paxtly account for measurement problems 
that might arise since in the calculations of TFP growth I use values for the years in 
which the firm is in the "selected" sample, and thus I might observe firms at different 
point in the business cycle. Further details on this issue and on the construction of 
the TFP growth variables can be found in the Appendix D. 
Finally, I try to control for factors, such as skill, technological opportunity, com- 
petitive pressure etc. that affect productivity growth in equation 5.10 and might also 
be correlated with innovation. " However, endogeneity might still be an issue in the 
model if unobservable factors (or factors unaccounted for in the analysis) that cause 
firms to grow more productive also cause innovations. I attempt to correct for this 
endogeneity using GMM techniques where I include in the matrix of instruments 
the inputs to the knowledge production function. 
In all the productivity regressions, I include 4-digit industry dummies to capture 
differences in technological opportunity and 11 regional dummies to control for lo- 
cation specific effects. I also include the lagged level of TFP relative to the median 
firm in the 4-digit industry. This should capture the scope for leaxning, whereby 
plants further away from the frontier have more scope for leaxning and so catch-up 
and grow faster (see also (Griffith et al., 2004b)). 
5.4.2 The Knowledge Production Function 
As already described in the previous chapter, the knowledge production function 
(Griliches and Pakes, 1980) assumes that innovation output arises from innovation 
inputs. I consider the innovation production function 
INNOV =f (JE ZKNOW) (5.11) 
211 also tried using lagged values of process and product innovation, from the three yeax period 
1994 - 1996 derived from the 
CIS2 innovation survey. As described in section C. 1.4, this information 
is only available for few firms. Indeed, this attempt was not very successful. 
22For example, I control for changes in management practices, to proxy for changes in work 
organisation and I add competition variables, such as lagged firm market share. 
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where, IEi is innovation expenditure (i. e. R&D investment, training costs etc. ). 
ZKNOW are other knowledge inputs into the ideas process (e. g. information from 
existing knowledge in the firm, or information from suppliers or customers) that 
the firm does not necessarily pay for. " An important feature of knowledge inputs 
ZKNOW axe that they are potentially transferable across organisations, given the 
public nature of knowledge. Thus I may write: 
INNOV =f (JE,, ZiKNOW, ZýýOW) (5.12) 
where I assume that innovations, either product or process, derive from the 
investment in innovation activities but also from the existing knowledge stock from 
other companies and institutions (suppliers, customers, or universities) and from 
the knowledge stock built up within the firms themselves. However, with the data 
at hand I cannot measure the existing 'knowledge stocks', thus I follow a different 
approach (as I did in chapter 3) and use a qualitative measure of the importance of 
information flows that a particular source has for a given firm. 14 
I therefore construct my measures of knowledge flows as follows. Firms are asked 
"How important to your ente7prise are the following as soumes of information for 
new technological innovation projects or the completion of existing projects? ". A 
number of information sources are provided (sources within enterprise, customers, 
suppliers and universities for example) and firms are asked to grade their importance 
on a 4-Likert scale ranging from 0 (not used at all) to 3 (very important), see also 
Cassiman and Veugelers 2002 for a similar argument. Although these questions do 
not capture the stock of ideas, they captures differences across firms in the flow of 
ideas from that stock. I briefly describe these knowledge flows (defined as ZFNOW 
and Z: ýNOW) measures here, and refer for details to the appendix D. To measure 
zF NOW I use the reported importance of ideas from sources within the enterprise. 
ZKNOW To measure -i ,I use 
the reported importance of ideas from various sources 
outside the enterprise. First, I consider the role of knowledge flows between the firm 
23The data does not allow to know whether firms pay for the information they receive from the 
different sources. 
24The rational is similar to that underlying the use of citation-weighted patents. However, the 
main limitation here is that we do not have a measure of 'knowledge stock'; while this might be 
less of a problem for knowledge stocks outside the firm, as explained below, the fact that we do 
not have a measure of knowledge stock at the firm level, might prevent us from capturing some 
relevant heterogeneity across firms. 
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and other enterprises within the enterprise group. Since there are other 18 exter- 
nal sources of information I group them together for convenience as follows. First, 
vertical sources information (from clients, customers or suppliers); second, market 
sources (from competitors). Third, commercial sources of information (from consul- 
tancy enterprises, reseaxch association or commercial R&D laboratories). Fourth, 
universities; fifth, free (from professional conferences, meetings, journals etc. ); sixth, 
regulatory (from health and safety regulations; product standards; environmental 
regulations), and finally, government (from government institutes; training and en- 
terprise councils) - 
Each source of ideas is graded from 0 to 3. When combining the idea sources 
together I used the maximum importance of any idea reported by the firm. Cassi- 
man and Veugelers use the average importance reported but this would understate 
the importance of a certain source of information and overvalue others within a pax- 
ticular group, thus flattening the differences among information sources. " Caution 
-i 
in order must be taken in the interpretation of the vaxiables 
ZFNOW and ZKNOW 
for these vaxiables to really capture differences in knowledge flows I need to assume 
that there are no significance differences in the knowledge stocks built up at the firm 
level and external to the firm. This assumption is probably very restrictive: firms 
are likely to differ both in their internal knowledge stock and possibly also in the 
external knowledge they can access. Although my measure might paxtly capture 
this heterogeneity, a more conservative interpretation of the ZKNOW variables is as 
a measure of the relative importance of different knowledge sources. 26 An additional 
concern arises because the ZKNOW measures axe based on self-reported ordinal in- 
formation provided by the firm rather than on caxdinal measures of importance of 
information flows. If firms anchor their scales at different levels this invalidates 
inter-firm comparisons. 27 
251 tested the robustness of my results to using both methods and actually they made little 
difference. 
261deally I would have liked to construct a weighted measures of knowledge stocks, with the 
ZKNOW variables as weights that capture the technological 'distance' between the firm and a 
particular source of information and knowledge stocks constructed at the level of each information 
source (e. g. universities, suppliers, trade fairs, etc. ). Given the data at hand this has not been 
possible. 
27jf the metric used by firms is invariant over time then using fixed effects helps to ease the an- 
choring bias problem, because it uses intra-firm time variation rather than interfirm cross-sectional 
variation (see also Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998)). 1 have tried this approach in the fixed 
effect logit equation reported in the previous chapter. 
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I also enter other variables that might indicate external knowledge flows: whether 
the firm is part of a group (GROUP), whether it has an international market or not 
(EXPORTER), is part of a British or foreign multinational enterprise (UKMNE 
and FOREIGN respectively) , whether it has cooperation agreement with other 
firms or institutions (COOP) and whether is part of a government programme on 
knowledge sharing (PROGRAM). Finally, to measure random factors such as luck, 
I add a random error term. I also add 4-digit industry dummies to proxy differing 
technological opportunities that might affect the flow of new ideas and regional 
dummies to proxy for geographical opportunities. 
Thus the equation I estimate is: 
INNOVi = ß, 
Ei 
+ ß2ZýNOW +Z 03j2i'jýow + ß4GROUP piyi 
i 
+ ß, 5EXPORTER +, 66UKMNE + ß7FOREIGN + ß8COOP 
+, 89PROGRAM +, 8, oln(emp)1998 + PIIAGE 
+, 812StrucChange 
AI+ýR+Ui 
Differently from previous studies I estimate the knowledge production function for 
both product and process innovation. For process innovation, I have yes/no an- 
swers as to whether a process innovation had occurred. For product innovation, 
I have data on the fraction of sales accounted for by new and improved products. 
Since the questionnaire asks about the fraction of sales I used this as dependent 
vaxiable. I use innovation expenditure normalised by sales, to measure intensity of 
innovation expenditure, as dependent vaxiable. Innovation expenditure encompasses 
investment in R&D but also in training, acquisition of external knowledge etc. The 
normalisation aims at reducing measurement error issues, since if firms consistently 
misreport their turnover and expenditures (Le some firms report in thousands and 
some in millions and they do this consistently) normalisation will help. " Thus if my 
dependent variable is process (product) innovation I use a probit (tobit) estimator. 
28jn the productivity growth equation I distinguish between radical and incremental product 
and process innovations. I will report the equations for novel product and process innovation as a 
robustness checks. 
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5.4.3 The innovation expenditure equation 
The investment in innovation aims at increasing the quality of the firm's product 
and/or decreasing the marginal cost of production. 
For a profit maximising firm that invests in innovation to increase its market 
share and/or improve its production efficiency the optimal level of innovation inten- 
sity, the ratio of innovation expenditure (IE) to sales (py, )29: 
IEj 
Ifi o9Yj 
Yj OIEj 
pi yi A . 9y, - Lz---i=. Y, 19pi -1 
(5.14) 
Where SE represents the total marginal costs of innovation expenditure, which 
given the cost reducing role of innovation expenditure, will be less than the marginal 
cost of a unit of innovation expenditure by an amount which is proportional to 
the production cost reducing effect of this investment. -I-Ei '9y' and -P-'L-9-y' are the Yj OIEj Y, Opt 
elasticities of output to innovation expenditure and prices, respectively. This stylised 
model can describe the heterogeneity in innovation investment decisions observed 
within and across industries, in that firms face different elasticities and different 
innovation total marginal costs. 
Equation 5.14 says that I& depends negatively on costs, "Ej, (but positively on 
the cost reducing effects of innovation expenditure via the total maxginal costs of IE): 
a firm where it is easier to implement process innovation, for example because of less 
organisational rigidities, will expect to get more marginal benefit from its innovation 
expenditure and hence spends more. According to this formula, innovation intensity 
is a decreasing function of the price elasticity of output and thus an increasing 
function of the degree of market power. Innovation expenditure increases with the 
elasticity of Output with respect to innovation expenditure. This latter elasticity can 
be thought of as being composed of a demand related element, i. e. the elasticity of 
demand with respect to product quality and a "technological opportunity" element, 
the elasticity of product quality with respect to innovation expenditure. I try to 
capture both these effects in the empirical analysis. 
Firms might decide not to invest if they face too low an elasticity of demand to 
product quality. this might be the case when the appropriability conditions in the 
industry axe such that the competitors can quickly copy the new product introduced 
29Equation 5.14 is a Dorfman-Steiner type first order condition, see also Gonz6lez et al. (2004) 
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by the firm. Similarly firms with poor technological opportunity, or high total costs 
of innovation (which encompasses cases of low cost reducing effect of innovation), 
that are too low too justify the innovation expenditure will optimally decide not to 
inVeSt. 30 
Thus, in the econometric specification I take into account the fact that zero 
innovation intensity might be an optimal corner solution to the profit maximisation 
problem by specifying the innovation intensity equation as a Tobit (Wooldridge, 
2002). The estimating equation 5.15 is a reduced form of the structural equation 
5.14. The choice of the regressors, therefore, aims at expressing the endogenous 
and unobservable elasticities and costs in terms of observable and predetermined or 
exogenous factors that affect them. 
(±Ei E a, jX, j + 1: a2kX2k+Ea3hX3h 
+ AI + Ui 
A Yi 
ikh 
and we observe maxIO, (F'E-y A 
The variables that enter the vectors X1, X2 and X3 are respectively: 
X, : SUBSIDYi, %engineers and scientists, %other graduates 
X2 : MUSHARE1998, EXPORTd . ..... y, Strategic protection, Formal protection, 
Info from CompetitorS4dig, 9496i 
X3 : GROUP, UKMNE, FOREIGN, ln(employ, 998), ln(age), Agedummys Merger, 
Closure, Startup 
In X1, I include factors that affect ", the total marginal cost of innovation: 
whether the firm has received a subsidy (0/1 dummy), qualitative information on 
organisational rigidities, which I include as a 0/1 dummy. Finally I include the 
proportion of educated workers. This variable captures two opposite effects: on the 
one hand the marginal cost of an R&D employee is higher the higher his education 
level; this would impact positively on the maxginal cost of an extra unit of innovation 
expenditure and thus decrease the optimal innovation expenditure; on the other, the 
presence of qualified personnel is likely to increase the ability to innovate and thus 
30We exclude the possibility that firm might have negative innovation expenditure, i. e. the 
possibility that firm might 'disinvest' in innovation. 
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the cost reducing effect of innovation expenditure, thus increasing the optimal level 
of innovation intensity. 
X2 contains factors that proxy for the competitive pressure and appropriability 
conditions of the firm: thus I include the lagged (and thus assumed predetermined) 
market share of the firm and whether the firm is an exporter; the importance of 
formal (e. g. trademaxks, patents and copyright) and strategic (e. g. secrecy, com- 
plexity of design) methods to protect innovation. Info from CompetitOrs4dig, 9496 is 
an industry level measure of the importance of knowledge coming from competitors 
in the industry calculated from CIS2. 
Finally, X3 includes firm characteristics that proxy for unobservables that might 
affect innovation intensity. These include ownership structure, structural changes, 
size and age. I include industry dummies to account for technological opportunities 
and regional dummies to account for geographical opportunities. 
5.4.4 Estimation procedure 
I estimate two versions of the innovation part of the model, for product and pro- 
cess innovation. Both system axe recursive and I estimate them using a two-step 
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) approach (see Maddala (1983) and 
Amemiya (1983) and Murphy and Topel (1985) for a useful discussion on these class 
of models). Both contain the innovation intensity equation estimated using the ap- 
proach suggested by Wooldridge (2002). In the first step I estimate a two-tiered 
model: 
IE 
Pr( 
Pi Yi = 
OIX) =1- e(Xy) 
IE IE 2) log(7ý-) 1 (X, T- > 0) - Normal (Xß, u yi ; yi yi iyi 
where in the first equation I model the probability that innovation intensity II is 
zero or positive, and in the second I assume that for positive values the conditional 
distribution of Innovation Expenditure on the regressors X =- IX,, X2, X31 is log- 
normal. Rom this first step I obtain 
IE IE or2 
7- = E( IX) = -D(X' exp(A 
i iy. y. piyi 
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In the second step I use pIE 
the predicted innovation intensity from this first 
,, y 
equation in the second maximum likelihood, and bootstrap the standard error to 
correct the asymptotic covariance matrix at this second step. The second step differ 
across the two versions of the model. In the specification for product innovation I 
include the predicted innovation expenditure in a tobit equation estimated as tobits. 
For process innovation the second step consists in estimating a probit for process 
innovation. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Innovation and Productivity Growth 
I staxt by looking at the effect of innovation output on productivity growth. The 
reason for doing so is that as noted by Griliches and Pakes (1980) and Cr6pon et al. 
(2000) what matters for productivity growth is the output of the innovation process 
rather than its inputs. 
Column 1 of table 5.4 relates to the traditional R&D intensity approach in that it 
includes R&D intensity to productivity growth. The estimate of the returns on R&D 
in the productivity growth equation, where the dependent variable is the annualised 
TFP growth rate calculated over the period 1997-2001, as described in detail in 
Appendix D, is 0.6% but not statistically significant. " 
A possible problem with column 1 is measurement error. The value of R&D 
reported in the CIS by firms that axe part of a group might include R&D conducted 
at their site on behalf of other enterprises in the group or alternatively they might 
enjoy the benefits of R&D done in other enterprises in the group. Thus, in column 
21 report the results of restricting the sample to enterprises that axe not paxt of a 
group. The coefficient increases to 69% but it is still not statistically significant. 
In column 31 use rather than a measure of innovation input a measure of inno- 
31Schankermann (1981) discusses the problems related to double counting of R&D inputs in 
an extended production function frameworks. To be able to correct for double counting in the 
productivity growth equation I should also have longitudinal information on R&D personnel and 
possibly on capital stock used in R&D activities. However I do not have this information. Thus, 
I assume that R&D personnel does not grow in the period considered 1997-2001. Although this 
seems a strong assumption. The longitudinal evidence available from comparing CIS2 with CIS3 
shows that the number of scientists and of R&D personnel remains stable over time. 
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Table 5.4: Estimates of productivity growth equation 
(1) 
R&D 
(2) 
single 
(3) 
patent 
(4) 
innov 
(5) 
GMM 
Yale-@ 0.0062 0.6947 
(0.1154) (0.4305) 
In(Patent) 0.0008 
(0.0074) 
Dummypatents -0.0137 
(0-0153) 
PrOcessinnovation 0.0051 0.0016 
(0.0087) (0.0139) 
Novel Process -0.0186 -0.0222 
(0.0128) (0.0376) 
% novel products 0.0827 0.0671 
(0.0463)* (0.1394) 
%newp, oduct. 
0.0157 0.0464 
(0.0160) (0-0510) 
Aci -0.1076 -0.0809 -0.1113 -0.1061 -0.0716 
(0.0496)** (0.0914) (0.0479)** (0.0479)** (0.0396)* 
RelativeTFA, t-j -0.0478 -0.0578 -0.0507 -0.0514 -0.0569 
(0.0285)* (0.0342)* (0.0248)** (0.0246)** (0-0139)*** 
MKTaharei, t-l 0.0305 -0.0074 0.0124 0.0564 0.0112 
(0.0819) (0.0826) (0-0735) (0.0852) (0-0280) 
In(age) -0-0074 -0-0143 -0.0067 -0-0057 -0.0056 
(0.0051) (0.0094) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0041) 
Dummyage 0.0106 0.0101 0.0094 0.0102 0.0066 
(0.0076) (0-0147) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0-0056) 
startup 0.0337 0.0102 0.0332 0.0290 0.0261 
(0.0243) (0-0298) (0-0242) (0.0243) (0-0211) 
merger 0.0185 0.0459 0.0149 0.0149 0.0097 
(0-0107)* (0.0259)* (0-0105) (0.0100) (0-0079) 
closure -0.0179 -0-0432 -0-0188 -0.0202 -0.0129 
(0-0131) (0.0296) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0-0103) 
O=rvatiýonsý 643 281 678 678 674 
Notes: Robust standaxd errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between 
unobservables for plants in the same firm. In all columns the dependent variable is annualised 
TFP growth rate over the 1997-2001 period. Regressors included in all columns but not reported 
in the table are: 4-digit industry dummies, 10 regional dummies, year dummies for the years used 
in the calculation of TFP growth (see Appendix D) for details. In column 5, the value of the 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 14.93 which under the null is distributed as Chi square 
with 13 degrees of freedom. The P-values is 0.31. Instruments used are information sources, 
financial and non financial support, technology push and demand pull dummies. 
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vation output, patents. " Again the estimated coefficient is positive but not statis- 
tically significant-33 
Column 4 and 5 set out the results of estimating equation 5.10 and report the 
estimates of the coefficients of CIS type measures of innovation output on produc- 
tivity growth: novel and new and improved product (measured as proportion of 
sales on total turnover) and novel and incremental process innovations (measured 
as 0/1 dummies). Column 4 reports the OLS estimates. The results show that the 
coefficient on incremental process innovation is positive but not significant, while 
the coefficient on novel process innovation is negative but also not statistically sig- 
nificant. The coefficients on product innovation variables are both positive, with 
the coefficient on the share of turnover due to new and improved products not 
significant, whereas the coefficient of novel product sales is a significant 0.08. 
These results seem to suggest first that novel innovations plays a stronger role 
than incremental innovations and secondly that process innovation is not signifi- 
cantly correlated with TFP growth. The first result is in line with the work of 
Duguet (2004) who, using French data for the 1986-1990 period, shows that radical 
innovations are the only significant contributor to TFP growth. 34 The second result, 
although surprising at first, is also consistent with previous results using the CIS 
for the Netherlands by Klomp and van Leeuwen (2001) and for Sweden by Loof and 
Heshmati (2002). The negative coefficient on novel process innovation might suggest 
that this type of innovations take time to be implemented, leading to an initial fall 
in measured TFP growth. " We will investigate this issue further in table 5.5. 
321 follow the traditional approach in the literature (Klette, 1996) and use the log of patents 
replace the log of zero patents with zero. We also include a dummy variables for observations with 
zero patents. 
331 must note that the measurement of both the R&D and patents variable in the Community 
Innovation Survey is affected by several limitations. The R&D variable is recorded for the year 
2000 and firms axe asked only about R&D conducted in their 'reporting unit', rather than at the 
enterprise group level, thus the measure available might miss all R&D conducted in other locations 
of the same groups. The patent measure we use is the number of patents applied for during the 
1998-2000 period. I do not know where the firm applied, i. e. European Patent Office or US Patent 
Office and I also do not know whether these patents were granted and how many citations they 
could receive. Thus, this measure of 'patents' is quite rough relative to the recent literature that 
use patents as a measure of output. The limitations of the two measure could paxtly explain the 
insignificance of the coefficients in the productivity growth regressions. 
34 Note, however, that the work of Duguet differs from this one in that Duguet does not distinguish 
between product and process innovation but rather he concentrates only on innovation 'height', 
i. e. incremental vs radical innovation. 
35 Such a preliminary dip is the basis of the macro work by Basu et al. (2003). Another possible 
explanation is that this negative correlation results from a timing issue: firms that undergo a 
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The OLS estimates might be inconsistent if the innovation output variables are 
endogenous. Thus, in column 6 we report the result of instrumental variable GMM 
estimation. As instruments for the innovation output measures we use the inputs to 
the knowledge production function. 36 The sign of the coefficients on the innovation 
variables remain unchanged after controlling for endogeneity of innovation output. 
In the notes to the table we also report the result of a Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions that cannot reject the validity of our instruments. 
In all columns we control for initial productivity level of the firm relative to the 
median firm in the industry (at the 4-digit level), such a regressor is often used to 
proxy the scope for learning, i. e. plants further away from the frontier have more 
scope for learning and so catch-up faster (Griffith et al., 2004b). The coefficient is 
negative, thus suggesting that firms with a lower productivity will catch-up and grow 
faster. Additionally, we control for the age of the firm and for structural changes 
during the 1998-2000 period, as reported by the firm in the CIS survey. This should 
account for differences in learning opportunity and significant events that might 
both affect productivity growth and be correlated with innovation output. The 
estimated coefficients on age and on the structural change variables seem sensible: 
a non-linear negative effect of age and a negative coefficients on the self-reported 
variable for partial closure. Finally, we add controls for the competitive environment 
of the firm that might not be already captured by the industry dummies: the firm 
initial market share, this variable is never significant across all specifications. 37 
These results seem to be robust to the inclusion of other controls and other 
sensitivity analysis as shown in table 5.5. 
The first column checks the robustness of the previous results to using different 
time periods to calculate the annualised growth rates. This implies also a change 
in the number of observations since the ARD is an unbalanced panel with gaps (for 
crisis are more likely to introduce improvements in the production process, both technological and 
organisational (Nickell et al., 2001). Yet another explanation is offered by Klomp and van Leeuwen 
(2001). They suggest that the negative coefficient might reflect a positive long-run effect of process 
innovation on employment, achieved through increased competitiveness due to the higher efficiency. 
This is unlikely to be the case here since we do not really observe a long time series. 
36The choice of which, follows from the discussion in chapter 4 and in the previous section. 
3TIn unreported analysis we also checked the reobustness of our -esult to the inclusion of the 
firm's international profile, captured by the global engagement dummies exporter, UK MNE and 
foreign MNE. None of these effects are consistently significant across samples. 
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Table 5.5: Estimates of productivity growth equation. Robustness checks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
% novel products 0.1142 0.0680 0.0852 0.0718 0.0364 
(0.0849) (0.0417) (0.0471)* (0.0452) (0.0336) 
%newp,. d. cts 0.0551 0.0251 0.0141 0.0134 0.0106 
(0.0407) (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0160) 
Novel Process -0.0361 -0.0159 -0.0207 -0.0238 
(0.0337) (0.0104) (0.0131) (0.0130)* 
Processj,,,,.,,. tjon -0.0025 0.0066 0.0059 0.0083 
(0.0188) (0.0070) (0.0086) (0.0090) 
Managerial change 0.0110 
(0.0057)* 
PrOMSSIowf lexibility -0.0067 
(0.0102) 
PrOMSSmediumflexibifity 0.0041 
(0.0079) 
PrOCeSShighf lexibility 0.0135 
(0.0182) 
Aci -0.0827 -0.0993 -0.1244 -0.1158 -0.1222 
(0.0828) (0.0493)** (0.0472)*** (0.0486)*** (0.0516)** 
In(age) -0.0068 -0.0084 -0.0043 -0.0056 -0.0047 
(0.0106) (0.0044)* (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0054) 
Durniny. ge 0.0162 0.0103 0.0083 0.0102 0.0083 
(0.0149) (0.0062)* (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0077) 
RelativeTFA, t-i -0.0078 -0.0446 -0.0467 -0.0505 -0.0419 
(0.0605) (0.0222)** (0.0254)* (0.0245)** (0.0309) 
MKTaharei, t-l 0.0549 0.0379 0.0583 0.0787 
(0.1483) (0.0313) (0.0851) (0.1213) 
%scientists & engineers -0.0134 
(0.0277) 
% other graduates 0.0678 
(0.0377)* 
Observations 435 648 660 617 592 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between 
unobservables for plants in the same firm. In column 1 the dependent variable is annualised TFP 
growth rate over the 1998-2000 period. In columns 2 to 5 the dependent variable is annualised 
TFP growth rate over the 1997-2001 period. Regressors included in all column but not reported 
in the table are: 4-digit industry dummies, 10 regional dummies, year dummies for the years used 
in the calculation of TFP growth (see Appendix D) for details). 
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smaller firms). Now, the sign of both incremental and novel process innovation is 
negative and the point estimate of the novel process coefficient is larger in absolute 
terms. This might suggest the presence of adjustment costs and a trial and error 
phase after the introduction of novel production processes. The significance of the 
coefficient of novel products has now dropped to 17%, but the point estimate is not 
significantly different from the one in column 4 of table 5.4. 
In column 2 we use as dependent variable the annualised growth rate over the 
period 1997-2001 as we did in table 5.4, but we try to control for the possible 
measurement error introduced by matching reporting units that report at different 
level in CIS3 and in the ARD: we drop those reporting units that axe multi-plant or 
part of a group and for which the ratio of employment in the ARD over that in CIS 
is above 1.5 and below 0.5.39 The coefficients, although very marginally significant 
(e. g. the coefficient of novel product innovation is significant at the 10.3% level), 
have the same signs as in column 4 of table 5.4. 
Column 3 aims at controlling for the effect of 'soft innovations' and at proxying 
for the unobservable quality of the firms' managers. To this aim, we include measure 
of organisational and managerial innovations. These changes are positively and 
significantly correlated with productivity growth and do not significantly affect the 
magnitude of the technological innovation outputs coefficients. 40 
In column 41 investigate the insignificance of the process innovation coefficients. 
The data only provides a 0/1 measure of process innovation, either novel or incre- 
mental, but does not directly give a measure of the success of this process innovation 
as it does for product innovation, by providing a sales weighted measures of product 
innovation. Moreover the distinction of novel and non-novel innovation, although 
very relevant for product innovation, is possibly less useful in the context of pro- 
cess innovation. Thus, I try to construct a successful weighted measure of process 
38in the table I only report the results from using only the 1998-2000 period. In unreported 
results I have experimented with other time periods, without obtaining very big different results 
from the ones reported in the tables. 39ThIs entails dropping observations for 32 firms. 
40An obvious extension would have been to study the effect of an interaction term between 
technological and managerial innovations. However, the number of observations for which there is a 
technological innovation but no organisational change is too small to allow separate Identification of 
the interaction between technological and managerial innovations, since the correlation coefficients 
between the technological innovation measures and the interaction terms are always greater than 
0.9. 
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innovation: using categorical information on "the impact that innovation activities 
have had on the enterprise" I construct a measure of process innovation that had 
a medium to high impact on improving production flexibility. The point estimates 
suggest that process innovations that axe more successful in improving production 
flexibility are more positively correlated with productivity growth. 
Column 5 investigates whether the inclusion of the education variable, which 
might capture unobserved quality of the firm's workforce, affect the estimated co- 
efficients on innovation. The coefficient on the share of novel product innovation is 
still positive although smaller. Moreover, column 5 suggests that only the propor- 
tion of educated workers, with degrees in non scientific subjects, is correlated with 
productivity growth, over and above technological innovation, rather than scientists 
and engineers. These, on the other hand, as we will see in the next section are highly 
correlated with the innovation output of the firm. 
5.5.2 The innovation expenditure equation 
I now discuss the results of estimating the innovation expenditure, or innovation in- 
vestment equation. As discussed above, I do have information on whether a firm has 
positive or zero expenditure, regardless of whether the firm has innovated or not. In 
this, the analysis differs from Cr6pon, Duguet and Mairesse who do not have infor- 
mation on innovation expenditure for non-innovators. Following Wooldridge (2002), 
I estimate a double-Hurdle model that accounts for the fact that zero innovation 
expenditures axe a corner solution to the optimisation problem of the firm. The 
innovation output depend on the innovation intensity, and axe modelled in a second 
equation, whose estimation I discuss in the next section. 
In table 5.6 1 present the estimation results of two specifications of equation 
5.15. In the first two columns I report the results when including 4 digit industry 
dummies. In columns 3 and 41 report the results of including three digit industry 
dummies but including measures of competition, sectoral growth and information 
from competitors at the 4 digit industry level. In columns 5 and 61 also include 
measures of information flows from outside the firm and measures of the importance 
of knowledge capital stock within the firm and within the group, to proxy for the 
absorptive capacity of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). 
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Table 5.6: Estimates of the innovation investment eauation (1) 
level 
(2) 
propensity 
(3) 
level 
(4) 
propensity 
(5) 
level 
(6) 
propensity 
ln(employment) 0.2005 0.3953 0.1315 0.3666 0.1080 0.2835 
(0.0967)** (0.0750)*** (0.0977) (0.0682)000 (0.1010) (0.0783)000 
In(age) -0.0429 0.0907 -0.0428 0.0838 -0.0483 0.0455 
(0.0706) (0.0714) (0.0697) (0.0680) (0.0694) (0.0774) 
Aged. m-w 
0.0457 -0.2172 0.0128 -0.2388 0.0466 -0.1358 
(0.1286) (0.1193)* (0.1250) (0.1160)0* (0.1225) (0.1338) 
In(MKTmh&rej, &-I) -0.3790 -0.2446 -0.3033 -0.1977 -0.3151 -0.2011 
(0.0825)*** (0.0659)*** (0.0852)*** (0.0592)000 (0.0895)*** (0.0705)000 
Expoildummy -0.0136 0.2985 0.0336 0.2177 0.0083 0.0884 
(0.1086) (0.0951)*** (0.1111) (0.0894)00 (0.1102) (0.1011) 
Herfindahl4dig, t-j 42.3166 -13.7962 46.3305 -0.1421 
(20.1669)00 (11.4871) (18.8133)** (10.6848) 
AgrOssOutPut4dig, 98-00 -0.2197 -0.1752 -0.2095 -0.0755 
(0.1254)* (0.0902)* (0.1301) (0.1142) 
group -0.0743 0.0472 -0.1330 0.0629 -0.1496 -0.0348 
(0.0981) (0.0973) (0.0989) (0.0943) (0.0968) (0.1092) 
mneUK 0.1180 -0.1415 0.0393 -0.1026 0.0483 -0.2678 
(0.1457) (0.1645) (0.1450) (0.1516) (0.1397) (0.1769) 
foreign 0.0127 -0.1040 -0.0154 -0.0733 -0.0329 -0.0619 
(0.1417) (0.1486) (0.1388) (0.1455) (0.1384) (0.1753) 
financial support 0.7435 0.6638 0.6639 
(0.1245)*** (0.1261)*** (0.1260)*** 
Znf0frOMCOmPCWOrs4diq, 940G 0.3198 0.4634 0.2254 0.1188 
(0.3262) (0.2790)0 (0.3179) (0.3373) 
formal protection 0.1847 0.4595 0.1675 0.4106 0.0892 0.0840 
(0.1366) (0.1362)*** (0.1356) (0.1304)*** (0.1368) (0.1440) 
strategic protection 0.6019 1.4912 0.7090 1.4832 0.4161 0.6313 
(0.1586)*** (0.1404) *00 (0.1531)*** (0.1337)000 (0.1463)000 (0.1553)0*0 
%scientistakengineers 1.0667 2.5121 0.9511 1.3343 0.7758 0.7522 
(0.3546)*** (0.6823)0* (0.3690)*** (0.6285)** (0.3616)0* (0.6277) 
%othergraduates -0.2497 0.0897 -0.1664 0.1780 -0.3183 0.2292 
(0.4234) (0.3324) (0.3960) (0.3201) (0.3809) (0.2822) 
Internal Info 0.2511 1.3725 
(0.1609) (0.1631)*** 
Info from group 0.3015 0.1865 
(0.1315)0* (0.1891) 
vertical Info 0.5950 I. G637 (0.1823)000 (O. IT38)000 
Info from competitors 0.0862 -0.5624 
(0.1469) (0.1996)0** 
Commercial Info 0.1926 1.0769 
(0.1664) (0.2391)*** 
Free Info 0.1626 0.5563 
(0.1633) (0.1895)**- 
Info from regulation 0.0805 -0.0360 
(0.1437) (0.1719) 
Info from universities -0.3010 0.0510 
(0.1985) (0.2784) 
Info from government -0.0425 -0.0109 
(0.1918) (0.2846) 
observations 1879 1879 1849 1849 1849 1849 
Notes: Robust standard errors in paxentheses, estimated allowing correlation between 
unobservables for plants in the same firm. In columns 2,4 and 61 report the estimates of the 
first part of the hurdle model, i. e. estimates of the propensity to innovate equation. In colu 
1,3 and 51 report the estimates of the level of investment, conditional on having invested. 
Regressors included in all columns but not reported in the table are: 3 indicators for structural 
change (startup, merger and closure) and 10 regional dummies. In column 1 and 21 also include 
4-digit industry dummies, while in columns 3 to 61 include 3-digit industry dummies. 
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The results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that laxger firms are more likely to invest 
in innovation, and conditional on a positive investment decision they invest more. 
This result seem to contradict stylised fact three of Cohen and Klepper (1996), which 
states that for firms engaged in R&D there is no systematic relationship between 
the level of R&D and size. However, looking at columns 3 and 4, when I explicitly 
include controls for the competitive environment of the industry, I find that the 
effect of size on the amount of innovation investment (column 3) is not significant, 
in line with stylised fact three of Cohen and Klepper. This result remains unchanged 
when I control for absorptive capacity and external knowledge flows in column 5 and 
6.41 
The coefficients on the variables that control for the role of market power of the 
firm, show that the firms with high market share (at the beginning of the period) are 
less likely to invest, and if they invest they invest less. This result is robust across 
all three specifications. " The second competition measure used, export dummy, 43 
seems also to suggest a positive correlation between innovation investment and com- 
petition. The third measure, the Herfindahl index of concentration, again, although 
less strongly suggest that firms in concentrated industries are less likely to invest 
but conditional on investment they invest more in innovation. 
In columns 3 and 41 find that both the probability of investment and the amount 
invested are negatively correlated (and significantly so at the 10% level) with the 4 
digit industry specific gTowth patterns (A904dig, 98-00). However, this result is not 
robust to the inclusion of the internal and external knowledge flows measures as 
shown in columns 5 and 6. 
I next report the effect of financial support, this variable is only included in the 
equation describing the 'second hurdle', i. e. only for the investors, since it is always 
411n table D. 2 I report estimates based on the same specification as column 3 and 4 and colu 
5 and 6, but where the dependent variable is R&D intensity rather than all innovation expenditure. 
The table shows that in the case of R&D the probability of investing is not correlated with size 
and the amount spent is correlated with size at the 10% level when I do not control for measures of 
absorptive capacitiy and knowledge flows but when I do (column 3 and 4 of table D. 2) the variable 
size is not significant in either column. 
42in the R&D investment equation, as reported in table D. 2, the effect on the propensity to 
invest is not significantly different from zero. 
43Note that the export dummy here is defined differently from the dummy variable "exporter" 
used in the previous chapter. This latter dummy was equal to one if the firm was a domestic non 
MNE that had positive exports. In this chapter the variable 'export dummy, takes value one in 
any firm, independently of its multinationality status, has positive exports. 
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zero for firms that did not invest. In all specifications (columns 1,3 and 5) 1 find 
that financial support is correlated with higher level of investment. 
What are the results concerning the effective appropriability conditions of inno- 
vation activities? I try to analyse this using two type of measures. The first uses 4 
digit industry level information from CIS2 to calculate how important is competitive 
is the industry in producing innovation using information existing in the industry 
(InfofromCompetitOrS4dig, 9496)s this variable also proxies for technological oppor- 
tunities in the industry, and indeed the coefficient is positive in columns 1 to 4. 
The second uses information on the importance of methods of protections of inno- 
vations over the 1998-2000 period. I group these protection measures as formal, or 
legal, (patents, trademaxks, copyrights, confidentiality agreements and registration 
of design) and as strategic (secrecy, complexity of design and lead time advantage 
on competitors). 44 The results show that the only measure of appropriability that 
is strongly positive and robust across specification is strategic protection. More- 
over the negative coefficient on the importance of information from competitors in 
columns 5 and 6 seem to suggest that firms that can easily use information from 
competitors in the industry are less likely to invest in innovation. This result might 
be given two intuitive explanations: the first is that if firms can successfully copy 
from their competitors they need to invest less in innovation, the second is that if 
firms know that it is easy to copy from competitors in their industry they are less 
likely to invest because they axe worried about competitors ripping off the benefits 
of their investment. 45 
The coefficients on the workforce skill structure suggest that a high presence of 
scientists and engineers is highly and positively correlated with both parts of the 
innovation investment equation, while conditional on the presence of scientists and 
engineers, the proportion of other graduates does not have any significance corre- 
lation with either the propensity to invest and the amount invested. This result 
44The measures axe constructed using the same method used to construct the information vari- 
ables: I take the maximum score of the information on the importance of each protection method, 
graded from 0 (not used) to 3 (high importance), normalised to vary between 0 and 1. 
45A third explanation, it might be that firms that rely on knowledge from competitors are 
actually the worst firm that would have invested little anyway. This latter explanation would 
suggest that the result is driven by unobserved heterogeneity among firms. If we had a larger 
panel I could try to investigate this latter issue in more detail, but the panel has a very limited 
number of observations and only two time periods. 
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suggest that innovation investment decisions are highly correlated with the knowl- 
edge capital already built up in the firm, which is partly embodied in its workforce. 
This result is confirmed by the positive coefficient on the relevance of information 
coming from within firm in column 6. The coefficients on the other sources of infor- 
mation seem to confirm the findings of the previous chapter, which highlighted the 
importance of vertical source of information and information from within the group. 
This latter variable is positively correlated with the level of investment but not 
with the probability of investment. Other information sources, 'free' (professional 
conferences, trade associations and fairs) and 'commercial' sources (consultants, pri- 
vate R&D labs), on the other hand, axe positively correlated with the probability of 
investing but not with the amount invested. 
In table D. 2 in Appendix DA I report the results of estimating equation using 
as dependent variable R&D intensity rather than total innovation expenditure. I 
have already outlined differences concerning the role of size and market share. A 
third difference to note is that in this equation, conditional on size and industry 
effects, being a MNE, headquarter or affiliates, entails being much more likely to 
engage in Research and Development. This result confirms evidence that MNEs are 
more likely to have R&D laboratories and highlight once more that the measure of 
innovation expenditure used is much broader than R&D. 
5.5.3 The knowledge production function 
Column 1 of Table 5.7 reports estimates of a two-limits tobit model of the knowl- 
edge production function, where the dependent variable is the proportion of sales 
accounted for by new and improved products. The figures reported are marginal 
effects, conditional on positive innovation outcomes. The estimates show that the 
estimated returns to innovation expenditure is a reasonable and significant 18%. We 
also find that conditional on the innovation investment size and age of the firm are 
not significant, although the correlation between age and the proportion of new and 
improved products in total sales is negative. The estimates also confirm that glob- 
ally engaged 46 firms are more innovative, although the coefficient on foreign affiliates 
is only borderline significant. I find that non-financial support by government is not 
46Note that in this specification I define the vaxiables exporter, UK MNE and foreign affiliates 
as in chapter 4 to make the results more comparable. 
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Table 5.7: Estimates of the knowledge production 
dep. var 
(1) (2) 
new and improved products 
(3) (4) 
process Innovation 
In(employment) 0.0042 0.0048 0.0331 0.0423 
(0.0023)* (0.0024)** (0.0078)*** (0.0107)*** 
In(age) -0.0045 -0.0034 0.0135 0.0204 
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0139) (0,0190) 
Ageduminy -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0366 -0.0226 
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0219)* (0.0301) 
Exporter 0.0128 0.0114 -0.0100 -0.0141 
(0.0068)* (0.0067)* (0.0201) (0.0275) 
group -0.0097 -0.0096 -0.0455 -0.0554 
(0.0059)* (0.0059) (0.0182)** (0.0239)** 
mneUK 0.0062 0.0049 0.0121 . 0.0254 
(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0340) (0.0385) 
foreign 0.0091 0.0078 -0.0259 -0.0392 
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0285) (0.0360) 
non financial support -0.0113 -0.0103 0.0241 0.0277 
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0353) (0.0436) 
cooperation 0.0352 0.0358 0.1078 0.1125 
(0.0061)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0344)*** 
Info from plant 0.0877 0.0818 0.2747 0.3088 
(0.0090)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0288)*** (0.0385)*** 
Info from group 0.0133 0.0158 0.0698 0.1026 
(0.0080)* (0.0080)** (0.0278)** (0.0358)*** 
vertical Info 0.0418 0.0440 0.2508 0.2919 
(0.0104)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0342)*** (0.0437)*** 
Info from competitors -0.0091 -0.0138 -0.1188 -0.1949 
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0327)*** (0.0419)*** 
Commercial Info 0.0149 0.0129 -0.0200 -0.0060 
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0341) (0.0423) 
Ree Info 0.0337 0.0319 0.1021 0.1603 
(0.0101)*** (0.0100)*** (0.0329)*** (0.0430)*** 
Info from regulation -0.0196 -0.0183 -0.0256 -0.0292 
(0.0090)** (0.0089)** (0.0296) (0.0382) 
Info from universities -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0316 -0.0352 
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0386) (0.0498) 
Info from government -0.0194 -0.0214 0.0128 0.0011 
(0.0118) (0.0118)* (0.0399) (0.0515) 
Innovation expenditure/total sales 0.1823 0.1653 0.5370 0.2260 
(0.0322)*** (0.0613 (0.1115)*** (0.2828) 
Observations 1836 1905 2513 1829 
Notes: In columns 1 and 21 report the conditional marginal effects of a tobit equation, with as 
dependent variable the proportion of sales accounted for by new and improved products. In 
column 3 and 41 report the marginal effects of a probit equation with dependent vaXiable a 
binary variable that is one if the firm has process innovated. IN column 1 and 31 use the 
innovation expenditure variable as reported in the survey, in column 2 and 41 use innovation 
expenditure calculated from the estimates of equation 5.15. Regressors included in all col 
but not reported in the table are: 3 indicators for structural change (startup, merger and 
closure), 10 regional dummies and 3-digit industry dummies. 
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correlated with level of innovation outcome (and the unreported effect on the proba- 
bility of being uncensored confirm this result). On the sources of information: I find 
that firms who cooperate have on average 3% more sales due to new and improved 
products. The coefficient on other information sources are in line with results from 
the previous chapter: internal information is strongly positive and significant, in- 
formation from the group is positive although not strongly significant. Information 
from commercial and free, or institutional, sources are positively correlated with 
sales of new and improved sales. The effect of universities as information sources is 
positive and insignificant, while information from competitors is negative but again 
insignificant. 
A possible issue with these results is one of endogeneity of the innovation in- 
puts in this knowledge production function, that arise if unobservables or omitted 
variables that affect the innovation investment equation also affect the innovation 
outcome. I try to correct this endogeneity problem sing a two step approach, as 
described in the previous section, where my exclusion restrictions rely on the as- 
sumption that, conditional on innovation expenditure, financial support, market 
share, the Herfindahl index of concentration, the output growth potential of the 
firm, and measure of appropriability do not affect innovation output. 
47 In column 2 of table 5.7 1 report the results of the two-step estimation. In 
column 21 use the predicted innovation expenditure from column 5 of table 5.6, 
which is my favourite specification. As expected the point estimate decreases. Al- 
though the standard errors are not corrected, this result seems to suggest that the 
source of endogeneity might indeed be factors, such as unobserved firm fixed effects, 
e. g. managerial quality, that are correlated with both innovation investment and 
innovation outcome. 
Columns 3 and 4 use as dependent variable process innovation. The first dif- 
ference relative to the estimates using as dependent variable product innovation, is 
that now size is significantly correlated with process innovation. Secondly, while the 
global engagement dummies are not significant, the information coming from other 
firms in the group is strongly correlated with process innovation. As for product in- 
47Note however, that correct inference from these results is not possible. I tried to correct the 
standard errors for the fact that I am using an estimated variable with bootstrapping. However, 
for problems of convergence of the likelihood function this has not been possible. 
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novation information from suppliers and customers and 'free' information from fairs 
and trade associations are positive and significant and information from competitors 
s negatively correlated with a positive process innovation. 
Regaxding the endogeneity issue, the pattern is similar to the one observed in 
columns 1 and 2; correcting for endogeneity of the innovation input lead to a de- 
crease in the point estimates on the coefficient of innovation input, in line with the 
presence of unobserved firm fixed effects, however the marginal effect of innovation 
expenditure is now very imprecisely estimated. These results are at odds with other 
work where controlling for endogeneity leads to an increase of the innovation input 
coefficient (e. g. Loof and Heshmati, 2002, and Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001). 
In table D. 1 in Appendix DA I report estimates of equation 5.14 when the 
dependent variable are measures of novel product and process innovations. 
The estimates suggest that novel innovations, both product (measured as pro- 
portion of sales accounted for by products new to the maxket) and process, rely, 
relative to non-novel innovations, much more on sources of information internal to 
the plant, or from suppliers and customers, rather than from external sources of in- 
formation, either commercial or institutional. Rirthermore, I do not find that large 
plants have more novel process innovation than smaller plants. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has used matched data from the Community Innovation survey (CIS) 
and from the ARD to estimate the link between innovation and productivity growth, 
and two equations describing the innovation activity of firms: an innovation invest- 
ment equation and a knowledge production function equation. 
Firstly, one of the aims of this chapter was to show that the use of survey data 
still gives sensible and interesting results, especially when matched to quantitative 
performance data. Secondly, relative to previous research that used similar type of 
data for other countries, I used a specification of the production function (Klette, 
1996) that rationalises different effects for product and process innovation and allows 
for the presence of non constant returns to scale and imperfect competition. 
The results confirm that it is innovation output and not innovation input that 
affect productivity growth: novel product innovations are correlated with a higher 
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productivity growth, controlling for the initial TFP level of the firm. I find that 
process innovations are negatively correlated with productivity growth. A further 
investigation of this result show that process innovations that the firm report as hav- 
ing increased the flexibility of production are actually positively correlated with TFP 
growth, thus suggesting the presence of adjustment costs. Finally, an interesting re- 
sult is that conditional technological process and product innovation, managerial 
and organisational change is positively correlated with TFP growth. 
On the result of innovation process, I find that competition, strategic protection 
methods, financial support and a high level of knowledge capital within the firm, 
measured by the workforce qualification and by the self-reported importance of inter- 
nal information, axe important determinants of the innovation investment decision. 
Also, the presence of suppliers and customers as source of relevant information are 
also correlated with a higher investment level. 
The estimated returns to this investment seem rather plausible with an esti- 
mated return of 18% when I considered as measure of innovation the proportion 
of sales accounted for by new and improved products. An attempt to account for 
endogeneity of the innovation input suggests the presence of an upward bias in the 
tobit equation. 
Beside investment and high absorptive capacity, as proxied by internal informa- 
tion, the main correlates with innovation output are, for both product and process 
innovations, cooperation and information from suppliers and customers. 
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Chapter 6 
Employer Size Wage differentials 
6.1 Introduction 
The strong positive relationship between employer size and wages is an empirical 
regularity which seems to be as stable as the positive relationship between wages 
and education. This relationship has been established not only for the US (e. g. 
Brown and Medoff, 1989 and more recently aoske, 1999 and Oi and Idson, 1999 
for a recent review of the literature) but also for other industrialized countries (see, 
for instance, work by Morrisette, 1993 for Canada, Main and Reilly, 1993, for Great 
Britain, Rebick, 1993, for Japan, Albaek et al., 1998 for the Scandinavian countries, 
and Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991, for Germany). However, there is no clear 
explanation for the existence of the firm size wage differential. In a systematic 
investigation on this issue, Brown and Medoff note that the size wage differential is 
one of the key differentials observed in labour markets. It is particularly interesting 
because, unlike the union wage differential, it exists in the absence of an obvious 
agent, one of whose goals is its existence. 
The variable 'employer size' combines a multitude of different determinants, and 
vaxious plausible explanations for firm size differentials have been brought forwaxd. 
The rationale behind these explanations is that the size-wage effect is due ei- 
ther to differences in measured and unmeasured dimensions of labour quality, to 
compensating differentials caused by different job characteristics, or to differences 
in compensating policies among different sized employers. 
One popular explanation for size wage differentials is that larger firms employ 
154 
workers of higher quality. There are various explanations for why this may be the 
case: capital-skills complementaxities (Hamermesh, 1980), higher innovation rates 
(Oi, 1991); skill complementarity between workers (Kremer, 1993) and matching 
between high ability entrepreneurs with high quality workers (Lucas, 1978 and Oi, 
1983). These explanations predict that high ability workers will sort into large firms. 
Alternative models for which differences in wages between small and large firms are 
due to differences in screening costs (Garen, 1985) suggest that larger plants are 
likely to emphasise formal qualifications and credentials more than smaller firms 
because of higher costs of acquiring detailed information about workers' quality and, 
conditional on formal qualifications, they might employ workers of less unmeasurable 
ability than smaller firms. 
Explanations based on efficiency wages theories (see Bulow and Summers, 1986), 
on rent-shaxing hypotheses (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990 and Weiss, 1966) and expla, 
-nations that refer to the type of jobs and tasks in differently sized firms (Masters, 
1969) suggest that firms size differentials exist also for workers of same ability. Dy- 
namic monopsony models reach similar conclusions (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) 
and (Manning, 2003). 
On the level of empirical implementation, hypotheses that size wage differentials 
are due to laxger firms employing higher quality workers imply that, conditional on 
workers' unobserved ability, the wage differential should vanish. However, longitudi- 
nal studies that control for unobserved ability using first differences or fixed effects 
methods, have confirmed that unobserved heterogeneity leads to upward biased es- 
timates in OLS level regressions, but does not account entirely for firm size wage 
differentials. 
A limitation of these empirical tests is that they need to assume that unobserved 
ability (as well as observable measures of ability, e. g. education) is equally valued in 
small and large firms so that unobserved fixed effects can be differenced out in first 
difference or fixed effects regressions. However, this might not be the case. Gibbons 
et al. (2002), in a study of occupational and interindustry wage differentials show 
that when unobserved ability is valued differently in different firms, first differencing 
does not provide consistent estimates of the parameter of interest. 
This chapter deviates from the assumption that the productivity differential 
between a high ability worker and a low ability worker is equally valued in firms of 
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different size, on the lines of Gibbons et al.. The underlying model is a one factor 
model, in the sense that a high ability worker is more productive in any firm; however 
workers' ability is differently valued in different firms. As a consequence, if higher 
ability workers are better matched with larger firms, then firm size effects occur 
even conditional on fixed effects (see also Gibbons and Katz, 1992 and Gibbons 
et al., 2002). The analysis also encompasses an additional dimension explaining 
the productivity of a given worker in a given firm. Workers do not know their 
optimal match, and search. Search induces mobility, which is not assumed exogenous 
(differently from, for instance, Abowd et al., 1999). 
I conduct the empirical analysis using a unique administrative data set, the Insti- 
tut ftir Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung (IAB) employment sample, which covers 
1% of the German labour force over the period from 1975 to 1995. From this data 
source, I construct a data set of complete work histories of about 34000 young male 
workers, from entry to the labour market onwards. The wage information is very 
precise, and refers to average daily wages over employment spells, so that I can con- 
struct exact wage history variables on work experience and firm tenure. In addition 
to characteristics of the individual, such as age, education, and marital status, I 
observe a number of characteristics of the establishment in which the worker is em- 
ployed. I observe industry and location at a very detailed level. Most importantly, 
I observe the exact number of employees in any year, and in any establishment in 
which any worker in the sample has been employed. This information is available 
for the period between 1980 and 1995. This continuous variable on employer size 
avoids measurement error problems, that are instead present with categorical firm 
size data (see Albaek et al., 1998 for a discussion), and it allows longitudinal analysis 
within the plant. 
Furthermore, some of the previous empirical analysis based on worker level data 
has been limited by the unavailability of various aspects of firm quality. The IAB 
data allows me to investigate a number of issues which could not be addressed with 
previous data sets, since I have some unique information about firm characteristics, 
sometimes cited for contributing to firm size differentials. For instance, the data 
provides information on the skill mix within the firm at the time of the worker's em- 
ployment, thus I can investigate the existence of possible complementaxities between 
workers' quality in larger firms. Additionally, from the establishment size variable, 
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I am able to construct a variable on the firm's age, the firm's closure, and the past 
growth of the firm. The firm closure information allows me to identify displaced 
workers, or "exogenous movers", which is important for the identification strategy, 
as explained below. 
This chapter does not intend to provide a conclusive explanation for why firm size 
differentials exists; rather it intends to provide estimates of the firm size effects which 
are not contaminated by differences in the ability mix, and the presence of workers 
unobserved ability valued differently in differently sized firms. Rirthermore, it tries 
to eliminate the bias which results from endogenous mobility even in difference 
equations. 
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section I briefly review previous 
hypotheses on size wage differentials, in section 6.3 1 describe the model and some 
empirical predictions, in section 6.4 1 describe the dataset and the sample used. 
I also present descriptive evidence on differences in wages, workers' characteristics 
and mobility across firms of different sizes which support both the existence of a 
comparative advantage and a 'true' employer size effect. In section 6.6 1 present the 
empirical results and section 6.7 concludes. 
6.2 A quick review of the literature 
While there axe well-established empirical results pointing to the existence of a 
wage premium, at a theoretical level there is still much investigation to be done to 
establish such a phenomenon. The analysis of the link between eaxnings and firm 
size seems to suffer from the fact that the vaxiable "employer size" is incompatible 
with a stringent causal concept. It combines a multitude of different determinants. 
This is a disadvantage since several theoretical interpretations can be adduced to 
explain the confirmed link between firm size and earnings. 
The explanations for explaining size wage differentials can be divided in two 
broad categories. First, the size wage differential is due to a higher productivity of 
workers in larger firms, so that workers with high measured and unmeasured ability 
would sort themselves in larger firms. Second, there is a wage premium paid to the 
worker which is not related to his productivity, but which is the result of a positive 
relationship between firm size and the costs of either information acquisition, or 
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screening and monitoring. In this latter group of models high ability workers are 
not necessarily matched with larger firms. 
There are various explanations for why larger firms employ workers of higher 
quality. Hamermesh (1980) for instance suggests that capital and skills are comple- 
mentary, Due to economies of scale and preferential access to credit in imperfect 
capital markets, larger firms are more capital intensive, and able to employ higher 
quality labour. Similarly in Oi (1991) large firms, being more innovative and more 
capital intensive, need more qualified and specialised workers and seek a lower rate 
of workforce turnover. Therefore firm specific human capital accumulation takes 
place primarily at large firms and plants. 
Kremer (1993) suggests that tasks are more complex in large enterprises because 
they adopt more advanced technologies. This induces greater skill complementarity 
between workers (O-ring production function) and therefore higher returns to human 
capital in larger plants. Oi (1983) argues that large firms need better quality workers. 
In Oi's model (1983) the matching of high ability entrepreneurs with high quality 
workers generates the size wage differential. As in Lucas' (1978) model of the size 
distribution of firms, entrepreneurs have an endowment of time and they decide how 
to allocate it to management and supervision. More able entrepreneurs manage 
larger workforce but have a higher opportunity cost of monitoring. In equilibrium 
better entrepreneur hire more productive workers who are characterized by lower 
supervisory costs. One of the implications of the model is that returns to labour 
quality increase with firm size, i. e. that the wage structure is convex. Similarly, in 
the presence of incomplete information about the workers' ability, firms may differ 
in their wage structure according to differences in the cost of screening mechanisms. 
Garen (1985) for instance suggests that larger plants have higher costs of acquiring 
detailed information about workers' quality and as a consequence, find it optimal to 
choose a more favourable compensation scheme for workers' of a given observable 
quality. In fact, Garen's model predicts that there is a negative correlation between 
the returns to observable and unobservable measures of quality: conditional on 
measurable workers' quality, such as education, qualification and experience, larger 
firm will employ workers of less unmeasurable ability. 
Hypotheses that allow for heterogeneity in wages, conditional on workers' abil- 
ity are based on efficiency wages theories (Bulow and Summers, 1986), rent-sharing 
158 
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) and (Weiss, 1966) and union avoidance hypothesis. Effi- 
ciency wage models point to discrepancies in technology and/or product quality as 
a possible explanation of the differences in wages according to size. Monitoring is 
more difficult in larger firms than in smaller firms; the cost of turnovers is higher 
and shirking has great negative effects; and productivity is more sensitive to wages. 
Larger firms exceed the market wage rate to reduce fluctuations and to offer incen- 
tives for a steady and involved work effort. The leading argument for rent-sharing as 
an explanation for size wage differentials is that larger firms are more likely to have 
monopoly power and they may share some of the monopoly rents with their workers, 
it being reasonable that excess profits lead to wage premiums especially when the 
labour force is organised as it is in large firms. In fact, the assumption underlying 
the work of Weiss, 1966 is that large employers axe more likely to be unionised, since 
the working conditions and the scale of activity in larger plants axe more likely to 
make workers receptive to unionisation. This results in higher wages. A different 
analysis, using a closely related argument and yielding the same result, is that is 
that large employers face a great threat of unionisation and therefore tend to follow 
a strategy of positive labour relations. Large non-unionised employers may try to 
avoid unionisation by conducting a policy of positive industrial relations including 
higher wages, more benefits and better working conditions. As a result, union wage 
and benefit differentials should vary inversely with size. The conclusion to both the 
union avoidance hypothesis and the union demands hypothesis is that the oligopolis- 
tic structure allows workers to obtain higher wages. ' The empirical findings of Arai 
(2003) do not seem to support the role of rent sharing as an explanation for the size 
wage premium, since this premium is still significant after controlling for profits. 
Another strand of explanations refer to the type of jobs and tasks in differently 
sized firms. Masters (1969) suggests that working conditions in large firms axe worse 
than in small firms, and that firms size differentials may be simply compensating 
differentials. For instance, there is increased work division, a more impersonal work 
atmosphere, greater reliance on rules, less freedom of action and scheduling, longer 
'Note that, as reported by Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991), collective bargaining in Germany 
is mainly organised on an industry level and thus firm size can be expected to mirror industry 
chaxacteristics. Therefore to test for these latter hypotheses (Union Avoidance and Union Demand) 
one can include explicitly sectoral dummies. Contrary to the case of the Unites States, including 
a variable for individual union status would not have a positive effect on wages in Germany since 
collective contracts also cover non-members. 
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commuting. Thus, larger employers have to compensate prospective workers of 
a given quality for the unattractive features of the job by paying a higher wage. 
However, empirical work, such as Troske (1999), has shown that controlling for 
working conditions does not explain size wage premiums. 
Some authors have suggested that firm size effects are due to internal labour mar- 
kets offered by larger firms (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). The literature on internal 
labour markets provides a possible explanation for the positive relationship between 
firm size and wages and between firm size and tenure: internal labour markets would 
represent a screening device and an incentive for human capital investments. Inter- 
nal labour markets facilitate the evaluation of workers' performance, since it is easier 
to collect information on the employee and ensure a higher return of specific human 
capital investments. This is thanks to reduced employee initiated turnover and a 
reduction in any diffidence of older workers in imparting their knowledge to new 
employees. Small firms seem to have higher failure rates and higher employment 
variability Dunne et al. (1989). Larger firms may, therefore, find it profitable to 
exploit their inherent size advantage for promoting within-firm job mobility. They 
can develop long-term relationships with their employees, offer on-the-job training, 
career growth and alternative types of jobs within the organisation due to lower 
failure probability (Idson, 1989 and Idson, 1996 and Winter-Ebner, 1995). 
More recently Burdett and Mortensen (1998), in a model of on-the-job search 
with labour market frictions and unemployment, present a theory consistent with 
larger firms having lower turnover rate. In their model, firms offer higher wages 
to reduce quits and at the same time attract workers from low wage firms 2 and a 
unique wage distribution exists for homogenous workers. In this distribution wages 
increase with firms' size, since firms are faced with an upward sloping labour SUpply. 3 
Results that support this idea are provided in Green et al. (1996). " 
2Employed workers have higher reservation wages than unemployed workers, since they always 
have the option to stay with their current employer 
3Jn the literature this model has been defined as a dynamic monopsony model (Manning, 2003) 
because the job market frictions make it possible for the firm to lower its wages infinitesimally 
without loosing all of its workers or increasing them to keep a larger fraction of the workforce 
without attracting all of the workers in the market. 
4However, they cannot exclude other the validity of other explanations. 
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6.3 The econometric Model 
6.3.1 The intuition 
I will sketch the assumptions of the model underlying the econometric specification. 
The model assumes that workers are differently productive in different firms and 
search for the location of their optimal match, and firms and workers learn about 
the match quality. This creates mobility which is not exogenous (different from, for 
instance, Abowd et al., 1999). The model is a one factor model, in the sense that 
a high ability worker is more productive in any firm; however, workers' ability is 
differently valued in different firms. In particular, larger firms may value a worker's 
ability more than small firms. As a consequence, if higher ability workers are better 
matched with larger firms than with smaller firms, then firm size effects occur even 
conditional on fixed effects (see also Gibbons and Katz, 1992). 
The model contributes to the existing literature in many respects. I highlight 
the differences with previous models. As I described in the previous section, in the 
traditional approach, ability is correlated with firm size. This leads to the conclusion 
that OLS estimates of the size elasticity are biased and inconsistent. The solution 
to this problem has been to treat ability as an unobservable fixed worker effect 
and to obtain consistent estimates using first differences or fixed effects models (see 
figure EA in appendix E. 2). The main limitations of these models is that ability 
is assumed to be equally valued in employers of different size and thus mobility 
is assumed exogenous. Gibbons and Katz (1992) and Gibbons et al. (2002) have 
developed an alternative approach based on a comparative advantage model. The 
Gibbons and Katz and Gibbons et al. models have not been explicitly adopted to 
study size-wage differentials, however, one can easily apply their idea to the analysis 
of size wage differentials. Gibbons and Katz assume that ability is differently valued 
in different firms. In their model learning about workers' ability generates mobility 
across sectors. One of the main implications of the model is that there are no "true" 
sector specific advantages. Thus, wages increase with ability, but they increase 
more in large firms relative to small firms, but the wage of low ability workers will 
be higher in smaller firms while the wage of high ability workers will be higher in 
larger firms (see figure E. 2 in appendix E. 2). The unobserved individual fixed effect 
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is valued differently across different sectors, so that it cannot been differenced out 
using first difference or fixed effects estimations methods. 
The approach here departs from Gibbons and Katz because it encompasses the 
presence of comparative advantage but also allows for the existence of true firm size 
effects (see figure E. 3 in appendix E. 2). 
The mobility decision has been modelled in several ways. Farber 1999 presents 
a simple model of mobility. It assume that workers search on-the-job for a better 
match. In each period the worker receives a wage offer, drawn from a wage offer 
distribution. He will accept the offer if this exceeds his current wage. 
Thus, in such model of job mobility, in every period t the worker draws from a 
truncated distribution of wage offers. However, if the worker loses his job for exoge- 
nous reasons, e. g. for firm closure, he will have to draw from the whole distribution. 
6.3.2 The empirical specification 
Consider a level wage equation (which could be derived from a simple human capital 
model): 
Inwit=ao+Jlxit+82zj(i, t)t+, ylnSj(i, t)t+77i+tiij(i, t)+Oj(i, t)+uit+Tt, (6.1) 
where Inwit axe log wages of individual i employed with firm j in period t, xit are 
individual specific characteristics (including education, tenure, and labour market 
experience). The size of establishment j employing individual i in period t is given 
by Sj(i, t)t, and zj(i, t)t axe other establishment characteristics. 5 
The term 77i is an unobserved individual specific heterogeneity component, Pjj(j, t) 
is a time invariant match-specific productivity component, Oj(i, t) is an unobserved 
firm fixed effect and uit is a transitory idiosyncratic shock to wages. Finally, Tt are 
aggregate wage shocks, which I will model with time dummies. 
The parameter I am interested in is y, the effect of establishment size on wages. 
5xit is a vector of individual characteristics: cubic polynomial in experience, cubic polynomial 
in tenure, occupation and educational qualification at labour market entry. zj(i, t) is a vector of 
time varying and time invariant firm characteristics: the educational composition of the plant, 
i. e. percentage of skilled workers and percentage of university/Fachochschule graduates, which is 
a time varying variable, and the time invariant plant specific characteristics industry and region. 
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Straightforwaxd OLS estimation of equation (6.1) leads to unbiased estimates of 
-y only if 
E(77i + pij(i, t) + Oj (i, t) + uit Ixit , zj(i, t)t , Sj(i, t)t I Tt) =0 
(6.2) 
This is unlikely to be the case for a number of reasons. First, unobserved ability 
77i may be correlated with firm size: if for some reasons high ability workers sort into 
larger firms, then this leads to an upward biased coefficient of the firm size variable. 
Second, sorting may lead to a correlation between the match specific effect Aij and 
firm size. Again, if high ability workers are better matched with larger firms, then 
this leads to an upward biased estimate of -y. Third, good quality firms, with high 
0, are likely to be large and offer higher wages. 6 
To eliminate the possible bias induced by individual specific heterogeneity, many 
papers have estimated fixed effects or difference equations: 
AInwit -"., z JI AXit + J2 (2j(i, t)t - Zj-l(i, t-l)t-1) + 7(Sj(i, t)t - Sj-l(i, t-l)t-1) (6.3) 
+(ILij(i, t) - Pij-i(t-1)) + (oj(i, t) - oj-l(i, t-1)) + (Uit - ui, t-i) + ATt 
Where j (i, t) might be equal or different from j-1 (i, t- 1). 
If unobserved ability is not equally valued in firms of different size, and workers 
search for firms which exploit and rewaxd their full productivity potential, then 
mobility is endogenous, and the change in match quality is likely to be correlated 
with firm size across firms, leading to biased estimates also in a difference equation: 
E((pjj(j, t) - pij-i(t-1)) + Oj(i, t) - Oj-l(i, t-i) + (Uit - uit-l)lAxit, ) (6.4) 
(zj(i, t)t - zj-l(i, t-l)t-l), (sj(i, t)t - Sj-l(i, t-l)t-1), ATO 54 0 
Similar problems occur when considering wage growth across firms only, i. e. 
when i(i, t) 7ý i- 1(i, t- 1): 
6An additional source of endogeneity might be caused by idiosyncratic shock uit caxrying over 
to both workers' wages and firm size. I will come back to this issue later. 
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E((ILij(i, t) - lLij-, (t-, )) + oj(i, t) -+ (uit - uit-, ) lAxit, (6.5) 
(zj(i, t)t - zj-l(i, t-i)t-l), (Sj(i, t)t - Sj-l(i, t-l)t-, ), ATt, STAY = 0) 
where I condition on the mobility decision in addition. There is bias due to sort- 
ing (better individuals sort into firms with better wage offers) and due to selection 
(only those individuals who obtain high outside offers change firms). 
Now consider wage growth within firms only. In this case, I obtain 
Aln(wit) : -- 61 Alit + 62 AZj(i, t)t + 'YASj(i, t)t + (Uit - Ui, t-1) + ATt (6.6) 
where: 
E(uit - ui, t-l I Axit, Azj(i, t)t, ASj(i, t)t, ATt, STAY = 1) (6.7) 
The firm fixed effect and the worker firm match component, as long as they axe 
assumed constant over time, drop out of this expression. However, I restrict the 
sample now to workers who do not change firms, introducing a selection bias -a 
positive transitory shock may induce the worker to stay with the firm. 7. 
I implement the following estimation strategy. I base the estimation equation 
on (6.6). 1 estimate within firm wage growth equations, and control for possible 
selection due to positive wage shocks. To do that, I estimate in a first step a 
reduced form probability equation: 
Prob(CH = 0) =f (xit, zjt, I, InSijt, ATt) (6.8) 
where I are our instruments. To identify firm size effects in equation (6.6), 1 
need variables which, conditional on Axit and Azi(i, t)t, do not affect wage growth 
within firms, but which do affect the probability that the worker stays with the 
firm. I use two sets of instruments. Firstly, I assume that, conditional on experience 
7An additional source of endogeneity bias arises because positive transitory shocks are likely to 
be correlated with change of firm size, inducing a correlation between (uit - ui, t-, ) and (Sj(i, t)t - 
sjo'ot-i) 
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and education, age does not affect wages. Age does however affect mobility, with 
older workers being less mobile than younger workers. Job sepaxations are likely 
to entail risks and costs that will vaxy across workers according, for instance, to 
his marital status and to whether he has children: workers who axe maxried and 
have children will be less likely to take risks, and thus more likely to stay with 
the same employer. Thus, I include a dummy for marital status and for whether 
the worker has children in the mobility equation. Secondly, the model suggests that 
workers learn about the quality of the match while being in the labour market. They 
then change firms only if the new match is superior to the old match. Accordingly, 
they draw from a truncated match distribution, where the average truncation point 
depends on how long they have been around in the labour maxket. Now suppose 
the worker loses his job because of some exogenous event, like a firm closure. 8 Then 
after job loss, and if compensation is independent of his former match quality, he 
will be forced to draw from the average distribution of job matches and not from 
the truncated distribution. Accordingly, when compaxing two identical workers who 
only differ in the fact that one worker has been exogenously displaced in the past, 
then the displaced worker is more likely to accept at any point in his employment 
history a wage offer. Following this line of argumentation, I use the number of past 
displacements as an instrument for our mobility equation. 
Thus the instruments I use axe age, marital status and number of displacements 
before the current jobs. 9 
8Many studies that estimate returns to tenure have used sample of displaced workers (e. g. 
Dustmann and Meghir (2004)) using the same dataset. Gibbons and Katz (1992) use displaced 
workers to estimate inter-industry wage differentials. I explain below why restricting the analysis 
to a sample of displaced workers would not help identification in this case 
9Previous cross-sectional work that has tried to control for the endogenous mobility, or more 
precisely endogeneity of firm choice include the study of Idson and Feaster (1990) and Main and 
Reilly (1993). Idson and Feaster (1990) argue that employer size is a decision vaxiable based on an 
interaction between employer demand and workers' labour supply decisions. They try to correct 
for non-random sorting of workers using an ordered probit to predict firm size attachment and then 
correct the wage regression for selectivity bias. Their findings suggest that there is a non-random 
sorting of better educated workers into big firms, whereas small firms attract those workers with a 
high individual drive and level of independence. Main and Reilly (1993) also use an ordered probit 
model to predict- worker's attachment to a given plant size. For identification, they use a set of 
vaxiables, number of dependent children and their age group, that describe family chaxacteristics. 
The rationale behind their choice is that these factors affect the choice of employment stability. 
The finding are not supportive of a non-random selection process into. differently sized employers. 
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6.4 The Data and the Sample 
The empirical analysis uses a one percent random sample of all employees in Ger- 
many for the period 1975-1995, the IAB Beschftigtenstichprobe, from the German 
Social Security Record, known as the Historical File (HF) of the Federal Employment 
Office. The information included in this data set is gender, nationality, education, 
gross earnings, and reasons for the interruption of the spell. The basis for this data 
set is an integrated procedure for health-, retirement-, and unemployment insur- 
ance, 10 which requires establishments to report any beginning and termination of 
an employment relationship covered by social security. In addition, establishments 
have to provide information on ongoing employment relationships at the end of each 
calendar year. The information provided includes gross earnings, gender, national- 
ity, education, job position, and occupation. For each of these employment spells, 
I observe the average daily wage. Due to the administrative nature of our data 
set, wages and employment spells are very accurate. Measurement error is thus 
negligible. 
I construct from this data base a sample of male workers whom I observe from 
their entry in the labour market onwards. " I require all workers to be at most 15 in 
1975 (which is the youngest age at which workers can join apprenticeship schemes). 
Workers with A-levels at labour market entry axe included in the sample when they 
were 19 or younger in 1975. This is the minimum age students can graduate from 
high school. Workers with university degree were 23 or younger in 1975.12 
From this sample I construct complete work histories for young workers from 
labour maxket entry onwaxds up to 21 yeaxs in the labour force. 
IOThe HF data is supplemented by an additional data source, the so-called Leistungsempfnger- 
datei, which contains spells for individuals who receive unemployment benefits from the Federal 
Employment Office. 
IINote that I restrict my sample to West Germany. 
12Workers without Abitur (secondaxy school qualification) to be between 15, since 15 is the 
eaxliest they can leave school and 19 at labour maxket entry (or at the start of the apprenticeship) 
to include all workers with ten years of general schooling plus two years of vocational schooling. 
Workers with A bitur are included in the sample when they were 19, age at which students graduate 
from high school or younger in 1975, but not older than 21 at labour market entry, to include all high 
school graduates who complete their compulsory military service (1 yeax and 3, or 6 months) before 
entry in the labour maxket. Workers with a university/polytechnic degree at labour market entry 
must be 24/23 or younger in 1975, since this is the minimum age at which German students can 
graduate and at most 29/27 at labour market entry, to allow for the completion of the compulsory 
military service and for the prolonged duration of tertiary degrees. 
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The data set covers only employees which pay social security contributions. This 
excludes civil servants, the self employed, and individuals in marginal jobs. Also 
excluded are employees whose earnings fall below the threshold that makes social 
security contributions obligatory; the data set is therefore left-truncated. However, 
this is a minor problem for the sample I are using, where I only include male workers 
who are in regulax full-time employment. Moreover, as many administrative data 
sets, our data is right-censored at the highest level of eaTnings that are subject to 
social security contributions. 13 In our overall sample, top-coding is not a serious 
problem for apprenticeship skilled workers and unskilled workers; less than 0.5 % of 
all wage observations are top-coded. It is however a problem for university graduates: 
for them 11-74% of observations are top-coded. Thus, I decided to conduct the 
empirical analysis sepaxately for workers from this group and to restrict it to their 
first 5 years in the labour maxket. During this period, top coding is again negligible 
(less than 10%). 14 
The dataset also contain a plant and a firm identifier. By aggregating up on the 
entire data base of 100% of the workforce, aggregate individual characteristics have 
been created at the establishment level, and matched to the data. The additional 
information I obtain from this include the within-firm educational structure (dis- 
tinguishing between the percentages of low skilled, medium skilled, and high skilled 
workers), plant size and plant closure information, with the latter vaxiable being 
available for the years between 1980 and 1995. This information is available for all 
firms over this period which ever employed any worker in the IAB sample. 
The size of establishments is included as a continuous vaxiable. This is a notable 
advantage. Often the precise number of employees is not available, so that many 
studies report estimated coefficients for various size classes. Moreover, being con- 
tinuous, it does allow longitudinal analysis within the plant, which is not possible 
in studies of industry wage differential or in studies that only have categorical in- 
formation on size, or a measure of size likely to be heavily affected by measurement 
error (e. g.: survey data). 
A potential disadvantage of the dataset is that for multi-plant firms I only know 
the size of each single establishment and not of the entire firm, since in the data 
13The threshold varies over the years 
14See also table (E. 1) in Appendix E. 1 
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there are no identifiers that allow to aggregate the size of each establishment up to 
the firm level. Thus, I cannot investigate whether establishment size and firm size 
have separate independent relevance for wages. 15 
Appendix E. 1 defines the variables I use in the empirical analysis. 
6.5 Mobility, Establishment Size and Wages 
The sample used for the descriptive and regression analysis includes 324,865 observa, 
tions, from the year 1980 to the year 1995: 34,033 full time workers in 63,912 plants. 
Of these 34,033 full-time workers: 6,580 axe unskilled, 23,648 have an apprenticeship 
and 4,648 hold a university or polytechnic degree. 
Table 6.1 displays plants' and workers' characteristics in the sample, according 
to firm size. I categorise firm size into four classes: small firms with less than 20 
workers, medium sized firms with less than 100, large, 100 to 999, and very large 
with 1000 workers or more. 
In rows 2 to 41 report the differences in skill mix across firms of different size 
calculated from the whole population. I distinguish between 3 skill categories: un- 
skilled, skilled and highly skilled. The numbers across the four columns of row 2 
indicate that the percentages of unskilled workers in large and small firms axe very 
similar. Row 3, however, shows that there is a slight decrease in the percentage 
of skilled workers (with an apprenticeship qualification) across categories, but, as 
shown in row 4, there is a substantial increase of highly skilled workers (with an 
academic degree). This indicates that at the upper end of the skill distribution, 
larger plants tend to hire on average higher quality workers than smaller plants. 
In rows 5 to 9 we look at the skill composition across size categories using the 
workers in our sample. The information in the sample is more detailed and I can 
disaggregate the 3 education groups in 5 education sub-groups: unskilled, semi- 
skilled, workers with an apprenticeship qualification, with a polytechnic degree and 
finally with a university degree. The picture gathered from looking at rows 5 to 9 
is quite similar to the one from rows 2 to 4. The proportion of workers holding a 
polytechnic or a university degrees is much higher in large firms. Moreover in the 
151n this chapter I will loosely use the terms firm, plant and employer interchangeably to indicate 
the establishment. 
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Table 6.1: Composition by Size Category 
1-19 20-99 1 1DO-999 1000+ Total 
I Number of observations 26.71 22.61 29.57 21.11 324865 
2 proportion unskilled in plant's workforce 30.18 31.32 32.92 31.71 31.59 
(29.83) (23.64) (20.61) 05-47) (23.15) 
3 proportion of skilled in plant's workforce 67.17 64.67 61.07 57.75 62.74 
(30.28) (23.56) (19-41) (14.29) (23.04) 
4 proportion highly skilled in plant's workforce 2.69 4.02 6.01 10.54 5.68 
(11.20) (11.16) (11.12) (12.28) (11.75) 
5 unskilled 27.63 27.04 30.13 15.2 11.5 
6 semi-skilled 28.7 24.62 28.12 18.57 6.55 
7 with apprenticeship 32.99 24.36 26.4 16.25 68.86 
8 fachochschule 17.49 19.49 31.87 31.15 4.54 
9 university 15.75 16.41 31.66 36.18 8.92 
10 tenure 2.21 2.64 3.28 4.22 3.05 
(2.56) (2.84) (3.18) (3.53) (3.12) 
11 average no. jobs 2.63 2.58 2.34 1.88 2.37 
(2.19) (2.07) (1.80) (1-42) (1.93) 
12 average no. jobs by size ct of first employer 2.54 2.55 2.30 1.80 2.33 
(1-94) (2.01) (1.92) (1.51) (1-90) 
Notes: Means (and proportions, rows 5 to 9) reported, standard deviations in parenthesis. The sample used 
includes 324,865 observations, from the year 1980 to the year 1995. Total number of workers in the sample is 
34,033. Total number of plants is 63,912. Rows 2 to 4 report statistics on the composition of the firms' workforce 
calculated using the complete population of workers, as described in E. 1. Rows 5 to 9 report the distribution of 5 
education levels in the sample by size category. Row 10 reports the average tenure in years. Row 11 reports the 
average number of jobs held in different firms according to the firm where the worker is employed. Row 12 reports 
a similar statistic but according to the size of the firm where the worker was first employed. 
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sample, the proportion of low skilled workers decreases with size of the firm. 
Row 10 shows that there are significant differences in tenure: tenure increases 
with firm size. 16 The numbers in row 11 also suggest that workers in laxger firms 
are less mobile than workers in smaller firms. While the average number of jobs 
held by a worker in the smallest category is 2.63, it is 1.88 in the largest category. 
Row 12 relates the total number of jobs an individual has held to the size of the 
first employer. Workers who started in firms with less than 20 employees hold on 
average 2.54 jobs compared to workers who staxted in firm with 1000 employees or 
more who have a total number of jobs of 1.8. This suggests am inverse relationship 
between mobility and employer size in the first job - individuals who find a large 
employer at entry to the labour market have a lower mobility than individuals who 
start at a small firm. 17 
The reason for that could be that it is the high productivity workers who match 
with large firms initially, thus reducing their later mobility, or that larger firms are 
more likely to offer internal labour markets, thus reducing mobility. Finally, it is 
likely that the average worker-employer match in larger plants is better and there- 
fore it is less likely that workers of larger plants might find advantageous outside 
offers. Overall, these figures indicate some substantial differences in mobility pat- 
terns across workers in firms of different size. They emphasize the importance to 
relax the assumption of exogenous mobility when investigating firm size differentials. 
I now investigate mobility patterns in more detail. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 display the 
separation rates and the joining rates of workers from and to differently sized firms, 
where the latter figure (6-2) reports sepaxation rates separately for unskilled, skilled 
and graduate worker. " The graphs show a clear relationship between establishment 
size and worker turnover, with both sepaxation rates and joining rates decreasing 
with the size of the establishment. Less than 10% of the observed separations 
and new acquisitions take place in plants with more than 1,000 employees. This 
16A t-test on the figures in row 10 shows that the differences axe significant at the 1% level. 
17Unreported statistics show that the average size of the first employer for workers who only 
hold only one job is 2,556, while for workers who hold 5 jobs or more it is 649. 
18The dataset does not directly distinguish between quits and layoffs. I did try to distinguish 
between layoffs and quits using information on time spent out of the labour market, i. e. I assume 
that workers that axe unemployed between spells have been laid off. However, it is not cleax that 
workers, who decide to quit, would not spend time out of work to find a better match. Thus in 
the end I decided not to use this distinction in this analysis. 
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Figure 6.1: Mobility Rates across Size Categories 
8 Q** 6 (-) Onmm 
25 
2 
is 
.1 
. 05 
pattern is consistent across different education groups (figure 6.2). The figure shows 
that mobility is highest among unskilled workers, and lowest among skilled workers. 
However, quit rates converge significantly with firm size across skill groups. A 
possible interpretation of this is that lower skilled workers, relative to highly skilled 
workers, are more likely to find a good match in larger firms. I will come back to 
this below when I analyse wages. 
Table (6.2) illustrates mobility across differently sized employers. For ease of 
exposition, I only distinguish between 3 size classes, less than 100 employees, between 
100 and 1,000 and more than 1,000. As shown in the bottom right corner of the 
table, I observe 56,964 separations in the sample between 1980 and 1995. Of these 
37,041, i. e. 65.03 %, axe separation from firms with 100 employees or less (row 1 
column 4), 25-24% (row 3 column 4). from firms with 100 to 1,000 employees, and 
only 9.74% (row 5 column 4) from large firms with 1,000 employees or more. Indeed 
row 1 shows that most of the mobility takes place among smaller plants: of the 
37,041 separations from small plants 26,148, Le. 70.59% find a new job in a firm 
of the same size (row 1 column 1), while only a small percentage (7-12%) finds a 
job in a large firm (row 1 column 3). The percentage of mobility to small from big 
employers is small, 2611 (row 3 column 1), and even less is the number of transitions 
from big plants to jobs with a similar sized employer: only 1,238. 
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Our results axe consistent with evidence from many countries that matches of 
workers to jobs in larger firms are generally considerably more stable than in smaller 
ones (OECD, 1993) and with previous empirical results from German data. 19 
In Table 6.3 1 analyse the wage gains and losses from moving across firms of 
different sizes. As in all the wage analysis I restrict my sample to unskilled and 
skilled workers, whose wages are not affected by censoring problems. " I distinguish 
between three size categories, less or equal to 100 employees, 100 to 1,000 employees, 
and more than 1,000. The figures show that the wage gains from mobility across 
firms of the same size category axe remarkably stable across categories, and they 
amount on average to 6- 7%. There axe large gains from mobility from small to 
larger firms, and significant losses from mobility from laxger to smaller firms. The 
wage increase of those who move from a small plant to a big plant is 18% whereas 
those who move from a big plant observe on average a wage loss of 0.5% when they 
move to medium sized plants and a wage loss of 5.11% when they move to small 
19Schasse (1991) shows that tenure tends to increase with firm size using the first four waves 
of the German household Panel collected between 1984 and 1987. Rick (1994), using 1988 micro 
data from an sectors of the German economy excluding agriculture and forestry, shows that quit 
rates and dismissal rates axe, ceteris paxibus, lower in laxger than in smaller firms. 20When analysing the same figures for graduates in the first 4 years spent in the labour market, 
the gains from changes across firms within the same size categories axe very similar as in table 6.3. 
However, in the case of graduates we never observe a wage loss, but we do observe smaller gains 
when workers move from laxger to smaller firms 
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iaDle D. Z: IVIOD111ty Detwee n size ciasses 
to<=100 to 101-999 to >=1000 Total 
From <=100 26148 8255 2638 37041 
70.59116 22.29% 7.12 Ivo 65.0311vo 
From 101-999 7918 4693 1765 14376 
55.08115 3 2.64 16 12.28% 25.2475 
Rom >=1000 2611 1698 1238 5547 
4 7.07% 30.6175 22.327o 9.747o 
Total 36677 14646 5641 56964 
64.3911yo 25.7115 9.900 tv /0 
Notes: Total number of observations is 324,865. Total number of separations observed in the sample 56,964. 
Figures reported are frequencies. In italics the table reports in columns 1 to 3 the proportion of separations in the 
cell relative to the total separations in the row (e. g. in the top left cell 26,148/37,041 = 70.59%). In column 4, the 
table reports in italics the proportion of separations in the cell relative to the total separations in the column (e. g. 
in the top right cell: 37,041/56,964 = 65.03% 
Table 6.3: Wage gains and losses from mobility between size classes 
to<=100 to 101-999 to >=1000 Average 
From <=100 6.60 12.62 18.21 8.73 
(33-44) (33-47) (34.30) (33.69) 
From 101-999 1.72 6.78 13.16 4.61 
(34-15) (32.17) (31.61) (33-47) 
From >=1000 5.11 -0.52 6.33 -1.61 
(37.03) (31.21) (28.54) (34'. 16) 
Average 4.81 9.51 14.59 
(33.99) (33.12) (32.83) 
Notes: Means of percentage wage gains reported, standard deviations in parenthesis. The sample used includes 
only unskilled and skilled workers, whose wages are never right censored. This sample includes 285,774 
observations, from the year 1980 to the year 1995. Total number of workers in the sample is 29,454, of which 6,020 
are unskilled and 23,434 are skilled. Total number of plants is 59,326. The total number of separations observed is 
52,536. Of which 35,274 from small firms (of which 25,069 to small firms 7,774 to medium size firms and 2,431 to 
large firms); 12,897 from medium sized firms (of which 7,365 to medium, 4,080 to small and 1,452 to large); 4,365 
from large firms (of which 814 to large; 1,299 to medium and 2,252 to small) 
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plants. In general those who move to a big employer, independently from the size of 
the previous plant, experience an increase of 15%, while those who move to a small 
employer 5%. 
Again, these differentials may be due to match quality - bad workers move to 
smaller firms, while good workers move to larger firms. In unreported analysis I 
investigated this issue in more detail. First, I looked at the relative wage level pre 
and post transition of workers who move across size categories and of those who 
move within the same categories. I find that workers who leave large firms to move 
to smaller firms are always the ones with the lowest wage in their size class. The 
wage levels of workers who move from small to larger plants are the highest in the 
size class but are still lower than those of workers worked at a large plants. This 
evidence confirms the presence of sorting, i. e. that high ability workers go to larger 
plants. 
6.6 Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis. I staxt by following the 
traditional literature on firm size-wage effects. I first estimate OLS level regres- 
sions controlling for observed firm and individual characteristics, then I conduct 
longitudinal analysis using fixed effects method. I finally depart from the tradi- 
tional literature and estimate the size coefficient controlling for unobserved firm and 
worker fixed effects, the impact of non-random mobility choices and finally for the 
possible endogeneity of firm size. 
6.6.1 OLS results 
Table 6.4 reports the estimate of a pooled OLS regression on the sample of unskilled 
and skilled workers. 21 Column 1 shows the unconditional size-wage differential in 
our sample. 22 This amounts to 4.37% and is in line with previous estimates for 
the German labour market. In column 2,1 control for industry effects; even within 
industries the size wage elasticity is an economically significant 3.93%. Finally in 
2'The results for university graduates are reported in the Appendix. 
221 include region and year dummies. 
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Table 6.4: Level estimates of size effects (OLS estimates of EQuation 6.1) 
In(size) 0.04366 0.03930 0.04155 0.03590 0.03501 
(0.00085)*** (0.00091)*** (0.00092)*** (0.00088)*** (0.00095)*** 
semiskilled OM072 0.05904 
(0.004 82) *** (0-00482)*** 
with apprenticeship 0.18699 0.17823 
(0.00380)*** (0.00384)*** 
experience 0.07259 0.07241 
(0.00134)*** (0.00133)*** 
2 experience -0.06112 -0.06125 
(0.00229)*** (0.00227)*** 
experzenee3 0.01966 0.01972 
(0.00111)*** (0.00110)*** 
tenure 0.02450 0.02393 
(0.00123)*** (0.00123)*** 
tenure2 -0.03876 -0.03772 
(0.00259)*** (0.00258)*** 
tenure3 0.01595 0.01549 
(0-00145)*** (0-00145)*** 
plant's % skilled workers 0.00078 
(0.00005)*** 
plant's % high skilled workers 0.00230 
(0.00024)*** 
observations 270271 270271 270271 270271 270271 
Adjusted Rsquared 0.239 0.287 0.314 0.448 0.452 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between unobservables for workers in 
the same firm. The dependent variable is log real daily wage deflated using the 1995. Column I includes 15 year 
dummies and regional dummies. Column 2 additionally includes industry dummies. Column 3 adds occupation 
dummies. Columns 4 and 5 include year, region, industry and occupation dummies. * significantly different from 
zero at the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. *** significantly different 
from zero at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6.5: 
(3) (4) 
In(size) 0.03501 0.03452 0.03338 0.03142 
(0.00095)*** (0.00100)*** (0.00103) *** (0.00074)*** 
semiskilled 0.05904 0.06006 0.04907 0.05806 
(0.00482)*** (0-00494)*** (0.00554)*** (0.004 64) *** 
with apprenticeship 0.17823 0.17744 0.15378 0.16716 
(0.00384)*** (0.00396)*** (0-00432)*** (0.00392)*** 
experience 0.07241 0.07057 0.06694 0.06906 
(0.00133)*** (0.00137)*** (0.00156)*** (0.00128)*** 
experience2 -0.06125 -0.05956 -0.05455 -0.05936 
(0.00227)*** (0.00231)*** (0.00258)*** (0.00215)*** 
experience3 0.01972 0.01926 0.01707 0.01933 
(0.00110)*** (0.00112)*** (0.00121)*** (0.00103)*** 
tenure 0.02393 0.02539 0.02894 0.02274 
(0.00123)*** (0.00125)*** (0.00141)*** (0.00116)*** 
tenure2 -0.03772 -0.03871 -0.04272 -0.03384 
(0.00258)*** (0.00260)*** (0.00285)*** (0.00243)*** 
tenure3 0.01549 0.01563 0.01699 0.01369 
(0-00145)*** (0.00146)*** (0.00156)*** (0.00135)*** 
plant's % skilled workers 0.00078 0.00075 0.00084 0.00056 
(0.00005)*** (0.00006)*** (0.00006)*** (0-00005)*** 
plant's % high skilled workers 0.00230 0.00219 0.00249 0.00146 
(0.00024)*** (0.00026)*** (0.00024)*** (0.00021) *** 
past growth 0.01200 0.01372 4.22657 
(0.00208)*** (0.00233)*** (0.04846)*** 
5 to 10 years old 0.00987 
(0.00385)** 
older than 10 years 0.00823 
(0.00396)** 
Observations 270271 255612 190277 270271 
Adjusted Rsquared 0.452 0.452 0.421 0.496 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between unobservables for workers In 
the same firm. The dependent variable is log real daily wage deflated using the 1995 German Consumer Price 
Index. Columns 1 to 5 include 15 year dummies and regional dummies. Columns 1 to 3 additionally include 
industry dummies and occupation dummies. Column 4 includes industry and occupation dummies at a more 
detailed level. * significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level. *** significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
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column 3,1 additionally include occupation dummies to account for possible com- 
pensating differentials between laxge and small employers; the estimated coefficient 
remains virtually unchanged. Column 4 controls for observable workers' chaxacter- 
istics, education, experience and tenure. These alone explain 13% of the row size 
differential. " The coefficient on size is still a significant 3.5%. This result seems 
to suggest that although differences in observed workers' quality axe relevant in 
explaining the size wage gap they axe not the whole story. 
In column 51 investigate whether the firm size wage gap might be explained 
by differences in educational composition across plants of different size. The skill 
mix of the establishment is a variable usually not available in data sets used for the 
analysis of size wage differentials. The coefficients on both the percentage of skilled 
workers and university graduates is positive and significant with the coefficient on the 
percentage of university graduates being significantly laxger than the coefficient on 
the proportion of skilled workers. However, the coefficient of size has not significantly 
decreased. Size is not a proxy for differences in skill composition. 
In table 6.5 1 check the robustness of the estimates reported in Table 6.4. 
In column 11 report the results of the preferred specification (column 5 of ta- 
ble 6.4). A chaxacteristic of larger firms paying higher wages is that laxger firms 
are more successful, and have experienced laxger past growth. A unique feature 
of the data is that I observe the size of each establishment any worker has ever 
been employed at between 1980 and 1995.1 can therefore construct a variable 
on past establishment growth and add it to the regressors. The estimates re- 
ported in column 2 show that past growth of the plant, measured as the differ- 
ence In (employment) t- I- In (employment) t-2) has a significant positive effect on 
wages, but this seems orthogonal to the effect of plant size, which remains virtually 
unchanged. 
In column 31 investigate whether, as suggested by Brown and Medoff, "the 
size-wage premium is really a relationship between employer age and wages", by 
including age as categorical vaxiable; plants that have been in business less than 5 
years ('young' businesses), between 5 and 10 ('adult' businesses) and more than 10 
years ('old' businesses). " According to my results, this is not the case: conditional 
23The 13% is calculated as follows: the ratio of the differences in the coefficients in column 3 
and column 4 to the coefficient in column 1, i. e. (0.04155 - 0.03590)/0.04366 
24Since the age variable is censored I use observations for which I can calculate the exact age, 
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on workers's characteristic the plant's skill composition and size, the age effect is 
significant, but it does not affect the significance and the magnitude of the size 
coefficient. " Finally in column 41 check the robustness of the results to using much 
more detailed industry and occupation classifications, the results show that the size 
elasticity is still more than 3%. 
From these two tables (6.4 and 6.5 1 can conclude the following. Firstly, the size 
coefficient is robust to the inclusion of observable plants' and and workers' charac- 
teristics, the effect of age is significant, but does not affect the significance of the size 
variable; the effect of past plant growth is strongly significant but does not affect 
the size coefficient. The inclusion of observable workers' and firm chaxacteristics 
explain 20% of the row size wage differential. " I now proceed to investigate the role 
of unobservable plant and workers' chaxacteristics on the size wage gap. 
6.6.2 Longitudinal estimates 
A problem with simple cross sectional estimates is that firm size may be correlated 
with individual specific heterogeneity. One way the literature has addressed this 
problem is to estimate difference equations, or to condition on individual fixed ef- 
fects. In column 2 of table 6.6 1 present results of first difference equation of our 
preferred specification (corresponding to column 5 in table (6-4), which I report in 
column I of table 6.6 for convenience. 
In column 2 the size coefficient drops to about 0.022. A first possible criticism 
is that if the variable size is measured with error the reported estimates are affected 
by attenuation bias and one should prefer to use the fixed effect estimator. The two 
estimators are asymptotically consistent, but since fixed effect estimates use both 
first and longer differences, they are less affected by measurement error than first 
i. e. firms that were recorded starting business later than 1977. The dummy variable 'old' includes 
firms for which the age variable is left censored -they were already in business in 1977 - and for 
which I only know that they have been in business for more than 10 year. I experimented with 
alternative specifications; e. g. I have included age as a dummy vaxiable equal to 1 for plants older 
than 10 years, as logaxithmic or cubic polynomial. The size coefficient is never affected by the 
inclusion of controls for age. 
25The significance of the age coefficient is at odds with recent results by Brown and Medoff 
who find that higher wages paid by established firms are completely explained by observable 
chaxa, cteristics of their workers. This might be due to the high proportion of censored observations 
in my sample: for 51% of the regression sample I can only say that they are older than 10 years, 
because their 'birth' variable is left censored. 
2620% = (0.04366 - 0.03501)/0.04366 
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Table 6.6: Longitudinal estimates of size effects 
In(size) 0.03501 0.02178 0.02933 0.01192 0.01943 
(0.00095)*** (0.00065)*** (0.00061)*** (0.00100)*** (0.00159)*** 
semiskilled 0.05904 
(0.00482)*** 
with apprenticeship 0.17823 
(0.00384)*** 
experience 0.07241 0.02918 0.06562 0.04931 0.05329 
(0.00133)*** (0.00242)*** (0.00166)*** (0.00674)*** (0.00755)*** 
experience2 -0.06125 -0.07834 -0.06140 -0.04796 -0.04338 
(0.00227)*** (0.00263)*** (0.00200)*** (0.00214)*** (0.00239)*** 
experience3 0.01972 0.02996 0.01925 0.01682 0.01376 
(0.00110)*** (0.00120)*** (0-00095)*** (0.00096)*** (0.00106)*** 
tenure 0.02393 -0.01827 0.00522 -0.01328 -0.00656 
(0.00123)*** (0.00120)*** (0.00100)*** (0.00645)** (0.00711) 
tenure2 -0.03772 0.03571 -0.01521 -0.00096 -0.00294 
(0.00258)*** (0.00252)*** (0.00212)*** (0.00192) (0.00235) 
tenure3 0.01549 -0.01581 0.00678 0.00116 0.00039 
(0.00145)*** (0.00137)*** (0.00117)*** (0.00099) (0-00121) 
plant's % skilled workers 0.00078 0.00033 0.00036 0.00010 -0-00003 
(0.00005)*** (0.00004)*** (0.00004)*** (0.00005)** (0.00008) 
plant's % high skilled workers 0.00230 0.00124 0.00139 0.00004 0.00036 
(0.00024)*** (0.00016)*** (0.00017)*** (0.00015) (0.00025) 
Observations 270271 241625 270271 191522 270271 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between unobservables for workers in 
the same firm. All regressions include include year and occupation dummies. Column 1 replicates column 5 of 
Table 6.4. Column 2 reports First Difference and Column 3 Fixed Effects estimates of equation 6.1. Columns 4 
and 5 report within-firm first difference (column 4) and fixed effects (column 5) estimates of equation 6.1. * 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
*** significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
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difference estimates (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
Therefore in column 3,1 estimate a fixed-effect regression rather than a first- 
difference regression: the coefficient is significantly larger, 27 thus suggesting the 
presence of some measurement error. These estimates might be interpreted as sug- 
gesting that unobserved individual fixed effects explain between 20% and 38% of 
the size gap of column 1. 
However, the estimates of column 2 and 3 do not condition on individual mobility 
choices. Thus, estimation in columns 2 and 3 is based on workers who change firms 
and workers who remain attached to the same plant. 
Unlike studies of inter-industry wage differential or of studies of size wage differ- 
ential that only have categorical measures of plant size, I can use the longitudinal 
variation in the continuous measure of plant size and estimate within-plant first dif- 
ference equation. In column 4,1 report the estimates of first differences on 'stayers', 
which control not only for individual effects but also for the firm and match specific 
components. Now the size coefficient drops significantly, and reduces to less than one 
half compared to the level specifications, to 0.012. This indicates that both match 
quality and individual heterogeneity lead to upward biased parameter estimates in 
simple OLS regressions. As I did for column 2,1 also report fixed effects estimates 
that should alleviate measurement error problems, the size elasticity now rises to 
19.4%. However, these estimates axe still affected by selection bias: workers that 
stay in the current jobs axe workers for which the outside wage offer does not exceed 
the current wage and the sample coefficient estimated on the sample of 'stayers' will 
be biased. 
6.6.3 Correcting for non-random mobility 
As shown in section 6.5, mobility is unlikely to be random. In this section I follow the 
approach described in section 6.3 to correct for the bias induced by non-random mo- 
bility in the estimates of equation 6.6.1 implement the following two-step procedure: 
in the first step I estimate a reduced-form probit of the probability of staying with 
the firm, predict the inverse Mill's Ratio which I then include in the second-step in 
an OLS regression of within-plant wage growth, correcting the standard errors using 
27A chi square test reject the nuU that the coefficients on size are the same across the two 
specifications 
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Table 6.7: Mobili and corrected longitudinal estimates 
(1) (2) (3) 
probit FD within FE within 
in(size) 0.02352 0.01556 0.02101 
(0.00060)*** (0.00110)*** (0.00126)*** 
experience -0.00808 0.03781 0.04791 
(0.00268)*** (0.00674)*** (0.00801)*** 
experience2 0.00180 -0.03500 -0.03096 
(0-00049)*** (0.00251)*** (0.00210)*** 
experience3 -0.00010 0.01093 0.00884 
(0.00003)*** (0.00100)*** (0.00092)*** 
tenure 0.10625 -0.00426 -0.00363 
(0.002.97)*** (0.00570) (0.00763) 
tenure2 -0.01449 -0.01332 -0.00632 
(0.00072)*** (0.00266)*** (0.00193)*** 
tenurd 0.00061 0.00628 0.00104 
(0-00004)*** (0.00122)*** (0.00105) * 
plant's % skilled workers 0.00073 0.00011 -0.00002 
(0.00006)*** (0.00005)** (0.00006) 
plant's % high skilled workers 0.00132 0.00012 0.00033 
(0.00025)*** (0.00020) (0.00019) * 
lambda -0.01571 -0.00139 
(0.00542)*** (0.00057)** 
semiskilled -0.04853 
(0.00723)*** 
apprentice 0.01757 
(0-00495)*** 
age 0.01303 
(0.00077)*** 
married 0.01539 
(0.00342)*** 
with children 0.00465 
(0.00651) 
1 exogenous job loss -0.11118 
(0.004 77) *** 
2 exogenous Job losses -0.15369 
(0.01226)*** 
3 exogenous job losses -0.14878 
(0.02389)*** 
4 exogenous job losses -0.19064 
(0.04532)*** 
5 exogenous job losses -0.25342 
(0.10957)** 
6 exogenous job losses -0.18581 
(0.00807)*** 
Observations 234320 166597 234320 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between unobservables for workers in 
the same firm. All regressions include include year and occupation dummies. * significantly different from zero at 
the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. *** significantly different from zero 
at the 1 percent level. 
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block bootstrapping to correct for the fact that the inverse Mill's Ratio is estimated 
in the first step. " The exclusion restrictions that allow identification are: age, which 
is assumed to affect mobility choices but, conditional on experience and tenure, not 
to affect wages. I also include the number of time a worker has previously lost his 
job for exogenous reasons, i. e. because of plant closure. The reason for including 
this vaxiable is that every time a worker is displaced, he loses his search capital and 
therefore will find himself in the lower part of the wage distribution. Thus, I expect 
that the more often a worker has been previously displaced, the more likely he is 
to receive better outside offers and quit the current employer. " Finally, I include 
two dummy variables for the marital status of the worker and for whether he has 
children, which again are assumed not to be correlated with the error term in equa- 
tion 6.6. The results of estimating this reduced form probit axe reported in column 
1 of Table 6.7, where I report the maxginal effects from the probit equation. The 
results show that workers of larger plants are more likely to stay in the same job, as 
axe married men. Having children does not significantly affect the decision to stay 
with the same plant. The dummies for the number of previous exogenous displace- 
ments has, conditional on actual experience and tenure, both a negative coefficient. 
Skilled workers, older workers and workers with large actual experience and tenure 
axe more likely to stay in the same job, as are workers employed in plants with a 
laxge proportion of skilled workers. In column 2 of Table 6.7 1 report the estimates 
of the within wage growth equation correcting for non-random mobility. The inverse 
Mill's ratio coefficient is significant and negative. The estimates show that control- 
ling for endogenous mobility the estimated size coefficient is still significant and is 
actually larger than in the previous table, where I do not control for non random 
mobility. As in the previous table, however we also estimate a fixed effects equation 
that might be more robust to the presence of measurement error. The result show 
that controlling for non random mobility and measurement error, the size coefficient 
281n the block bootstrapping procedure I treat each worker-employer combination as a different 
sampling unit. This allows for heteroscedasticity of unknown forma and for serial correlation. 
29A similar approach used in the literature to control for endogeneity of mobility has been to 
use a sample of displaced workers (see for example Gibbons and Katz (1992) for the estimation of 
interindustry wage differentials and Dustmann and Meghir (2004) on estimating returns to expe- 
rience and tenure. I preferred not to adopt this approach here, since smaller firms axe more likely 
to close down and therefore selecting the the sample to displaced workers also meant restricting 
the sample to smaller plants. Also I would still face a problem of selection when using the wage 
growth after displacement. 
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Table 6.8: Size elasticities across education groups: summary table 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNSKILLED 
0.057 0.048 0.030 0.041 0.008 0.014 0.009 0.014 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004) * (0.007)** (0.005)0 (0-005)*#* 
SKILLED 
0.039 0.035 0.022 0.028 0.011 0.016 0.012 0.017 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)0** (0.002)0** (0.002) 00* (0.002) 0*0 
HIGH SKILLED 
In(size) 1 0.037 0.031 0.013 0.019 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.012 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.005)** (0,00spoo (0-004)*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between unobservables for workers in 
the same firm. All regressions include include year and occupation dummies. The sample used in the regression 
only includes the first 5 years of labour market experience of all education groups. The first column of the table 
reports results from a pooled level regression where I only include In(size), region and time dummies. In column 2 
1 include observable plants' and workers' characteristics as I did in column 5 of table 6.4. Column 3 and 4 report 
longitudinal estimates, first difference (column 3) and fixed effects (column 4) within and across firms. Column 5 
reports within firm first difference estimates and column 6 fixed effects estimates. Finally, columns 7 and 8 report 
within firm first difference and fixed effects estimates, respectively, that correct for non random mobility. * 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 0* significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
*** significantly different from zero at the I percent level. 
is now 2.1%. 
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6.6.4 Firm size and education 
In the results presented I only included unskilled and skilled workers and I excluded 
university graduates because of the above mentioned censoring problem. In this 
section I report results for the graduates and I distinguish between individuals with 
different educational background according to the classification 'unskilled', 'skilled' 
and 'graduates'. Given the problem of censoring I restrict the analysis for univer- 
sity graduates to the first 5 years in the labour market and to make the estimates 
comparable across the three education groups I restrict the sample of unskilled and 
skilled workers accordingly. 
Some of the previous literature has established that returns to education differ 
across different size categories. In particular, Caren (1985) has formalized a theoret- 
ical model which has the implication that large plants rely more heavily on external 
indicator of ability, such as schooling, to assess workers' productivity. This would 
3'There might still be another source of bias in my estimates of the size elasticity. Idiosyncratic 
shocks may be positively correlated with both wage growth, and growth in the size of the firm, 
thus leaAfing to an upward bias. One possible approach to correct for the correlation between size 
growth and the idiosyncratic shocks is to use as instruments for the difference in log size lagged 
values of plant size. I did try to use this approach and in paxticular I use lagged value of size as a 
continuous vaxiable and as a spline with nodes at 5,20 and 100 employees, values of size at which 
relevant employment dismissal laws and implementation of work councils become more stringent. 
However, the Sargan test always rejected the validity of the instruments. 
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imply that returns to schooling increase with plant size. The empirical results, 
however, axe ambiguous. 
Previous empirical findings for Germany (Gerlach and Schmidt, 1990) have 
shown that the returns to schooling are positively correlated with firm size. Gerlach 
and Schmidt claim that this finding is supportive of Garen's model; they also reports 
that previous studies (Bruederl and Preisendoerfer, 1986) do not find significant dif- 
ferences in returns to schooling between small and large plants. Findings for other 
countries are not clear cut. Brown and Medoff, Idson and Feaster and Oi report 
a tendency for the wage differential to decline with skill levels. Main and Reilly 
(1993) find that the estimated returns to education axe highest in "small" plants, 
but that the differences in the estimated returns to education across different size 
classes for the UK are not significant. Finally, the study by Albaek et al. (1998) on 
the Nordic countries finds no evidence that reward to formal education vary with 
size of the plant and descriptive evidence shows that large plants do not seem to 
attract workers with higher level of education relative to small plants. 
To investigate the relationship between wages and establishment size for indi- 
viduals in different educational categories, I estimate a modified version of column 
5 of table (6.4) for skilled, unskilled and university workers. " The first two columns 
presents results from simple OLS regressions. The numbers indicate that there is a 
significant difference between the wage size differentials between graduates, skilled 
and unskilled workers: with the size gap being significantly laxger for unskilled work- 
ers, whether or not we control for firms' and workers'characteristics (column 2) or 
not (column 1). The next two columns present first difference equations (row 3) 
and fixed effects estimates (column 4) for all workers. This eliminates the fixed in- 
dividual specific effect, but not the innovation in the match quality. The size of the 
coefficient is reduced, but there is still a significant difference between graduates, 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
In the fifth and sixth columns, I present within-firm difference and fixed effects 
estimates. The size wage differential reduces even further, which is due to the elim- 
ination of the firm and match specific components. Now the firm size differentials 
are practically the same for skilled and unskilled workers. Columns 7 and 8 report 
31jonly include a quadratic in experience and tenure, since I only consider the first 5 years in 
the labour market. 
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the first difference (column 7) and fixed effects estimates (column 8) where I control 
for non-random mobility. 32 
These results suggest that unskilled workers axe more likely to find a good match 
in larger firms than skilled workers, leading to a larger correlation between Pij and 
Sj(i, t)t in (6.4) and consequently a larger bias. This would imply that the difference 
in mobility between skilled and unskilled workers is smaller in larger firms, since 
the difference in the match quality is likewise smaller. This is exactly what figure 
(6.1) suggests - while there is a substantial difference in mobility between skilled 
and unskilled workers in small firms, but there is little difference in larger firms. 
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter studies size wage differentials using longitudinal administrative data 
from the IAB data for Germany for the 1980-1995 period. 
The underlying model is one that encompasses comparative advantage and the 
existence of true firm size effects. The objective of the chapter is to estimate size 
wage elasticities that are not affected by unobserved heterogeneity in workers' ability, 
worker-employer matches and firm fixed effects. I achieve this by estimating within 
firm wage growth equation and controlling for the endogeneity of mobility choices 
of workers. Identification relies on the exogeneity of the instruments in the mobility 
equation: age, maxital status, and number of previous displacements. 
The empirical findings show that controlling for observed workers' and firms' 
characteristics can explain about 20% of the observed size wage gap. Unobserved 
firm, match and workers' effects account, once we control for the presence of mea, 
surement error and non random mobility for an additional 32% of the size wage gap, 
i. e. we explained about half of the size wage differential. 33 According to our fixed 
effects estimates gap of 2.1% remains unexplained. 
I also show that the estimated size wage gap is robust to the inclusion of firms' 
past success and firms' age. 
Finally, I show that in the level equation this firm size advantage decrease with 
32The complete set of estimates for the three education groups are reported in tables E. 2; E. 3 
and EA in appendix E-3 
33These figures are calculated as follows: 20%=(0.044-0-035)/0.044 and 32%(0.035-0.021)/0.044. 
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the educational level. However, in the longitudinal analysis, I find that the size 
wage elasticity does not vary significantly across education groups. This results are 
at odds with models that predict that laxge firms tend to reward more education 
than less directly observable measure of ability. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this final chapter is to review the main findings, policy conclusions 
and limitations of this thesis. For each chapter, I summarize the main findings, I 
then delineate some points deserving further attention, suggest some ideas for future 
research and policy conclusions. 
In Chapter 21 looked at the role of differences in share ownership structure 
for explaining differences in productivity. The main contribution is to exploit the 
longitudinal nature of the data to investigate a long-debated issue in the economic 
literature. Does the separation between ownership and control matter for firm per- 
formance? Most of the previous literature has analysed the effects of this separation 
on maxket value. I know of only two previous studies (Curcio, 1994 and Nickell 
et al., 1997) that have looked at the relationship between ownership and productiv- 
ity growth in the UK. To the best of my knowledge the analysis in this chapter is 
the first to look at the effects on productivity levels. 
The findings show that, as predicted by principal-agent models a higher concen- 
tration of ownership guarantees a higher efficiency in the firm. I find that this effect 
is stronger if financial institutions are among the largest shareholders. 
The study presents a number of limitations and is open to improvements and 
extensions. I discuss them in turn. The first criticism that could be raised is that in 
the analysis I do not explicitly control for other corporate governance mechanisms 
that can affect firm's productivity. According to agency theories of the firm, when 
shareholders appoint agents to the management of assets, these managers will act 
in the interest of their principals only as far as this behaviour is beneficial to them- 
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selves. Market structure pressures and, more generally, the environment where the 
firm operates are important factors in determining the extent to which direct mon- 
itoring by shareholders can be substituted by alternative discipline devices (Fama, 
1980). In particular, I do not control for the firm financial condition and for the 
competitive environment in which the firm operate. 1 For example, debt financing 
matters, as increased debt reduces free cash flow and so limits managerial discretion 
(Jensen, 1986). Also I cannot control for other firm characteristics such as age and 
multinationality because of lack of information in the data. The first extension of 
this chapter, therefore, would be to enrich the available information in the data to 
account for these factors. 
The second area that I believe deserves further analysis is whether shaxe owner- 
ship affects productivity and maxket value differently. This analysis would constitute 
the missing link between the analysis of this first chapter of the thesis and the ex- 
isting financial literature on ownership and market value. 
A third promising extension is to match to the ownership data information with 
patenting activity. Indeed, theories have focused on two main effects of the sep- 
axation of ownership from control: on efficiency and effort (Leibenstein, 1987 and 
Laffont and Tirole, 1986 and on innovative activity Aghion et al., 1997). Using the 
matched data would allow me to test the predictions of these latter class of models 
and to take into account both the effect of ownership structure both on productivity 
level, i. e. the short run effect on efficiency and effort, and on productivity growth, 
i. e. the effect on innovative activity. This type of analysis would contribute to 
the ongoing debate on the short-termism of financial institutions that the current 
(static) analysis on firm efficiency does not take into account. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the findings of this chapter have several impli- 
cations. The findings contribute to the corporate governance debate in both the US 
and the UK, which has, in recent yeaxs, focused on the potential for institutions to 
take a more active role in the governance of corporations. At the same time, this 
field of reseaxch is important not only in shaping future regulations in the UK or 
US, but also for policy makers in countries where the stock market is not as devel- 
oped (e. g. transition economies) and for countries that need to reform their pension 
'However, I do check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of industry time interaction 
dummies. 
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systems (e. g. in continental Europe). The findings suggest that one of the public 
policy objectives should be to make corporate governance by institutional owners as 
effective as possible. Indeed, the estimates do not support the common view that 
the high presence of financial institutions as large shaxeholders is detrimental for 
productivity. In particulax, these findings speak against excess regulation or legal 
restrictions on stock ownership that raise the cost of paxticipation of institutions 
in corporate governance, which prevent them from building significant stakes in 
individual corporations. 
The third chapter uses a newly available dataset to identify domestic MNEs in a 
large scale UK plant level productivity dataset. The chapter shows that the produc- 
tivity leadership of US owned plants relative to all other multinationals, British and 
foreign, remains after controlling for industry and observable firm chaxacteristics; 
thus qualifying previous findings of Doms and Jensen. Secondly, we find that, except 
for the US, the foreign ownership advantage in Britain is indeed by and large an 
MNE advantage. For non-US foreign owned plants, multinationality explains most 
of the foreign advantage; once we control for their capital intensity they are as pro- 
ductive as domestic MNEs. Finally, we investigate the validity of three hypotheses 
on the sources of the MNE and US advantage using the longitudinal dimension of 
our data. 
We confirm the prediction of theories of multinationals, which suggest that the 
productivity advantage of MNEs is to be attributed to specific firm level assets (e. g. 
patents, branding and know-how of production processes) which MNEs can transfer 
to any of their affiliates. We also find that MNEs pick the best plants in the UK. In 
fact, we find that the additional superiority of US firms over all other MNEs seems 
to be entirely driven by a particular ability of US firms to 'cherry-pick' the best 
British plants rather than improving the productivity of acquired plants any more 
than other MNEs do. Finally, we try to test whether we can find any evidence of 
productivity improvements due to reverse technology transfers for plants owned by 
British firms that start investing abroad. We do not find any significant evidence 
for an ex-post productivity increase for these plants. However, this result might be 
due to the short time series available. 
Indeed, the short time series is probably a weakness of our data: we only have 
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a5 yeax panel. This, in conjunction with the unbalanced nature of the ARD panel, 
makes it very hard to capture long run productivity effects for the plants in the 
sample. The second main limitation of the study is that we do not control for a 
potential correlation between idionsYncratic (time varying) shocks and the multina, 
tional status of the plants. Our model only controls for correlation between MNE 
status and firm and plant fixed effects. This was due to the lack of valid instruments 
to control for this type of endogeneity. This limitation suggests that a first exten- 
sion of this research might concern finding these instruments. Our results suggest 
a direction for the search of these instruments: the stock market value of foreign 
markets relative to the UK. 
In fact, the relationship between FDI and stock markets is an area of research 
that deserves further exploration. Indeed, the 'cheap capital' view of FDI provides 
a plausible explanation of the US best plant effect: US MNEs, overvalued in the US 
stock market, and thus with access to low cost capital, might have found it more 
profitable to use this capital to target firms in the UK not affected by the same 
stock market bubble. 
Finally, in this study we consider inward direct investment. The second area 
that we want to investigate is the outward foreign direct investment decisions of UK 
MNEs. Firstly, where do they invest? What are the factors that affect this decision? 
But also, is there any relationship between their productivity in the UK and the 
location of their subsidiaxies? Can we find any evidence of reverse technology effects 
when we consider UK-US links? 
The results of these projects will be complementary to the research conducted 
in chapter 3 in understanding the role that MNEs have for countries' productivity 
levels and for exchanges of knowledge flows across countries. 
Chapter 4 focuses on one particular aspect of the MNEs' success: their higher 
innovative activity. The findings show that almost two thirds of the higher innova- 
tive outcome of MNEs is due to MNEs shaxing technological knowledge within the 
enterprise group and with suppliers and customers more than domestic non-globally 
engaged firms. This therefore seems a plausible source of the firm advantage found 
in the previous chapter. This result points to the fact that when conducting studies 
on returns to innovation investments it is important to account for the utilization of 
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investments and knowledge in other firms belonging to the MNE group. Generally, 
this is not been possible for lack of data. 
The CIS data, despite its limitations, is useful in that it does measure the im- 
portance of knowledge flows across firms belonging to the same group. The analysis 
in this chapter can be extended in two different directions. 
Firstly, the qualitative measures on knowledge flows across firms in the same 
sectors (i. e. horizontal flows across competitors), and vertical, from suppliers and 
customers, might be used to devise a measure of spillovers from foreign firms to 
domestic ones, which combines existing quantitative measures based on presence 
of foreign multinationals with the qualitative measures from the CIS. This would 
contribute to the evaluation of the usefulness of governments outlays in subsidies 
and incentives for foreign firms to locate and/or expand existing production in a 
particular region or country. 
Secondly, the data contains information on the location of the agents and in- 
stitutions with which a particular firm cooperates. I could exploit this information 
to investigate the existence and importance of knowledge flows from 'technology 
sourcing' from outside the boundaries of the multinationals (e. g. universities, sup- 
pliers) from technologically advanced countries, such as the US. 2 The research would 
contribute to identify the importance of sourcing from countries on the technology 
frontier. The results would have important policy implications. If the findings show 
a significant role for technology sourcing, then, as noted by Griffith et al. (2004a), 
they would suggest that policies that might induce MNE companies, in particular 
from EU countries, to relocate their operations and their research activity from the 
US back to their home countries could hinder the innovative success of these firms in 
that they would reduce the ability of European firms to benefit from US knowledge 
stocks. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis matches Community Innovation survey (CIS) with pro- 
duction data from the ARD. The first aim is to confirm that the CIS, notwithstand- 
ing its limitation, is a valid tool for analysis. The second aim is to estimate the link 
between innovation and productivity growth, using a specification of the production 
2SiMilaX studies have been conducted mainly in the business literature (see for example the 
recent analysis of Criscuolo 2004) and more recently in the economic literature (see the work of 
Griffith et al. 2004a). 
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function (Klette, 1996) that rationalise different effects for product and process in- 
novation and allows for the presence of non constant returns to scale and imperfect 
competition. Thirdly, I describe the innovation activity of firms using an innovation 
investment equation and a knowledge production function equation, which highlight 
the role of investment in innovation activities, outside formal R&D laboratories and, 
but also of external knowledge flows. 
The results confirm that it is innovation output and not innovation input that 
affect productivity growth: product innovation, particularly when is new to the 
market, is positively correlated with higher TFP growth; process innovations are also 
positively correlated with TFP growth, but only as far as they have increased the 
flexibility of production, thus suggesting the presence of adjustment costs. Finally, 
the results also suggest that organisational change is important for TFP growth. 
In the analysis of the innovation process, competition, strategic protection meth- 
ods, financial support, a high level of knowledge capital within the firm and the pres- 
ence of suppliers and customers as source of relevant information play an important 
role in the innovation investment decision. 
The innovation output equation shows that, beside investment and high absorp- 
tive capacity, as proxied by internal information, the main correlates with innovation 
output are, for both product and process innovations, cooperation, and information 
from suppliers and customers. 
Although I attempt to account for endogeneity of the innovation input; the choice 
of the instruments used for identification is subject to criticism. This is probably 
one of the main limitations of this study. Ideally, I would have wanted to use panel 
data analysis. However, the CIS innovation panel presents a number of limitations, 
the first one being the fact that we only have information for two waves of the survey 
and only for 787 firms. 
In spite of its weaknesses, the chapter provides a useful framework to study 
innovation and its relationship with productivity growth. An immediate extension 
is to use a similar framework to study the link between innovation and productivity 
growth in the service sector, and analyse the differences between the manufacturing 
and the service sectors. Indeed, the CIS data seem particularly suitable for such an 
analysis, since they comprise a broad definition of innovation activity. 
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Finally, chapter 6 of this thesis uses German administrative data to investigate 
employer size wage differentials. The size-wage differential is a significant fraction 
of the overall wage inequality in several countries and across time' but has not been 
well explained by traditional theories. ' 
The analysis of this thesis extends the available empirical literature on the firm 
size-wage effect in several ways. The analysis uses a very rich and detailed longitu- 
dinal dataset, that allows to control for observable workers qualities and some firm 
characteristics that the literature has suggested as determining the size wage differ- 
ential. The panel structure of the data and the detailed information on job mobility 
allows to account for workers' and firms' unobserved heterogeneity controlling for 
endogeneity induced by non-random mobility. In particular, I use information on 
firm closures to construct an instrument, that together with workers' age and family 
characteristics, alleviates the problems generated by endogenous worker mobility. 
My findings show that even after controlling for observable workers' characteris- 
tics and for occupation and industry-specific effects, a substantial wage differential 
remains between laxge and small firms and only part of the observed size wage 
differential can be attributed to larger firms employing workers with greater unob- 
served ability. Paxt of the remaining wage differentials is due to firms' heterogeneity 
and heterogeneity if worker-firm match quality. What underlies the remaining wage 
differential is unclear. 
Since different explanations of the size wage differential may lead to different pol- 
icy implications, determining the source of the wage-firm size effect is an important 
question for future research. 
3Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) for example show that changes in for the period 1976 to 1985 
the size-wage differentials alone account for 40% of the increase in the ninetieth-tenth percentile 
wage differential among US manufacturing workers. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
A. 1 Additional details on the data and variables 
definition 
Measure of ownership structure 
construct several measures of ownership structure. These identify the concentration 
of ownership, the type of shareholders or both. The variables that describe the 
concentration of ownership axe: 
* TOP1, the cumulative percentage of all shares held by the laxgest shareholder 
* TOP5, the cumulative percentage of all shares held by the largest five shaxe- 
holders. 
& TOP10, the cumulative percentage of all shares held by the largest ten share- 
holders. 
BLOCK5, the cumulative percentage of all shares held in blocks greater or 
equal to 5%. 
HERFINDAHL, the Herfindahl index of concentration. Since I only observe 
the actual proportional shareholdings for the largest ten shareholders, I cal- 
culate the lower and upper bound of the Herfindahl index following a method 
in line with Cubbin and Leech (1983) and described in detail in the Appendix 
A. M. 
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identity of shareholders are: 
FININST the proportion of total identified shareholdings owned by financial 
institutions. This group includes pension funds, insurance companies and 
other institutions 
e INDIV the proportion of total identified shareholdings owned by individuals. 
Since I do not have information on all the outstanding equity of the firms, when 
I use these measures I am assuming that the distribution of ownership among share- 
holdings smaller than 0.25% is the same as the distribution for shareholdings larger 
than 0.25%. Although this might seem a strong identifying assumption, it reflects 
the fact that the distributions in the two groups of shareholdings axe likely to be 
positively correlated. Alternatively, one can assume that the ownership distribution 
of shareholdings smaller than 0.25% is common across companies and therefore the 
true distribution is obtained by weighting the observed distribution and the common 
one. 
I also introduce interaction variables: 
e TOPiBIG the proportion of shaxes owned by the largest shareholder, if it is 
an individual. 
* TOP5IND, the proportion of shares held by the five laxgest shareholders owned 
by individuals. 
* INDPROP10, the proportion of shares held by the ten largest shareholders 
owned by individuals. 
9 TOP5INST the proportion of shares held by the five largest shareholders 
owned by institutions. 
9 INSTPROP10 the proportion of shares held by the ten largest shareholders 
owned by institutions. 
* BLOCK5INST, the proportion of shaxes held in blocks greater or equal to 5% 
by institutions. 
9 BLOCK5IND, the proportion of shaxes held in blocks greater or equal to 5% 
by and by individuals 
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Table AJ: CDA Spectrum ownership information. Source: Bond Chennels and 
Windmeijer (1997) 
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A. 1.2 The Herfindahl Index of concentration and its bounds 
I have constructed a measure of the Herfindahl index and its bounds following the 
methob used by Cubbin and Leech but modified to account for the fact that my data 
identifies the actual proportional shareholdings for the largest ten shareholders, the 
total number of shareholdings above or equal to 0.25% and thus the total holdings. 
I define Si the holding of shareholder i and I rank the shaxeholdings in decreasing 
order of size as follows: 
So :5 Si '. 5 ... :5 
SIO: 5 Sll 'S' Sn: 5 Sn+1: 5 SN 
where So is the largest holding, S10 is the tenth largest holding, i. e. the smallest for 
which I know the actual proportional shareholding, S,, is the smallest shareholing 
whose owner is identified, i. e. is above or equal to 0.25%, SN the smallest and N is 
the total number of shareholders, that is unknown. I also define 
N 
TN Si 
and 
N 
TN-n E si 
i=n+l 
n 
T. 
n-10 
si 
10 
Tio si 
si TN 
If I could observe the complete distribution of holding I could calculate the Herfind- 
ahl. index of concentration as follows: 
N 10 11 n( Si N 
n-10 
=Z( 
i Si )2 + )2 + N-n 
si 
Htrue _ý_)2 =E(_E- (A. 2) 
i=, 
TN 
i=, 
TN TN 
i=ll 
Tn-10 TN 
i=n+l 
TN-n 
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Thus, 
10 
E p2 + (Cn Htrue 
_10 _ 
C, 0)2Hn_lo + (1 - Cn-10)2 HN-n (A. 3) 
Directly from the data I can exactly calculate the first term of the equation, C10 
and C,, -Io. For both H,, _10 and HN-,,, I can only calculate lower and upper bounds. 
For H,, _10, the upper 
bound is calculated assuming that the 11th and all smaller 
identified shareholders have the same holding as the tenth largest shareholder; the 
lower bound assumes that the 11th and all smaller identified shareholders have 0.25% 
proportional shareholdings. Similarly for HN-,, I can construct an upper bound 
assuming that all non-identified shareholdings are 0.25% and the lower bound in the 
limit is 0, i. e. where non identified shares are held by infinitely many shareholders. 
Thus, the bounds on the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration are given by: 
10 10 
P2 + Wn-10 - CIO)0.0025 < Ht,,,, Pi2+(Cn-lo-Clo)Plo+(l-Cn-lo)0.0025 
(A. 4) 
Finally, as a measure of concentration I construct the Herfindahl index of Concen- 
tration Herf, which is the average of the lower and upper bounds. 
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A. 2 The Structure of the sample 
Table A. 2: Structure of sample by number of observation per firm 
Annual obs 456789 10 11 12 13 
companies 26 30 29 15 21 24 11 18 52 42 
Table A. 3: Structure of sample 4, y number of firms 
firms 1 141 184 200 220 223 223 213 201 192 176 170 160 92 
Table AA: Total shareholdings by category of owner (1) - (2) (3) - - (4) -(5) (6) 
all small firms large firms 
Identified of Identified %-Of Identified % of 
equity id. equity equity id. equity equity id. equity 
I Total financial institutions 39.85 63.07 33.50 47.48 45.29 76.42 
(19.60) (29-30) (19.88) (26.39) 07.63) (24.72) 
2 pension funds 9.56 15.54 6.86 9.62 11.86 20.62 
(7.29) (12.19) (6.39) (8.98) (7.24) (12.30) 
3 Insurance companies 10.55 17.44 5.85 8.21 14.57 25.34 
(8.72) (14.86) (6.52) (8.99) (8.35) (14-33) 
4 Other financial institutions 19.74 30-09 20.78 29.64 18.85 30.47 
(13.57) (18.25) (15.16) (20.51) (11.98) (16.07) 
5 individuals 20.94 28.49 32.36 43.48 11.15 15.65 
(23.04) (29.03) (22-94) (27.70) (18.11) (23.46) 
6 Company 3.91 5.64 5.10 7.24 2.88 4.28 
(9.01) (12.34) (9.50) (13.06) (8.45) (11.51) 
7 Sepon 0.70 1.25 0.63 1.08 0.75 1.39 
(1.13) (2.36) (1.13) (2-40) (1.13) (2.31) 
8 Other non financial institutions 0.93 1.55 0.52 0.72 1.29 2.26 
(1.77) (2.75) (1.60) (2.08) (1.83) (3.04) 
9 Total identified 66.32 100 T2.12 100 61.36 100 1 1 
(17.20) 06.28) 
1 
(16.40) 
Notes: Reported statistics are unweighted averages and in italics in parentheses unweighted standard deviations 
calculated on the unbalanced panel of 268 firms and 2,395 observations over the 1985-1997 period. Small (large) 
firms have in the year they enter the sample a number of employees lower (higher) than the median firm in that 
particular year. Row 1 reports summary statistics for the proportion of equity held by financial institutions. Rows 
2 to 4 report descriptive statistics for each of the financial institutions included in this category: row 2 refers to 
pension funds, row 3 to insurance companies and row 4 to other financial institutions. Row 5 reports summary 
statistics for individual owners. Rows 6 to 8 refer to the other categories of identified ownership : row 6 to 
company, i. e. to non-financial companies, row 7 to Sepon Ltd, the Stock Exchange Clearing company, i. e. it 
includes equity that is in the process of being sold at the time of measurement, and row 7 to 'other institutions', 
i. e. non-financial institutions, e. g. universities, local government bodies etc. The last row reports the proportion of 
equity for which the CDA Spectrum databases identifies the ultimate owner. See also section 2.3 for details on the 
data and variables definitions. 
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Table A. 5: Distribution of ownership concentration measures in the saMDle 
Sample P10 p25 p50 p75 P97- 
top5 whole 14.09 21.46 32.77 49.23 67.13 
small 24.29 30.14 40.76 57.71 69.69 
large 11.60 15.91 22.10 33.54 53.60 
top5inst whole 0.00 14.38 40.33 81.00 100.00 
small 0.00 5.60 28.48 59.70 85.54 
large 9.83 26.11 64.08 100.00 100.00 
top5ind whole 0.00 0.00 14.88 68.85 94.46- 
small 0.00 9.84 40.28 80.76 100.00 
large 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.46 74.46 
block5 whole 0.00 9.50 25.57 47.51 67.02 
small 10.86 22.29 37.89 57.09 67.51 
large 0.00 0.00 11.46 24.96 52.22 
block5inst whole 0.00 0.00 5.61 12.34 21.16 
small 0.00 0.00 6.62 15.63 25.01 
large 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.86 16.04 
UI-o ck5 -in d whole 0.00 0.00 5.08 27.75 49.23- 
small 0.00 0.00 13.06 39.35 61.78 
large 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.28 31.34 
Notes: The table refers to the sample of 2,395 observations. The variables reported as defined as follows: TOP5, 
the cumulative percentage of all shares held by the largest five shareholders; TOP51NST the proportion of shares 
held by the five largest shareholders owned by institutions; TOP51ND, the proportion of shares held by the five 
largest shareholders owned by individuals; BLOCK5, the cumulative percentage of all shares held in blocks greater 
or equal to 5%; BLOCK5INST, the proportion of shares held in blocks greater or equal to 5% by institutions; 
BLOCK5IND, the proportion of shares held in blocks greater or equal to 5% by and by individuals. 
Table A. 6: AR1 test: t-test using OLS estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep Var t In(VA) In(SALES) In(K) In(EMP) ZOP5 toplo blockY- 
Ue-p Var t-1 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.990 0.937 0.944 0.935 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
F 1,267) 6.85 6.65 5.23 11.07 36.40 48.34 50.71 
p-value 0.009 0.010 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 1 
ln(Týý) ln(fAý, -LýES) ln(l'q) top5inst top5ind block5inst block5ind 
Dep Var t-1 0.957 0.970 0.959 0.879 0.936 0.880 0.922 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0-009) (0.008) (0-014) (0.013) 
FTI, 267) 15.51 19.67 36.77 171.91 64.41 72.98 . 36.16 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The coefficients (robust standard errors in parenthesis and italics) are estimated by Least Squares on an 
unbalanced panel of 268 observations and 2,395 firms. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
B. 1 Variable Definitions 
* Capital stock: capital stock was calculated using a perpetual inventory method 
(PIM). For a more detailed description of the method adopted we refer to 
Martin (2002) 
" Deflators: to deflate output measures (gross output and value added) we use 
producer price indices at the 4-digit SIC92 industry level. To deflate interme- 
diates, we use material price deflators at the 2-digit SIC92 industry level. The 
base year is 1995. Capital stock is deflated using investment deflators with 
base year 1995; for years pre-1995 these axe implicitly derived from nominal 
and real sectoral ONS historical investment series. From 1995 onwards I use 
the publicly available MM17 series. 
" Foreign plants axe plants owned by foreign owned enterprise groups. 
" Country groups: 
EUnorth includes plants owned by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland , 
Luxembourg, Sweden and Republic of Ireland. 
EUsouth includes plants owned by Italy, Spain and Canary Islands, Portugal 
and Greece. 
Tax includes plants owned by British Virgin Islands, Channel Islands, Isle of 
Man, Liechtenstein, Antigua and Barbuda, Cyprus and US Virgin Islands. 
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otherEurope includes plants owned by Norway and Switzerland. 
otherOECD includes plants owned by Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Iceland, Mexico, Poland, South Korea and Turkey. 
other is a residual category that includes plants owned by the rest of the world 
and plants which are foreign owned but whose nationality is unknown. 
e Weights are calculated using the register employment information on the basis 
of 4 digit sector, region and employment cells. For each cell i the weight is 
calculated as 
Number of plants in register in Eell i 
Number of selected plants cell I 
B. 2 The monotone relationship between profits 
and shocks 
Start by noting that given our assumption of a homogenous production function 
(equation 3.7) we can write the cost minimization problem as: 
(Kit, wvit) = min X 6kE wzit±zit s. t. 1 (kits ýCvjt Jtv't 
z54K 
I 0 K- v 
where w. -it represents the cost of factor z and Kit = 114t with Qjt = Qit Ait 
Xvit 
collects the same transformation for all variable production factors in a vector. Total 
cost become in terms of Equation B. 1 
Cit = 6itQ' it 
Next consider the profit function. 
Hit (Kit, Ait, ait, wit) = R., t - Cit 
Given the demand function 3.4 and the cost function B. 2 we can write it as 
(B. 2) 
Hit (Kit, Ait, ait, wit) =q- CitQit (B. 3) 
ýip-tt 
Pt Q, - 
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Note that the firm's profit maximization first order condition is 
lzit 
=1 
ýit 
z (Q, it, Kit) (B. 4) 77 Qit ly Qit 
where 
z(Q'it, Kit) = ýO-Qjt + 6it (B. 5) 
it it 
Finally, note that the derivatives of profit with respect to changes in Ait and ait are 
9rIj -1 -=p t 
and 
ari. vv &t z (Qit, Kit) A-I& (B. 6) Oait -y Ait 
where the last equality follows from the first order condition B. 41 and 
A= 
(i 
- 7-17) 
-, 
As a consequence of all these results we get for the total differential of profits 
d1lit = Rt (dAit + dait) = Rtdwit (B. 7) 
which establishes that there is a positive relationship between profits and composite 
shock index wit. 
B. 3 Testing if p is constant 
In this section, we describe a simple test of the hypothesis that A is uniform across 
each 4 digit sector based on over-identifying restrictions. As expected, the null 
hypothesis is rejected in the majority of sectors. Column 3 of table 6.4 shows 
estimates of equation 3.20 on a restricted sample of plants in sectors where the null 
hypothesis of uniform p cannot be rejected to check the robustness of our results. 
Our test works as follows: if we want to allow for a more general market structure 
then the coefficient of capital in Equation 3.18 is not constant but depends on the 
'This is an application of the envelope theorem 
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exogenous quality paxameter of the firm, Ait. 2 
rt- viit or i t. -lkit + g(kit-1, 
Ilit-1) + vit (B. 8) 
, 
8r 1=2(, 
\, t_ 
). 3 If we nevertheless used a specification with constant 3K where t. - AI 
we axe faced with the following situation: 
(ßý 
- rit - viit = ßKkit + g(kit-i, IIit-1) + vit +t 
ßK)k 
it (B. 9) t 
where, 6' represents the constant capital coefficient we axe trying to estimate. Equa- 
tion B. 9 shows that there is unaccounted for heterogeneity which is correlated with 
the explanatory vaxiables, thus an estimator based on zero correlation conditions 
between kit, Hit-,, etc. and the error term breaks down. Equation B. 9 is the 
alternative specification to the hypothesis we want to test, namely that 8K is con- 
stant. Thus it can help us find restrictions which allow us to test our hypothesis. 
The first set of these restrictions we mentioned already: zero correlation between 
e, t = rit _ Vi, t _ pKkt - 9(kit-1, IIit-, 
) and the explanatory variables in B. 9: 
EftitXitl =0 (B. 10) 
where Xit E Ikit, kit-,, Ilit-11. An additional instrument would be the interaction 
between current capital stocks and last periods demand shock, kit - \it-,. The 
problem with this is of course that Ait-1 is not observed. Note however that since 
Ait is a component of wit and although wit is not observed we have a way of controlling 
for it: we approximate it by a polynomial in Hit and kit. This implies that we can 
derive additional zero correlation conditions for the interaction of kit with all lagged 
polynomial terms, thus under the null tit will not be correlated with terms such as 
kit - kit-, - Hit-1, etc. Note here, that it is crucial to make the assumption about 
sluggish prices. Because there would always be a correlation between vit and wit 
we could not make a similar axgument staxting from a zero correlation condition 
between kit - Ait and tit. Finally note that, because of the presence of kit in tit, under 
2FIor simplicity I make the formal argument in terms of log levels and not deviations from log 
values of the median plant as in section 3.5.3. The axgument can be made similarly in both cases. 
3Note that in order to use our test I implicitly need to assume that there is a certain sluggishness 
in price setting: markups depend on last period's realization of the A-shock, as I describe below. 
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Table B. 1: Statistics on double fixed effects groups 
(1) 
obs 
(2) 
plants 
(3) 
firm 
min 2 1 1 
max 634 201 55 
median 3 1 1 
groups 6754 
obs 28338 
Notes: The first panel reports summary statistics for the double fixed effects gToups (DFG) In 
our sample. Column 1 row 1 shows that the smallest DFG consists of 2 observations, the largest 
of 634 and the median group of 3 observations. Columns 3 and 4 report the same statistics for 
the numbers of plants and firms. 
the alternative hypothesis (B. 9), all these zero correlation conditions break down 
and they axe thus indeed a means to test our hypothesis. 
We implement the test as a Sargan-Test where we use the restrictions in B. 10 to 
exactly identify all required paxameters and then test the zero correlation of the 
restrictions from the polynomial interactions as a x'-distributed statistic. 
BA A double fixed effects approach 
We suggested that Equation 3.22 could also be estimated using a double fixed effects 
methodology. This section discusses how this could be done and the problems it 
raises. 
Firm and plant effects can be identified separately to the extent that plants 
move between firms. Abowd et al. (2002b) have laid out in detail which firm and 
plant effects we can hope to identify: ' They define sets of 'double fixed effect gToups, 
(DFG). A DF group DFGg is defined as the set of all firms and plants which interact 
over the sample period. A firm and a plant interact simply if the plant is owned 
by the firm. Two plants interact if they are both owned by the same firm at some 
but not necessarily the same point in time. Two firms interact if they own the same 
plant at different points in time. 
Abowd et al. show that for each plant and each firm in a DFG one can identify a 
fixed effect which is informative about its productivity relative to the group average, 
4Abowd et al. work with matched employer-employee panels but their results apply to our 
problem immediately once plants take on the role of employees and firms the role of employers. 
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Table B. 2: Double fixed effects regression results 
(1) (2) 
us -0.031 0.039 
(0.013)** (0.024)* 
MNE 0.002 0.020 
(0-018) (0.018) 
FOR 0.026 0.028 
(0.018) (0.025) 
green GB non MNE 0.000 
(0.021) 
green US 0.030 
(0.054) 
green FOR 0.037 
(0.063) 
green MNE -0.001 (0.037) 
obs 2842 2865 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors are from the third-stage of 
the double-fixed effects model. In column I the dependent variable is firm fixed effects estimated in the 
second-stage. ever US firm is I for all US firms. ever MNE firm Is I for all MNE firms. ever FOR firm is 1 
for non US foreign firms. In Column 2 the dependent variable is the plant fixed effects estimated In the 
second-stage ever MNE plant is I for all plants that have ever been owned by a MNE over the course of the 
sample period. Similarly for the ever US and ever other foreign dummies. The green dummies take value one for 
all plants that are established during the course of the sample period (1996-2000), green GB non WINE is one 
for plants owned by domestic firms when established. green ]VINE is one for plants owned by MNE firms when 
established. green US (green FOR) is one for plants owned by US (other foreign) firms when established. 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ** significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
*** significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
where the group average includes the fixed effect of an omitted reference firm, AR, 
and an omitted reference plant a,. Thus, any estimated fixed effect has to be 
interpreted as relative to the omitted plant and firm. 
Table B. 1 reports some statistics on these groups. Consider first the second panel 
which reports that there axe in total 6754 such groups in our dataset. Also note that 
the number of observations has now reduced because we can only use observations 
from plants we observe at least twice. Panel 1 reports various statistics on these 
6,754 groups. We see that the majority of groups is rather small. Both the median 
number of plants and firms (row 3 in columns 2 and 3) is 1 one which means that our 
dataset consists mainly of firms that own one plant which is never sold. For these 
there is no chance of sepaxating firm and plant effects. Our sample thus reduces to 
those groups which consist of at least 2 plants or firms. This corresponds to about 
one third of our original sample. 
After establishing how many fixed effects can effectively be identified the double 
fixed effects problem is in principle nothing else but a regression on dummies for 
each plant and firm whose fixed effect can be identified. However, this runs into 
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computational problems because of the sheer size of the matrices that are to be 
inverted. Abowd et al. apply some advanced linear algebra techniques to get round 
this problem. However, since all coefficients' estimates are relative to a group, 
neither efficiency of consistency is lost if estimates are obtained sepaxately for each 
group. In our case the laxgest group consists of 55 firms and 201 plants. This is still 
in the range feasible for a normal dummy variable regression, which is our strategy. 
In each group we can then estimate the fixed effects of each plant and firm except 
for one reference plant and firm: 
ai - a, - AR and ILi ---a-r'- ILR 
where a, is the reference plant and pR the reference firm. 
To examine the existence of MNE firm and plant effects as discussed in Section 3.6 
we regress these estimated fixed effects on MNE plant and firm dummies; i. e. for 
the firm effect: 
ever pi - a. - AR --: --, 
8MNEVer MNEj( )+ cit 
Can we hope that OMNE; F, ' ',, provides a consistent estimator of 
EjpjjMNEj"(j, 't') = 1} (B. 12) 
Only if we can assume that there is no systematic correlation between 11i + ai 
and MN 17 ... r j(i, t), However, this is unlikely 
because multinational firms are more likely 
to interact with other multinational firms or with domestic firms which have higher 
productivity so that ElIzi I 1} > Ejpjj0}. This would introduce a downward bias in 
our estimate Of MNEY, 'r' A similar axgument applies to our estimate of the MNE 
plant effect. Given the downwaxd bias we expect that regressions of B. 11 and the 
equivalent plant equation lead to lower MNE firm and MNE plant estimates than 
the results found in Section 3.6. 
Table B. 2 shows estimates of equation B. 11 in column 1 and the equivalent plant 
level equation in Column 2. All point estimates are lower than the comparable 
estimates in Section 3.6 and most effects are found to be non significant. Only the 
US plant effect is still significant at the 10 percent level (column 2, row 1), whereas 
The US firm effect estimate is now negative and significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Appendix C 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
C-1 The Community Innovation Survey 
C. 1.1 Cleaning the Community Innovation Survey 
Some vaxiables in the original CIS3 data axe missing. When possible we have tried 
to fill in these gaps in the data in several ways, using, when available, information 
from the CIS3 survey. 
e Exports: we have replaced missing with zero wherever the firm had answered 
that the enterprise's largest market was local, regional or national. 
* Laxgest market: if the firm has positive exports or declared we replace missing 
answers to the largest market with "international". 
We decided to drop all observations for which any of the following information 
remained missing: 
* All the indicators on innovative activity 
9 Innovative sales when the enterprise declares to be a product innovator 
For the regression analysis we also dropped observations for which any of the 
following information is missing: 
e Proportion of graduate employees 
o Enterprise's exporting activity 
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Table CA: Details of CIS2 and CIS3 samples 
(1) (2) 
CIS 2 CIS3 
I Number of sampled reporting units 5,892 19, ý62- 
2 Number of responding Reporting Units 2,339 8,172 
3 Number of sampled reporting units in service sector 1,986 8,622 
4 Number of responding Reporting Units in service sector 743 3,605 
5 Number of sampled Reporting Units in Production 3,906 10,980 
6 Number of responding Reporting Units in Production 1,596 4,567 
7 Number of Reporting Units in Manufacturing excluding sector 23 and Northern Ireland 1,405 3,347 
Notes: Production includes manufacturing; mining; electricity, gas and water; construction. Services Include 
distribution and services: wholesale trade except of motor vehicles; transport, storage and communication; 
financial intermediation and real estate, renting and business activities. Sector 23 is defined as "manufacturing of 
coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel". 
9 Estimated turnover due to new or improved products missing but firm declares 
to have product innovated. 
* observations that had missing or no innovative expenditure but had positive 
innovation outcomes. 
C. 1.2 The Community Innovation Survey Samples 
Table CA sets out the details the composition of the innovation surveys: from CIS2 
we have usable data on 2,339 respondents (Row 2, column 1) of which 1,596 in 
production (Row 6 column 1) and 743 in services (Row 4, column 1). For CIS3 the 
number of respondents is 8,172 (Row 2, column 2), of which 3,605 in the service 
sector (Row 4, column 2) and 4,567 in the production sectors (Row 6, column 2). 
C. 1.3 Survey Questions in CIS3 
9 MEASURES OF KNOWLEDGE OUTPUTS (AKi) 
Process Innovation During the three year period 1998-2000, did your en- 
terprise introduce any technologically new or improved processes for pro- 
ducing or supplying products which were new to your firm? 
Product Innovation During the three year period 1998-2000, did your en- 
terprise introduce any technologically new or significantly improved prod- 
ucts (goods or services) which were new to your firm? 
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% Turnover due to new and improved products Please estimate how 
your turnover in 2000 was distributed between products (goods or ser- 
vices) introduced during the period 1998-2000 which were: New to your 
firm + Significantly improved (%). 
Patent Protection During the period 1998-2000, please indicate the impor- 
tance to your enterprise of the following methods to protect innovations? 
Number of Patents How many patents, if any, did your enterprise apply 
for during the period 1998 to 2000? 
o MEASURES OF KNOWLEDGE INPUTS (Hi) 
R&D Personnel How many persons were involved in R&D activities within 
your enterprise in 2000 (in full time equivalents)? 
Proportion Scientists and Engineers Approximate proportion [of employ- 
ees] educated to degree level or above [in the fields of] science and engi- 
neering subjects 
Intramural R&D Please tick if expenditure in the category [of] Intramural 
research and experimental development (R&D); [and if so ticked], please 
estimate innovative expenditure in 2000, including personnel and related 
investment expenditures (no depreciation) 
MEASURES OF KNOWLEDGE FLOWS (K'). Sources of Information 
for Innovation Activities: "Please indicate the sources of knowledge or infor- 
mation used in your technological innovation activities, and their importance 
during the period 1998-2000. " 
We adopt two alternative method to construct variables that describe the in- 
formation flow to the firm. The groups considered axe reported below. ' The 
first method summarises information from the CIS according to the following 
criterion: the information flow variables take the maximum values between 
those reported in that particular group, normalized to one. This is our pre- 
ferred method. The second method follows Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) 
lNote that given minor differences between the two waves of the surveys we have to slightly 
modify the definitions of our variables accordingly. 
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and summarises information from the CIS according to the following criterion: 
the information flow variables take the average values between those reported 
in that particular group, normalized to one. 
Internal Information from Self Within the enterprise 
Internal Information from Group Other enterprises within the enterprise 
goup 
Vertical Information from Suppliers and Customers Suppliers of equip- 
ment, materials, components or software + Clients or customers 
Information from Competitors Competitors 
Commercial Information Consultants + Commercial laboratories / R&D 
enterprises 
Free Information Professional conferences, meetings + aade associations 
Technical/trade press, computer databases + Fairs, exhibitions 
Regulatory Information Technical standards + Environmental standards 
and regulations + Health and safety standards and regulations 
Information from Universities Universities or other higher education in- 
stitutes + Private reseaxch institutes Information from Government Gov- 
ernment reseaxch organisations; + Other public sector (e. g., Government 
Offices) 
Note that the question in CIS2 reads as follows: "How important to your 
enterprise axe the following as sources of information for new technological in- 
novation projects or for the completion of existing projects? " The information 
sources that have a slight different definitions in CIS2 axe the following: 
Information from Competitors Competitors + patent disclosures 
Commercial information Consultancy enterprises 
Information from universities Universities or other higher education in- 
stitutes+ Private non profit research institutes +Reseaxch associations 
or other independent Research and technology organisations 
227 
Table C. 2: CIS 2 and CIS3 panel 
(1) (2) 
_CIS 
2 CIS3 
1 Number of Reporting Units 2,339 8,172 
2 Number of Reporting Units in Manufacturing (exc. SIC 23 and NI) 1,453 3,425 
3 Number of reporting units in both surveys 787 
4 Number of reporting units in manufacturing In CIS2 and in CIS3 (exc. sector 23 and NI) 509 
Notest Sector 23 is defined as "manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel". NI: 
Northern Ireland. 
information from Government Government institutes+ Training and en- 
terprise councils+Business links 
* OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES 
Employment Number of employees [at the enterprise) (full time equivalents) 
Structural Change Did any of the following significant changes occur to 
your enterprise during the three year period 1998-2000? 
- Established: The enterprise was established 
- Merger: Turnover increased by at least 10% due to merger with 
another enterprise or part of it. 
- Sale or Closure: Turnover decreased by at least 10% due to sale or 
closure of paxt of the enterprise. 
C. 1.4 Constructing an innovation panel 
One of our aims is to construct an innovation panel, using information from CIS2 
and CIS3. The results of this exercise are reported in Table C. 1.4 
787 enterprises axe in both surveys. Some of them are recorded in the manufac- 
turing sector in CIS2 and in the service sector in CIS3. Since in CIS3 the survey is 
the same for both sector we decided to consider these enterprises as being part of the 
manufacturing sector if they are in the manufacturing sector according to the ARD. 
What information can we get from the panel? Although the gist of questionnaire 
for CIS2 and CIS3 is the same, the two questionnaires differ in several respects, 
so that the construction of an innovation panel needs some caution. Firstly the 
main questions and definitions of both product and process innovation differ. In 
paxticulax, the wording of the question on process innovation might lead to some 
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ambiguity: some firms might tend to report process innovations only if these were 
used for producing products which were new to the firm. Secondly, the CIS3 ques- 
tionnaire is the same for both production and service sector while CIS2 had two 
different questionnaires for services and production. Thirdly, in CIS2 an additional 
problem axises because companies can skip a part of the questionnaire by declaring 
that they have not engaged in any innovative activity and do not have any intention 
to start innovative projects in the next five yeaxs while there are no filter questions 
in CIS3. Fourth, the ordering and the general layout/editing of the questions in the 
survey differs. This matters if we believe that respondents get tired of answering 
the questionnaire and become less attentive towards the end of the questionnaire. 2 
20ther differences concern the question regarding public support for innovation in CIS3 distin- 
guishes between the source of the support (regional, central or European government), whereas in 
CIS2 the question entails a yes/no answer on whether the enterprise has received any central gov- 
ernment financial support. Also, the classification of innovation-related public programs slightly 
differs among the two surveys. Lastly, there axe differences in the lists of sources of information, 
in particular in CIS2 firms were asked whether patent disclosures constituted a valuable source of 
information for innovations, this questions has been excluded; whereas the questions on methods 
of innovation protection were added only in CIS3. 
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Appendix D 
Appendix to Chapter 5 
D. 1 Data Cleaning 
D. 1.1 Cleaning the ARD 
This section provides detail on how we cleaned the dataset and provide definitions 
for relevant variables. We cleaned the dataset according to the following criteria 
(partly following Hall and Mairesse ( '1995)). 
First, we have removed all observations for which growth of value added, em- 
ployment, capital and material inputs is missing. 
Second, we drop any observation for which the average annual growth rate in 
value added, gross output or material inputs was more than 300 percent or less than 
-90 percent. 
Third, we adopt a similar criterion for observations for which the average annual 
growth in labour and in capital is more than 200% or less than -50 percent. 
D. 1.2 Cleaning the Community Innovation Survey 
Table C. 1 in the Appendix to the previous chapter sets out the details the com- 
position of the Community Innovation surveys. The analysis in this chapter use 
the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) and only includes the manufactur- 
ing sectors, except for the manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel (Sector 23 of the 2-digit ISIC92 classification) because of the lack of 
deflators for the productivity measures in this sector. This leaves us with a sample 
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of 3,425 reporting units in CIS3 (Row 4, column 2 of Table C. 1). I also exclude 
businesses located in Northern Ireland, since ARD data for Northern Ireland was 
not made available. This leaves 3,347 in CIS3 (Row 8). 
D. 2 Variables definition 
Many of the vaxiables used in this chapter have been defined in Chapter 4. Below, 
I define the remaining vaxiables. 
Organisational innovation Did your enterprise make major changes in the fol- 
lowing areas of business structure and Practices during the period 1998-2000 
and how far did business performance improve as a result? Implementation 
of. new or significantly changed Corporate strategies or advanced management 
techniques or Organisational structures. 
Innovation expenditures/activity Did your enterprise engage in the following 
innovation activities in 2000? Please estimate innovative expenditure in 2000, 
including Personnel and related investment expenditures (no depreciation). 
Total Innovation expenditure is defined as follows: as reported, if the total 
figure is not missing or calculated as the sum of reported Intramural R&D + 
Acquisition of external R&D + Acquisition of machinery and equipment + 
Acquisition of other external knowledge + All design functions + Internal or 
external training + Internal or external marketing. 
Process Innovation During the three yeax period 1998-2000, did your enterprise 
introduce any technologically new or improved processes for producing or sup- 
plying products which were new to your firm? 
Novel Process Innovation During the three year period 1998-2000, did your en- 
terprise introduce any new or significantly Improved processes for producing 
or supplying products (goods or services) which were new to your industry? 
Product innovation During the three year period 1998-2000, did your enterprise 
introduce any technologically new or significantly improved products (goods 
or services) which were new to your firm? 
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turnover due to new and improved products Please estimate how your turnover 
in 2000 was distributed between products (goods or services) Introduced dur- 
ing the period 1998-2000 which were: New to your firm + Significantly im- 
proved (%) 
Novel Product Innovation During the three year period 1998-2000, did your en- 
terprise introduce any new or significantly Improved products (goods or ser- 
vices) which were also new to your enterprise's market? 
turnover due to novel product innovation Please estimate the shaxe of turnover 
of these (novel) products in 2000 
Public support for innovation Did your enterprise receive any public support 
(financial or other assistance and advice) for innovation-related activities in 
the period 1998-2000? 
Financial support What were the sources of this public support for innovation- 
related activities in the period 1998-2000? Financial Support from Local or 
regional government, Central government (including institutions working on 
behalf of central Government) or The European Union 
Non financial support Other Support from Local or regional government, Cen- 
tral government (including institutions working on behalf of central Govern- 
ment) or The European Union 
Export Dummy Is your enterprise's laxgest market? International or Either Ex- 
ports of goods in 1996 or 1998 positive. 
Protection methods During the period 1998-2000, please indicate the importance 
to your enterprise of the following Methods to protect innovations? 
Strategic Protection Complexity of design+ Lead-time advantage on competi- 
tors+ Secrecy 
Formal (legal) Protection Registration of design+ Trademarks+ Patents+ Con- 
fidentiality agreements+ Copyright 
Cooperation Did your enterprise have any co-operation arrangements on innova- 
tion activities with other Enterprises or institutions in 1998-2000? 
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D. 3 TFP growth calculations 
When calculating TFP growth, one incurs into issues related to the ARD being an 
unbalanced panel. To understand this issue consider figure DA: 
Figure D. 1: Calculating TFP growth 
f 
0m 
N11,0 
m 
b 
d 
Before 
During 
After 
There are three main issues: timing, measurement and the treatment of missing 
observations. 
First, timing. Suppose there is no mismeasurement and no missing observations. 
If the innovation produces immediate effects on TFP then the appropriate measure 
would seem to be period d less period c. Against this, the effect might not be 
immediate, in which case one might want to look at periods e or f against period c, 
b or a. Equally, the question asks about an innovation at any time during 1998-2000, 
in which case one might want to compare period c with 'during' observations, or 
either of these and period d. 
Second, TFP is likely to be mismeasured, in which case one would not like to 
rely on single observations but rather take an average, say averaging a, b and c, 
and d, e and f and measuring the difference between the averaged observations. 
In the diagram above for example, it might be that innovation does indeed raise 
productivity but periods c and d axe subject to upward and downward measurement 
error respectively, in which case averaging would give a better picture. Note however, 
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this might induce bias against finding any impact of the innovation if the effect on 
TFP is immediate and the averaging period is lengthy. Finally, with unbalanced 
panels due to sampling it is often the case that firms are not present for all three 
years, in which case one has to decide over which firms to average and how to 
annualise. We took the view that measurement problems means that averaging is 
desirable. Hence we did the following. Where all observations a to f were available, 
we averaged real outputs and real inputs a to c and d to f, then took logs and then 
calculated TFP growth, using 
n 
A In TFP =A (ri - pj) -E 9jAxj 
j=i 
where the averaged shares axe average a to c, plus average d to f, divided by 2. 
A In TFP is converted into an annual growth rate, in this example, by dividing by 3 
(there being 3 years between observation d and c). We take logs, even though they 
do not necessarily measure growth rates, since theory indicates a relation between 
changes in log outputs and share weighted changes in log inputs. 
Third, missing observations. Where not all observations of inputs and outputs 
axe available, we calculate averages only for years where all inputs and outputs 
are present and convert AInTFP into an annual growth rate by dividing by the 
interval between the averaged observations after and before. If 9j is negative for 
a firm, we replace it by the average for the 4-digit industry, since we believe that 
output elasticities axe better measured in this way rather than assuming firms with 
negative shocks, or measurement problems, have negative elasticities. Finally, we 
experimented, using these same methods, with changes in TFP calculated as changes 
between before and after, during and after and before and during. 
There axe two further issues, raised by the presence of missing observations. 
Assume that macro shocks shift TFP for all firms to low levels giving period b and 
high levels giving period e. Suppose there axe two identical firms one of whom is 
observed in periods a and f, and one in period b and e. The macro shock introduces 
a spurious difference between them. To deal with this we entered time dummies for 
all periods over which firms axe observed, thus removing the common element of 
TFP growth across all firms observed in a given year. 
Formally, therefore, annualized TFP growth is calculated as follows: 
n 
A In TFP A ri PI E=sjAxj where: 
j=i 
I 
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T2 T T2 T 
E (ri-pj)t ý (ri-PAt E xt ý Xt A (ri _ pI) = 9ýt2 - t=tl ; At = 
t=t2 
- 
t=tl 
E sit 
72 71 72 TI 
and sj T- , 1+7; ý 
Small letters denote logarithms., r, and 7-2 are the total number of years in which 
a firm is surveyed during the time periods before and after. is the total number of 
periods the firm is observed during the before and after periods. 
D. 4 Additional results 
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Table D. 1: Estimates of the knowledge production: novel innovations 
(2) (3) (4) 
dep. var novel products novel process 
In(employment) -0.0009 0.0010 0.0057 0.0059 
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0030)* (0.0049) 
In(age) -0.0031 -0.0006 0.0072 0.0098 
(0.0030) (0.0036) (0-0055) (0.0088) 
Aged,,,. my -0.0009 -0.0016 -0-0162 -0.0215 
(0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0082)** (0.0134) 
Exporter 0.0150 0.0112 -0-0027 -0.0061 
(0.0050)*** (0.0059)* (0-0088) (0.0137) 
group -0.0089 -0.0096 -0.0118 -0.0196 
(0.0045)** (0.0050)* (0.0075) (0.0115)* 
mneUK 0.0230 0.0124 0.0378 0.0434 
(0.0075)*** (0.0084) (0.0219)* (0.0287) 
foreign 0.0184 0.0097 0.0130 0.0291 
(0.0072)** (0.0081) (0.0160) (0.0254) 
non financial support -0.0009 -0.0106 0.0268 0.0419 
(0.0074) (0.0086) (0.0198) (0.0297) 
cooperation 0.0164 0.0147 0.0466 0.0515 
(0.0044)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0143)*** (0.0189)*** 
Info from plant 0.0562 0.0538 0.0937 0.1257 
(0.0069)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0194)*** 
Info from group 0.0032 0.0034 0.0023 0.0061 
(0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0110) (0.0163) 
vertical Info 0.0231 0.0279 0.0256 0.0481 
(0.0077)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0143)* (0.0216)** 
Info from competitors -0.0068 -0.0166 -0-0423 -0.0742 
(0.0071) (0.0082)** (0.0140)*** (0.0214)*** 
Commercial Info -0.0034 -0.0031 0.0102 0.0174 
(0.0071) (0.0080) (0.0131) (0.0199) 
Ree Info 0.0100 0.0038 0.0222 0.0183 
(0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0139) (0.0215) 
Info from regulation 0.0031 0.0123 -0.0006 0.0185 
(0.0065) (0.0075)* (0-0125) (0.0189) 
Info from universities 0.0101 0.0114 0.0052 0.0237 
(0.0080) (0.0091) (0.0145) (0.0221) 
Info from government -0.0069 -0.0019 -0.0117 -0.0324 
(0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0158) (0.0238) 
Innovation expenditure/total sales 0.0711 0.0435 0.1512 -0.0477 
(0.0214)*** (0.0299) (0.0349)*** (0.1006) 
Observations 2598 1905 2555 1818 
Notes: In columns 1 and 21 report the conditional marginal effects of a tobit equation, with as 
dependent variable the proportion of sales accounted for by novel products (new the market). In 
columns 3 and 41 report the marginal effects of a probit equation with dependent variable a 
binary variable that is one if the firm has introduced a process innovation which is new to the 
industry. In columns 1 and 31 use the innovation expenditure variable as reported in the survey, 
in columns 2 and 41 use Innovation expenditure calculated from the estimates of equation 5.15. 
Regressors included in all columns but not reported in the table axe: 3 indicators for structural 
change (startup, merger and closure), 10 regional dummies and 3-digit industry dummies. 
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Table D. 2: Estimates of the R&D investment equation 
(1) 
level 
(2) 
propensity 
(3) 
level 
(4) 
propensity 
In(employment) 0.2408 0.1109 0.2213 OAM11 
(0.1292)* (0.0691) (0.1348) (0.0704) 
1n(MKTsharej, t-j) -0.3439 -0.0863 -0.3521 -0.0596 
(0.1081)*** (0-0596) (0.1136)*** (0.0600) 
In(age) -0.1153 0.0350 -0.0945 0.0269 
(0.1172) (0-0682) (0.1208) (0.0710) 
Aged. mmy 
0.0943 0.0470 0.0826 0.1095 
(0.1911) (0.1160) (0.1923) (0.1206) 
Exportdummy -0.0010 0.3969 -0.0223 0.3098 
(0.2213) (0.0999)*** (0.2223) (0.1058)*** 
group -0.2311 -0-0409 -0.2836 -0.0806 
(0.1486) (0.0926) (0.1467)* (0.0956) 
mneUK 0.0526 0.2979 0.0196 0.2619 
(0.2219) (0.1291)** (0.2181) (0.1304)** 
foreign -0.0228 0.4453 -0.0646 0.4806 
(0.2062) (0.1289)*** (0.2026) (0.1314)*** 
financial support 0.6799 0.7318 
(0.1849)*** (0.1876)*** 
formal protection 0.3065 0.3280 0.1842 -vv' 0.1076 
(0.2180) (0.1275)** (0.2118) (0.1318) 
strategic protection 0.4085 1.1466 0.1617 0.8375 
(0.2942) (0.1299)*** (0.2547) (0.1412)*** 
%scientists&engineers 2.1251 0.9062 1.8666 0.4803 
(0.5071)*** (0.3571)** (0.5216)*** (0.3573) 
%othergraduates 0.8264 0.1597 0.7688 0.1298 
(0.6070) (0-3455) (0.6147) (0.3345) 
Inf ofrornCornpetitor84diq, S)496 0.5668 -0-0136 0.5958 -0.0015 
(0.4976) (0.2803) (0.4975) (0.2845) 
Herfindahl4dig, t-l 76.6209 -28.7249 90.6908 -24.3421 
(28.8200)*** (14.8506)* (30.7710)*** (15.7407) 
Agros8OUtPUt4dig, 98-00 -0.1638 -0.0457 -0.1416 0.0233 
(0.1609) (0.0990) (0.1642) (0.1013) 
Info from plant 0.6149 0.8863 
(0.2942)** (0.1444)*** 
Info from group 0.3257 -0.2475 
(0.2046) (0.1422)* 
vertical Info 0.0804 0.0524 
(0.2945) (0.1754) 
Info from competitors -0.0900 -0.3163 
(0.2496) (0.1608)** 
Commercial Info 0.2468 0.7244 
(0.2597) (0.1622)*** 
free Info -0.0593 0.3787 
(0.2647) (0.1789)** 
Info from regulation 0.1236 -0.1281 
(0.2265) (0.1517) 
Info from universities -0.1750 0.5710 
(0.2706) (0.1862)*** 
Info from government -0.2014 -0.3284 
(0.2941) (0.2010) 
Notesi Number of observations is 1849 in all columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing 
correlation between unobservables for plants in the same firm. Columns 2 and 4 report estimated coefficients of 
the propensity to innovate equation. Columns 1 and 3 report the estimated coefficients of the level of investment, 
conditional on having invested. Regressors included in all columns but not reported In the table are: 3 indicators 
for structural change (startup, merger and closure), 10 regional dummies and 3-digit industry dummies. 
Appendix E 
Appendix to Chapter 6 
E. 1 Variables description 
Wages The Federal Employment Office requires plants to report any beginning and 
end of an employment relationship which is covered by social security. Employers 
have to provide information on ongoing relationships at the 31 of December every 
year. For each wage spell, the duration of which is calculated in calendar days, I 
observe the average daily wage and I deflate wages using the Consumer Price Index, 
with 1995 as the basis year. The exact individual wage in DM is reported, only for 
group with high wages the wages reported axe censored. The defined threshold, the 
contribution assessment ceiling of the social insurance system, varies from yeax to 
yeax. 
This limitation is not a serious problem for our sample: less than 1.5 % of all 
wage observations are top-coded. 
The education group mostly affected by censoring are the university graduates, 
for them the percentage of censored wage observations becomes 11.7% and increases 
with yeaxs spent in the labour maxket with a peak of 25% at the 10th yeax of 
experience. 
Size of plant This vaxiable is defined as the number of employees as the 1st of 
June of each year. It is derived from the original 1% sample dataset. 
Size Categories I have used different classification for the size categories accord- 
ing to the particulax matter investigated. A first broader classification distinguishes 
among small (<100 employees), medium (100 to 1000 employees) and big (>1000 
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Table E. 1: Incidence of top coding for University graduate by year of experience 
mean Std. dev. Obs 
1 2.035 14.122 3685 
2 5.084 21.970 4445 
3 6.046 23.836 4350 
4 7.845 26.891 4130 
5 9.747 29.664 3755 
6 13.302 33.964 3383 
7 16.364 37.002 2866 
8 18.573 38.897 2369 
9 22.233 41.592 2015 
10 24.045 42.748 1701 
employees) plants. I then used a more detailed classification that includes 5 cat- 
egories: 1-4 employees, 5-19 employees, 20-99 employees, 100-999 employees, and 
more than 1000. A further classification includes 8 categories: 1 employee, 2-10 
Work experience I define actual work experience as the number of years 
(weeks) worked full-time from the year of labour maxket entry onwards. Hence, 
I assume that a worker doesn't accumulate any work experience while he holds a 
part-time job. Given the nature of the data, a problem arise with work experience 
acquired while self-employed or in the civil service, since these spells are not ob- 
served. Moreover I assume that apprentices only start cumulating experience after 
the end of their apprenticeship. 
Tenure Tenure can be precisely measured by adding up the number of years 
(weeks) the worker was employed at the same plant, since plants must report the 
date the worker joined the firm as well as the date the worker left the firm, the 
measure of tenure is computed very precisely. 
Education groups I mainly distinguish 3 education groups: "unskilled", "skilled" 
and "graduates". In fact, I aggregate from 5 categories: no formal education, some 
vocational education, vocational qualification, polytechnic degree and university de- 
gree. 
The first group, "unskilled" includes: workers with no formal education and 
workers with some vocational education. I define workers with no formal education, 
those who never had a placement with a firm neither did an apprenticeship and 
do not hold any polytechnic or university degree. More precisely, unskilled workers 
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were never reported as apprentices or as doing jobs for which a tertiary education 
degree was necessary. Workers with some vocational education, are workers who did 
some work placement with a firm but they have not completed an apprenticeship 
and were never classified as university or polytechnic graduates in any of the jobs 
they held. 
The second group are the "skilled": workers who are reported as apprentice 
(Praktikant) in one company for at least 700 days, and workers with a work place- 
ment, if the work placement lasted 1 year or more and at least in half of the jobs 
the worker held he was recorded as a worker with a completed apprenticeship. Only 
spells after completion of the apprenticeship training are considered in the analysis. 
The third group includes Fachhochschule graduates, workers who were recorded 
in at least one jobs -as polytechnic graduates, but never as university graduates and 
university graduates, worker who were employed at least once in a job that classified 
them as university graduates. The difference between this last two categories lies in 
the duration of the course, with the university courses lasting longer, and in the more 
practical content of a Fachhochschule curriculum in respect to a more theoretical one 
of the university degree. Only wage spells after graduation axe used in the analysis. 
Occupational Group This variable describes the field of occupational special- 
ization of an employee. I aggregate the very detailed information available in the 
data (269 categories) up to include 11 occupational groups. 
9 Miners 
9 Row materials and Intermediate Goods Producers 
* Consumption Goods Producers 
o Builders: main building 
* Builders: renovation 
o Installation and maintenance of machinery 
9 Planning and Organisation, Laboratory Technicians 
9 Administration 
9 Qualified Administrative and Managers 
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* Qualified services providers 
* Simple Services provides 
9 Infrastructural tasks 
Marital Status This dummy variable is equal to one if the worker is married 
Number of past displacements I calculate this variable as the total number 
of times a worker, has lost his job because of plant closure, before the current job. I 
define a plant closure if a plant is recorded as having zero employees (and does not 
reappear in the sample). 
Regional location This variable aggregates the 142 administrative districts 
(Kreis) of the Federal Employment Services in Western Germany in 11 regional 
units (Laender). 
Industry Classification This variable defines the specific industry to which 
the employing establishment belongs to. The data contains information at a very 
detailed level (85 categories). I exclude from our analysis the agricultural sector 
and I aggregate the other indsutries in the following categories: 
9 Energy, mining, water 
o Chemical industry 
o Metal industry, machines 
9 Electro, technical industry, automobiles 
9 optical industry, fine mechanics 
9 wood, printing, paper 
9 leather, textiles, food 
e construction, carpentry 
o trade 
o traffic, news 
o credit and insurance 
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9 services 
9 charities and public services 
Past Growth Given the definition of size, I include the growth variable as the 
difference in log size between (t-1) and (t-2). 
Age of the firm This variable is strongly censored: I know the exact date 
of "birth" for those plants which have been built after 1977, therefore I can only 
observe the exact age of the plant that have not been in business more than 18 years. 
This, I believed has flowed my analysis as far the wage age relationship is concerned. 
When I created age categories for the plants, I included those observations that were 
left censored in the category of plants "15 years or older". 
E. 2 Graphical description of model 
Figure E. 1: Previous models 
Wage 
ability 
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Figure E. 2: A compaxative Advantage Model: Gibbons and Katz, 1992 
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Figure E. 3: The model: a graphical intuition 
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